Suchergebnisse

In light of the discrepancy between Britain's and France's postcolonial security roles in Africa, which seemed already determined half a decade after independence, this book studies the making of the postcolonial security relationship during the transfer of power and the early years of independence (1958-1966). It focuses on West Africa, and more specificially the newly independent states of Nigeria and Cãote d'Ivoire, which rapidly evolved into key players in the postcolonial struggle for Africa.

Preliminary Material -- Introduction -- A World in Motion -- Anglo-Swiss Relations 1945–1949 -- Vampires 'off the Shelf' -- 'Homemade' Vampires? -- Intermediate Conclusion I -- A Divided and Unstable World -- Anglo-Swiss Relations 1949–1953 -- Engines and Venoms -- Centurion I -- Intermediate Conclusion II -- A World in Tension -- Anglo-Swiss Relations 1953–1958 -- Centurion II -- Hunter -- Conclusion -- Appendices -- Bibliography -- Index.

Marco Wyss examines the extensive Anglo-Swiss armaments relationship between 1945 and 1958 in light of their bilateral relations, and thereby assesses the role of arms transfers, neutrality and Britain, as well as the two countries' relationship during the Cold War.

In the wake of decolonization, Britain wanted to maintain its strategic interests in Nigeria and to keep the newly independent African country in the Western orbit. Having abrogated a defense agreement in reaction to Nigerian domestic opposition, the British government counted on military assistance to secure its postcolonial security role. The British thus hoped to gain responsibility for the buildup of a Nigerian air force, which the authorities in Lagos wished to establish for national prestige and protection against potential enemies such as Ghana. The Nigerians, however, first tried to secure the requisite assistance from Commonwealth countries other than Britain before opting for a West German air force mission. The Nigerian government aimed to reduce its dependence on Britain and thereby burnish its neutralist credentials. Yet London was challenged by a Western version of neutralism, similar to Western neutrality, because the Nigerians never attempted to approach the Soviet bloc about military assistance.

In the wake of decolonization, Britain wanted to maintain its strategic interests in Nigeria and to keep the newly independent African country in the Western orbit. Having abrogated a defense agreement in reaction to Nigerian domestic opposition, the British government counted on military assistance to secure its postcolonial security role. The British thus hoped to gain responsibility for the buildup of a Nigerian air force, which the authorities in Lagos wished to establish for national prestige and protection against potential enemies such as Ghana. The Nigerians, however, first tried to secure the requisite assistance from Commonwealth countries other than Britain before opting for a West German air force mission. The Nigerian government aimed to reduce its dependence on Britain and thereby burnish its neutralist credentials. Yet London was challenged by a Western version of neutralism, similar to Western neutrality, because the Nigerians never attempted to approach the Soviet bloc about military assistance.

In Nigeria, Britain asserted its post-colonial security role during and immediately after the transfer of power, and remained responsible for assisting the Nigerian armed forces. While the Americans recognized Nigeria's potential as an important partner in the Cold War, they preferred to focus on development aid. Washington was thus supposed to complement British assistance, while leaving the responsibility for the security sector to London. But with the escalation of the Cold War in Africa, the Nigerians' efforts to reduce their dependency on the United Kingdom, and Nigeria's growing significance for the United States in African affairs, this Anglo-American burden-sharing was increasingly questioned in Washington. The United States thus eventually decided to militarize its aid policy towards Nigeria. In analysing the militarization of US aid policy towards Nigeria, this article will, first, assess the Anglo-American relationship in the early 1960s; secondly, position Nigeria in American Cold War policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa; thirdly, question the role of military assistance in Washington's policy towards Nigeria and Africa; and fourthly, discover the regional and local factors that influenced policy-makers in Washington and London.

Since the late 1990s, French policymakers have promised an indirect approach to African security in partnership with regional organisations. Yet this shift towards capacity-building, Africanization and multilateralization has not necessarily been followed, and forceful French military interventions in Africa have still taken place. This article thus aims to assess whether, to what extent, and why the theoretical convergence of France's African security policy and the peacekeeping aspirations of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) does not necessarily translate into practice. Through the analysis of the evolution of France's African security policy and ECOWAS' peacekeeping record, the French capacity-building efforts in West Africa, and the roles of France and ECOWAS in the Ivorian and Malian crises, this article will show that convergence in practice depends on the nature of an individual crisis, as well as the political, strategic, and economic interests of both France and ECOWAS member states.

As the recent and current French military interventions in West Africa have illustrated, France succeeded in establishing long-lasting security relationships with its former colonies during the transfer of power. In Britain's case, by contrast, decolonisation was largely followed by military withdrawal. This was not, however, for lack of trying. The episode of the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Agreement clearly illustrates that Britain, driven by its global cold war military strategy, wanted to secure its long-term interests in sub-Saharan Africa. The agreement was first welcomed by the Nigerian elite, which was not only anglophile and anti-communist, but also wanted British military assistance for the build-up of its armed forces. Yet, in Nigeria, the defence pact was faced with mounting opposition, and decried as a neo-colonial scheme. Whereas this first allowed the Nigerian leaders to extract strategic, material and financial concessions from Britain, it eventually led to the abrogation of the agreement. Paradoxically, Britain's cold war grand strategy created not only the need for the agreement, but also to abrogate it. In the increasingly global East-West struggle, the agreement was strategically desirable, but politically counterproductive.