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Previous findings on punishment have focused on deterministic environments in which the outcomes are known with certainty. In this article, we conduct experiments to investigate how punishment affects cooperation in stochastic social dilemmas where each person can decide whether to cooperate, when the outcomes of alternative strategies are specified probabilistically. Two types of punishment mechanisms are studied: (1) an unrestricted punishment mechanism—both persons can punish—and (2) a restricted punishment mechanism—only cooperators can punish noncooperators. We compare behavior in a two-person deterministic prisoner's dilemma game (DPD) with a two-person stochastic prisoner's dilemma (SPD). In all treatments, participants are given information on the other person's actions. We find that in both games, the restricted punishment mechanism promotes more cooperative behavior than unrestricted punishment. However, the difference in the degree of effectiveness between the two mechanisms is smaller in the SPD game than in the DPD game because noncooperative behavior is less likely to be punished when there is outcome uncertainty. Our findings provide useful information for designing efficient incentive mechanisms to induce cooperation in a stochastic social dilemma environment.

In a typical laboratory 'Investment Game' experiment, participants' endowments are provided by the experimenter; thus, the worst case for the investor is that she loses all of her 'found' money. By contrast, in naturally occurring environments, investment decisions can often lead to a loss of one's own money. This paper investigates whether 'trust' found in one-shot anonymous laboratory interaction is robust to 'own money' environments. Our results show that, consistent with previous investment game results, most investors send a positive amount, and most trustees return at least the transfer amount, regardless of whether the investors purchase or are gifted their endowment. However, investments are on average lower when participants use their own money, and the fraction of maximum investments (the most 'risky' investment decision) is only half as large under 'own money' as it is under gifted endowments. Our results explain why one should exercise caution in placing trust in any government's ability to spend other people's money prudently. Adapted from the source document.