Suchergebnisse

AbstractMotivated by the fact that many e‐tailers offer online rebates through cashback websites to attract more consumers, and wield channel leadership, we construct a retailer‐Stackelberg supply chain comprised of one e‐tailer, one manufacturer, and one cashback website. Cashback websites have two commission formats: sharing and fixed. We first explore the online rebate strategy of the e‐tailer (under the two commission formats); and then study the e‐tailer's commission format selection strategy when offering rebates. Our analysis reveals that: (i) the product valuation and fraction of low‐end consumers play key roles in shaping the e‐tailer's online rebate and commission format selection strategies; (ii) the e‐tailer's rebates increase the wholesale price under sharing commission, but decrease it under fixed commission; (iii) the e‐tailer's rebates may be a trap for consumers because they may pay a higher retail price after rebates; (iv) under both commissions, the e‐tailer's rebates hurt the manufacturer, but could enhance supply chain performance; and (v) when offering rebates, low‐end consumers and the manufacturer are better off under sharing commission if its product valuation is sufficiently low, while high‐end consumers are better off under fixed commission. Additionally, the e‐tailer has a stronger incentive to provide rebates when the manufacturer acts as the leader; temporary rebate promotion may lead to a triple win situation for the manufacturer, e‐tailer, and consumers.

AbstractConsumers are affected by the relative sizes of products' sales volumes, which is regarded as consumers' sales comparison behavior when purchasing online. Therefore, some firms manipulate their sales volumes to attract consumers. To shed light on firms' sales manipulation, we develop game theoretical models to investigate sales manipulation strategies for a high‐quality firm and a low‐quality firm on a platform. We identify conditions for firms' sales manipulation and investigate its impact on the platform. We find the following: (1) A small amount of sales manipulation volumes may harm each firm. (2) When only the high‐quality (low‐quality) firm manipulates its sales volume, the total market share shrinks (expands), and the profit of the low‐quality (high‐quality) firm is damaged. In this case, the platform can only benefit from the high‐quality firm's sales manipulation. When both firms manipulate sales volumes, each firm aims to claim a higher sales volume than its competitor. (3) At equilibrium, when the unit sales manipulation cost is intermediate, only the high‐quality firm manipulates its sales volume. When the unit sales manipulation cost is low, both firms manipulate sales volumes and consequently get trapped in a Prisoner's Dilemma. In this case, the platform's profit cannot be improved. This study then incorporates considerations of consumers' sales comparison behavior, nonlinear cost structures for sales manipulation, firms' long‐term vision, and sales manipulation strategy in competitive supply chains to reveal that most aforementioned results are qualitatively robust.

ABSTRACTWe study the distribution channel decision of a manufacturer who considers whether to add an online channel (direct channel) to its brick‐and‐mortar retailer (indirect channel). The retailer faces the opportunity to invest in store assistance to help consumers choose products and thus reduce product returns. Special attention is given to the impact of product returns and retailer's store assistance investment on manufacturer's dual channel decision. We examine conditions under which the manufacturer uses dual channels and how various relevant factors affect its channel decision under two settings, depending on whether the retailer has its own online store or not. When the retailer does not have its online store, we find that (i) the addition of the direct channel raises the wholesale price; (ii) the direct channel addition hurts the retailer if the nonreplacement rate is low; (iii) the manufacturer has a lower incentive to add the direct channel when the retailer's service cost is lower or its returns reduction rate from service investment is higher; and (iv) the manufacturer should treat its own returns handling cost as a key factor in its channel structure decision. In addition, when the retailer operates an online store, we find that the manufacturer may have an incentive to add a direct channel such that both firms own direct channels.

ABSTRACTIn this article, we consider distribution channel strategies for an incumbent manufacturer who produces two complementary products and must determine whether or not to have another company to sell its products. We identify factors that affect the manufacturer's motivation to use dual‐channel distribution. Our results show that both complementarity between complements and product substitutability between firms influence the manufacturer's channel strategy. We find that if the potential entrant does not produce the complement of the primary product, a higher complementary effect for the complement will weaken the motivation of the incumbent to add an indirect channel. We also find that the incumbent has a stronger incentive to add the indirect channel when a product's substitutability is high. Furthermore, we show that when the two channels have the same pricing power, the incumbent has a stronger incentive to sell through the indirect channel in a higher pricing power environment.

ABSTRACTThis article examines production and outsourcing decisions for two manufacturers that produce partially substitutable products and play a strategic game with quantity competition. When both manufacturers outsource key components to the same upstream supplier, their products become more substitutable due to the increased commonality of the products. In addition, outsourcing may create better consumer perception about the product if the manufacturers choose reputable suppliers with better brand or quality. We explicitly model the substitutability change and the brand/quality effect and provide conditions under which the manufacturers should outsource the components to a supplier. We present the subgame perfect Nash equilibriums for the situation in which there is only one supplier and the case in which two suppliers compete with each other in the upstream supply chain. Numerical examples are presented to illustrate the findings.