A screening perspective on experimental zones
In: China economic review, Band 77, S. 101881
ISSN: 1043-951X
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In: China economic review, Band 77, S. 101881
ISSN: 1043-951X
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 53, Heft 4, S. 703-732
ISSN: 1756-2171
AbstractWe study sequential auctions as optimal mechanisms for selling multiple heterogeneous items to unit‐demand buyers. We find that as long as the items can be ordered in decreasing variation of the buyers' values, any combination of static standard auctions in this sequence achieves full efficiency and the constrained optimal revenue, subject to (BIC), (IIR), and the all‐sold constraint. In addition, with increasing threshold types and optimal static reserve prices, any l‐th price auctions in the same sequence can achieve the optimal revenue subject to (BIC) and (IIR). Our results have implications for practical auction design, such as sponsored search auctions.
In: China Economic Review, Forthcoming
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In: RAND Journal of Economics, Forthcoming
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In: Theoretical Economics, forthcoming
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In: Johns Hopkins Carey Business School Research Paper No. 18-07
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In: Review of Economic Design, Band 18, Heft 1
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In: Johns Hopkins Carey Business School Research Paper No. 21-14
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In: STOTEN-D-24-06513
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