This case illustrates how a mixed-methods approach facilitates the study of social interactions at the individual level. Using the case of the diffusion of a new crop in rural villages, it describes the collection and analyses of the data reflecting farmers' adoption behavior and the data representing the social networks in which adoption takes place. It is often challenging to obtain a workable complete dataset of micro-level behavioral data and social network data. This case shows how to collect these data in an approach with pragmatic strategies that use primary and secondary research jointly. Specifically, it illustrates the collection of the data of various ascribed social relationships using interviews and pre-existing documents and the data of adoption behavior using questionnaire and historical records.
Verfügbarkeit an Ihrem Standort wird überprüft
Dieses Buch ist auch in Ihrer Bibliothek verfügbar:
In the literature, debate around environmental federalism is lasting and inconclusive. China has followed the global tendency of decentralization and has adopted a de facto environmental federalism. In this broad and diverse country, local knowledge and expertise is necessary to develop proper solutions for many environmental problems with local and regional nature. However, despite the adopted de facto environmental federalism, dramatic environmental crises and policy failures widespread in China. In particular, more recently, this country has seen arise many problems predicted by the opponents of decentralization. It appears that, contrary to the fiscal decentralization which has been a "helping hand" in resource mobilization and economic growth at the sub-national level, the decentralization of environmental policy implementation has rather been a "grabbing hand" in environmental management. With the purpose of providing a better and detailed understanding of the de facto environmental federalism in China, this thesis follows the different critics in the literature and test empirically for each of them in the Chinese-specific context. In summary, empirical results found in this thesis support the existence of problems related to environmental externality, strategic interaction and politically incentivized environment-sacrificing behaviors. Moreover, the current fiscal decentralization is likely to strengthen the capital-competition driven inter-provincial interaction; fiscal imbalance is more environmentally detrimental in poor provinces. These findings call for a "new environmental federalism" and a reform of incentives, in order to transform the Chinese de facto environmental federalism from a "grabbing hand" to a "helping hand" for better environmental governance. ; Dans la littérature, les débats autour du fédéralisme environnemental sont persistants et non-concluants. La Chine a poursuivi la tendance globale de la décentralisation et adopté un de facto fédéralisme environnemental. Dans ce pays vaste et ...
China's actual fiscal decentralization is one-sided: while public expenditures are largely decentralized, fiscal revenues are recentralized after 1994. One critical consequence of the actual system is the creation of significant fiscal imbalances at sub-national level. This paper investigates empirically effects of fiscal imbalances on environmental performance of Chinese provinces. First, environmental efficiency scores of Chinese provinces are calculated with SFA for the period from 2005 to 2010. Then, these scores are regressed against two fiscal imbalance indicators in a second stage model. Finally, conditional EE scores are calculated. This paper finds that effects of fiscal imbalances on EE are nonlinear and conditional on economic development level. Fiscal imbalances are more detrimental to environment in less developed provinces. These results suggest that the one-sided fiscal decentralization in China may have regressive environmental effects and contribute to regional disparity in terms of sustainable development.
In the literature, debate around environmental federalism is lasting and inconclusive. China has followed the global tendency of decentralization and has adopted a de facto environmental federalism. In this broad and diverse country, local knowledge and expertise is necessary to develop proper solutions for many environmental problems with local and regional nature. However, despite the adopted de facto environmental federalism, dramatic environmental crises and policy failures widespread in China. In particular, more recently, this country has seen arise many problems predicted by the opponents of decentralization. It appears that, contrary to the fiscal decentralization which has been a "helping hand" in resource mobilization and economic growth at the sub-national level, the decentralization of environmental policy implementation has rather been a "grabbing hand" in environmental management. With the purpose of providing a better and detailed understanding of the de facto environmental federalism in China, this thesis follows the different critics in the literature and test empirically for each of them in the Chinese-specific context. In summary, empirical results found in this thesis support the existence of problems related to environmental externality, strategic interaction and politically incentivized environment-sacrificing behaviors. Moreover, the current fiscal decentralization is likely to strengthen the capital-competition driven inter-provincial interaction; fiscal imbalance is more environmentally detrimental in poor provinces. These findings call for a "new environmental federalism" and a reform of incentives, in order to transform the Chinese de facto environmental federalism from a "grabbing hand" to a "helping hand" for better environmental governance. ; Dans la littérature, les débats autour du fédéralisme environnemental sont persistants et non-concluants. La Chine a poursuivi la tendance globale de la décentralisation et adopté un de facto fédéralisme environnemental. Dans ce pays vaste et diversifié, connaissances et compétences locales sont nécessaires pour développer des solutions appropriées pour de nombreux problèmes environnementaux souvent avec une nature locale ou régionale. Cependant, malgré le de facto fédéralisme environnemental adopté, crises environnementales dramatiques et échecs de la politique sont répandus en Chine. En particulier, plus récemment, ce pays a vu apparaître de nombreux problèmes prédits par les opposants à la décentralisation. Il semble que, contrairement à la décentralisation fiscale qui a été un "coup de main" dans la mobilisation des ressources et la croissance économique au niveau sous-national, la décentralisation de l'application de la politique environnementale a plutôt été une "main saisissant" dans la gestion environnementale. Dans le but de fournir une compréhension meilleure et détaillée du de facto fédéralisme environnemental en Chine, cette thèse suit les différents critiques dans la littérature et teste empiriquement pour chacun d'eux dans le contexte spécifique chinois. En résumé, les résultats empiriques trouvés dans cette thèse soutiennent l'existence de problèmes liés à l'externalité environnementale, à l'interaction stratégique et aux incitations politiques qui conduisent au compromis de l'environnement. Par ailleurs, la décentralisation budgétaire en cours est susceptible de renforcer les interactions interprovinciales conduites par la concurrence pour capitaux; le déséquilibre fiscal est plus préjudiciable à l'environnement dans les provinces pauvres. Ces résultats appellent à un "nouveau fédéralisme environnemental" et une réforme des incitations, afin de transformer le de facto fédéralisme environnemental chinois d'une "main saisissant" à un "coup de main" pour une meilleure gouvernance environnementale.
In the literature, debate around environmental federalism is lasting and inconclusive. China has followed the global tendency of decentralization and has adopted a de facto environmental federalism. In this broad and diverse country, local knowledge and expertise is necessary to develop proper solutions for many environmental problems with local and regional nature. However, despite the adopted de facto environmental federalism, dramatic environmental crises and policy failures widespread in China. In particular, more recently, this country has seen arise many problems predicted by the opponents of decentralization. It appears that, contrary to the fiscal decentralization which has been a "helping hand" in resource mobilization and economic growth at the sub-National level, the decentralization of environmental policy implementation has rather been a "grabbing hand" in environmental management. With the purpose of providing a better and detailed understanding of the de facto environmental federalism in China, this thesis follows the different critics in the literature and test empirically for each of them in the Chinese-Specific context. In summary, empirical results found in this thesis support the existence of problems related to environmental externality, strategic interaction and politically incentivized environment-Sacrificing behaviors. Moreover, the current fiscal decentralization is likely to strengthen the capital-Competition driven inter-Provincial interaction; fiscal imbalance is more environmentally detrimental in poor provinces. These findings call for a "new environmental federalism" and a reform of incentives, in order to transform the Chinese de facto environmental federalism from a "grabbing hand" to a "helping hand" for better environmental governance. ; Dans la littérature, les débats autour du fédéralisme environnemental sont persistants et non-Concluants. La Chine a poursuivi la tendance globale de la décentralisation et adopté un de facto fédéralisme environnemental. Dans ce pays vaste et diversifié, connaissances et compétences locales sont nécessaires pour développer des solutions appropriées pour de nombreux problèmes environnementaux souvent avec une nature locale ou régionale. Cependant, malgré le de facto fédéralisme environnemental adopté, crises environnementales dramatiques et échecs de la politique sont répandus en Chine. En particulier, plus récemment, ce pays a vu apparaître de nombreux problèmes prédits par les opposants à la décentralisation. Il semble que, contrairement à la décentralisation fiscale qui a été un «coup de main» dans la mobilisation des ressources et la croissance économique au niveau sous-National, la décentralisation de l'application de la politique environnementale a plutôt été une «main saisissant» dans la gestion environnementale. Dans le but de fournir une compréhension meilleure et détaillée du de facto fédéralisme environnemental en Chine, cette thèse suit les différents critiques dans la littérature et teste empiriquement pour chacun d'eux dans le contexte spécifique chinois. En résumé, les résultats empiriques trouvés dans cette thèse soutiennent l'existence de problèmes liés à l'externalité environnementale, à l'interaction stratégique et aux incitations politiques qui conduisent au compromis de l'environnement. Par ailleurs, la décentralisation budgétaire en cours est susceptible de renforcer les interactions interprovinciales conduites par la concurrence pour capitaux; le déséquilibre fiscal est plus préjudiciable à l'environnement dans les provinces pauvres. Ces résultats appellent à un «nouveau fédéralisme environnemental» et une réforme des incitations, afin de transformer le de facto fédéralisme environnemental chinois d'une «main saisissant» à un «coup de main» pour une meilleure gouvernance environnementale.
China's actual fiscal decentralization is one-sided: while public expenditures are largely decentralized, fiscal revenues are recentralized after 1994. One critical consequence of the actual system is the creation of significant fiscal imbalances at sub-national level. This paper investigates empirically effects of fiscal imbalances on environmental performance of Chinese provinces. First, environmental efficiency scores of Chinese provinces are calculated with SFA for the period from 2005 to 2010. Then, these scores are regressed against two fiscal imbalance indicators in a second stage model. Finally, conditional EE scores are calculated. This paper finds that effects of fiscal imbalances on EE are nonlinear and conditional on economic development level. Fiscal imbalances are more detrimental to environment in less developed provinces. These results suggest that the one-sided fiscal decentralization in China may have regressive environmental effects and contribute to regional disparity in terms of sustainable development.
In the literature, debate around environmental federalism is lasting and inconclusive. China has followed the global tendency of decentralization and has adopted a de facto environmental federalism. In this broad and diverse country, local knowledge and expertise is necessary to develop proper solutions for many environmental problems with local and regional nature. However, despite the adopted de facto environmental federalism, dramatic environmental crises and policy failures widespread in China. In particular, more recently, this country has seen arise many problems predicted by the opponents of decentralization. It appears that, contrary to the fiscal decentralization which has been a "helping hand" in resource mobilization and economic growth at the sub-National level, the decentralization of environmental policy implementation has rather been a "grabbing hand" in environmental management. With the purpose of providing a better and detailed understanding of the de facto environmental federalism in China, this thesis follows the different critics in the literature and test empirically for each of them in the Chinese-Specific context. In summary, empirical results found in this thesis support the existence of problems related to environmental externality, strategic interaction and politically incentivized environment-Sacrificing behaviors. Moreover, the current fiscal decentralization is likely to strengthen the capital-Competition driven inter-Provincial interaction; fiscal imbalance is more environmentally detrimental in poor provinces. These findings call for a "new environmental federalism" and a reform of incentives, in order to transform the Chinese de facto environmental federalism from a "grabbing hand" to a "helping hand" for better environmental governance. ; Dans la littérature, les débats autour du fédéralisme environnemental sont persistants et non-Concluants. La Chine a poursuivi la tendance globale de la décentralisation et adopté un de facto fédéralisme environnemental. Dans ce pays vaste et ...
This study presents an agent-based simulation of the formation of cooperation in using irrigation. The simulation model is developed based on our understanding of the underlying mechanisms by which farmer households participate the cooperation. That is, a household first becomes a potential participant when the cost of cooperation it needs to sustain is not higher than the amount it can afford or is willing to pay; and on top of this, the propensity that the household participates is heavily affected by its personal characteristics and neighborhood effects. We use model to examine the impacts of initial participants and government support on both the reach and velocity of the cooperation diffusion. The model is calibrated to villages with successfully running Water User Association in central China. Our results show that government support plays a critical role but the initial participants do not matter much for different types of initial participants and network structure of the village. ; ISSN:2194-3206
AbstractTransboundary pollution is a particularly serious problem as it leads people located at regional borders to disproportionately suffer from pollution. In China, where the environmental policy is decentralized and where environmental conflicts between provinces have occurred several times, transboundary pollution is likely to exist. However, until now, nearly all the studies have focused on developed countries. In this paper we study whether transboundary pollution problems exist in China. To do so, we estimate whether, within Hebei province, polluting firms are more likely to set up in border counties than in interior ones. The estimations of a count-data model allow us to conclude that border counties are more attractive destinations for polluting firms than counties located within the province. Moreover, it appears that this effect has strengthened over time.
This paper studies whether Chinese provinces set strategically their environmental stringency when faced with interprovincial competition for mobile capital. Using Chinese provincial data and spatial panel econometric models, we find that Chinese provinces do engage in this kind of strategic interaction, particularly among those with similar industrial structure. Furthermore, we haven't found evidence of asymmetric responsiveness suggested by the race to the bottom theory. Finally, the one-sided fiscal decentralization is likely to strengthen the strategic behavior. These empirical results call for a skeptical attitude towards China's decentralization of environment policy implementation as well as its fiscal arrangements.
This paper studies whether Chinese provinces set strategically their environmental stringency when faced with interprovincial competition for mobile capital. Using Chinese provincial data and spatial panel econometric models, we find that Chinese provinces do engage in this kind of strategic interaction, particularly among those with similar industrial structure. Furthermore, we haven't found evidence of asymmetric responsiveness suggested by the race to the bottom theory. Finally, the one-sided fiscal decentralization is likely to strengthen the strategic behavior. These empirical results call for a skeptical attitude towards China's decentralization of environment policy implementation as well as its fiscal arrangements.
