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"Township-village enterprises (TVEs) were a major engine of China's rapid rural industrialization in the past three decades. TVEs also played a key role in fostering entrepreneurship and served as a major stepping-stone for institutional changes when legal protections of private property rights were not in place and the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were slow to react to changing market demand. As private ownership was gradually recognized legally, TVEs lost their edge in competing with private firms. In the past two decades, industrial clusters with a concentration of private entrepreneurial firms coordinated by local governments have emerged rapidly in many areas. The structures of such firms as TVEs and the subsequent clustering modes of production are an outcome of interaction with other local and macro environments. As the environment changes, a firm's organization and organizational structure may change as well." --from authors' abstract ; Non-PR ; IFPRI1; GRP32 ; DSGD

This Article develops a framework for analyzing the relation between basic features of statutory and case law and the design and functioning of institutions that enforce this law. The basic premise is that law is inherently incomplete and that this has important implications for law enforcement. In particular, when law is incomplete, special emphasis needs to be placed on the allocation of lawmaking and law enforcement powers (LMLEP) to different institutions such as legislatures, courts, or regulators, in order to attain optimal levels of law enforcement. Using the development of the legal framework governing financial markets as an example to illustrate the conceptual framework, this Article examines how different legal systems have responded to the problem of incomplete law by reallocating lawmaking and law enforcement powers from courts to regulators. Most examples are drawn from the U.K., which has spearheaded financial market development since the mid-19th century. A comparative analysis of the U.S. and German experiences is also presented. This Article regards a law as complete if a law enacted today unambiguously stipulates for all future contingencies; otherwise a law is incomplete. A law may be incomplete if it attempts to specify comprehensively actions that shall be covered but fails to include some which could result in similar harmful outcome. Alternatively, law may be incomplete because it uses open-ended, vague wording, as a result of which the boundaries of the law are not clearly delineated. Incomplete law may be a function of bad drafting, but it is not limited to that. While failure to include all relevant issues that are known at the time a law is drafted or a court verdict is rendered may be the result of oversight, there are a number of other causes for incomplete law, including environmental factors and deliberate design.

This paper develops a conceptual framework for the analysis of legal institutions. It argues that law is inherently incomplete and that the incompleteness of law has a profound impact on the design of lawmaking and law enforcement institutions. When law is incomplete, residual lawmaking powers must be allocated; and enforcement agents have to be vested with law enforcement powers. The optimal allocation of lawmaking and law enforcement powers under incomplete law is analyzed with a focus on the legislature, regulators and courts as possible lawmakers, and courts as well as regulators as possible law enforcers. The timing and process of lawmaking and law enforcement differs across these agents. Legislatures are ex ante, courts are ex post lawmakers, regulators have combine ex ante and ex post lawmaking functions. Courts are reactive law enforcers, while regulators are proactive law enforcers in that – unlike courts – they can initiate enforcement procedures. We argue that the optimal allocation of residual lawmaking and law enforcement powers is determined by the degree and nature of incompleteness of law, the ability to standardize actions that may result in harm, and the magnitude of harm and externalities expected from such actions. Under highly incomplete law, regulators are superior to courts when actions can be standardized and, if allowed to proceed, may create substantial externalities. Otherwise courts are optimal holders of lawmaking and law enforcement powers. We apply this analytical framework to the development of financial market regulation in England since the mid-19th century, with comparative reference to developments in the United States and Germany. The comparative evidence suggests that financial market regulators with both residual lawmaking and proactive law enforcement powers emerged in all three jurisdictions in response to ineffective judicial law enforcement of highly incomplete law.

This paper surveys the theoretical literature on the effect of soft budget constraints on economies in transition from centralization to capitalism; it also reviews our understanding of soft budget constraints in general. It focuses on the conception of the soft budget constraint syndrome as a commitment problem. We show that the two features of soft budget constraints in centralized economies –ex post renegotiation of firms' financial plans and a close administrative relationship between firms and the centre – are intrinsically related. We examine a series of theories (based on the commitment‐problem approach) that explain shortage, lack of innovation in centralized economies, devolution, and banking reform in transition economies. Moreover, we argue that soft budget constraints also have an influence on major issues in economics, such as the determination of the boundaries and capital structure of a firm. Finally, we show that soft budget constraints theory sheds light on financial crises and economic growth.