Abstract Democratic backsliding has posed significant challenges to democracies in many countries. Recent calls for a better theorization of pushback against backsliding have triggered renewed scholarly interest in the field of opposition and its role in stopping or reversing creeping authoritarian rule. This study calls for a theoretical and empirical recalibration of the concept of opposition to account for multifaceted 'non-partisan' actors and venues of oppositional mobilization. It proposes a new classification of resilient civic opposition. The explanatory typology is based on two factors: (1) the ability of civic opposition to bring multiple grievances together and to balance between on-street and off-street mediums, and (2) the rapport between political opposition parties and civic opposition. Four cases of civic opposition from Hungary and Turkey illustrate the proposed typology empirically.
What motivates diasporas to support undemocratic rule in their countries of origin while enjoying democratic freedoms in their countries of settlement? This study adopts a meso-level approach to answer this question, and focuses on the Turkish diaspora in Europe as a case study. Lately, the diaspora governance literature has focused on official diaspora institutions and the policies of countries of origin. This study, alternatively, highlights "diasporic civic space" as an arena entrenching authoritarian practices "at home." It investigates the conditions under which diasporic civic space can be co-opted by undemocratic countries of origin and the role of "home state oriented diaspora organizations" in this process of co-optation. The study shows that diasporic civic space can offer resources to undemocratic regimes to mobilize previously dormant diaspora communities and create a support base abroad that is driven by nationalism and partisanship. The empirical discussion unveils four factors behind the successful mobilization of diasporas by undemocratic countries of origin: (1) nationalist sentiments among the diaspora; (2) motivations to get a share from the perks that may be meted out by home country government; (3) feelings of insecurity, fear, and marginalization as immigrants; and (4) the desire to assert one's identity and cultural ties vis-à-vis the majority in countries of settlement. The findings are based on the case of the Turkish diasporic civic space in Europe, which has recently been mobilized by a diaspora organization with political ties to the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Original data are drawn from semi-structured interviews conducted in 2018–2019 with members and representatives of major pro-AKP diaspora organization known as the Union of International Democrats (UID), as well as Alevi, Kurdish, and Islamist/conservative diaspora organizations in Sweden, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Germany. The findings contribute to the understanding of undemocratic home states' non-coercive and de-territorialized governance practices beyond their borders.
What motivates diasporas to support undemocratic rule in their countries of origin while enjoying democratic freedoms in their countries of settlement? This study adopts a meso-level approach to answer this question, and focuses on the Turkish diaspora in Europe as a case study. Lately, the diaspora governance literature has focused on offi cial diaspora institutions and the policies of countries of origin. This study, alternatively, highlights "diasporic civic space" as an arena entrenching authoritarian practices "at home." It investigates the conditions under which diasporic civic space can be co-opted by undemocratic countries of origin and the role of "home state oriented diaspora organizations" in this process of co-optation. The study shows that diasporic civic space can off er resources to undemocratic regimes to mobilize previously dormant diaspora communities and create a support base abroad that is driven by nationalism and partisanship. The empirical discussion unveils four factors behind the successful mobilization of diasporas by undemocratic countries of origin: (1) nationalist sentiments among the diaspora; (2) motivations to get a share from the perks that may be meted out by home country government; (3) feelings of insecurity, fear, and marginalization as immigrants; and (4) the desire to assert one's identity and cultural ties vis-à-vis the majority in countries of settlement. The fi ndings are based on the case of the Turkish diasporic civic space in Europe, which has recently been mobilized by a diaspora organization with political ties to the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Original data are drawn from semi-structured interviews conducted in 2018–2019 with members and representatives of major pro-AKP diaspora organization known as the Union of International Democrats (UID), as well as Alevi, Kurdish, and Islamist/conservative diaspora organizations in Sweden, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Germany. The findings contribute to the understanding of undemocratic home states' non-coercive and de-territorialized governance practices beyond their borders. ; What motivates diasporas to support undemocratic rule in their countries of origin while enjoying democratic freedoms in their countries of settlement? This study adopts a mesolevel approach to answer this question, and focuses on the Turkish diaspora in Europe as a case study. Lately, the diaspora governance literature has focused on official diaspora institutions and the policies of countries of origin. This study, alternatively, highlights "diasporic civic space" as an arena entrenching authoritarian practices "at home." It investigates the conditions under which diasporic civic space can be co-opted by undemocratic countries of origin and the role of "home state oriented diaspora organizations" in this process of co-optation. The study shows that diasporic civic space can offer resources to undemocratic regimes to mobilize previously dormant diaspora communities and create a support base abroad that is driven by nationalism and partisanship. The empirical discussion unveils four factors behind the successful mobilization of diasporas by undemocratic countries of origin: (1) nationalist sentiments among the diaspora; (2) motivations to get a share from the perks that may be meted out by home country government; (3) feelings of insecurity, fear, and marginalization as immigrants; and (4) the de-sire to assert one's identity and cultural ties vis-à-vis the majority in countries of settlement. The findings are based on the case of the Turkish diasporic civic space in Europe, which has recently been mobilized by a diaspora organization with political ties to the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Original data are drawn from semi-structured interviews conducted in 2018–2019 with members and representatives of major pro-AKP diaspora organization known as the Union of International Democrats (UID), as well as Alevi, Kurdish, and Islamist/conservative diaspora organizations in Sweden, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Germany. The findings contribute to the understanding of undemocratic home states' non-coercive and deterritorialized governance practices beyond their borders.
This study examines the relationship between populism, nationalism and religion through evidence from Turkey's Justice and Development Party (AKP) rule. The literature on the populism's rapport with nationalism has developed in isolation from the burgeoning theorization of populism-religion nexus. This study has a two-fold contribution. Theoretically, it advances a historical approach to deepen our understanding of the widespread appeal of contemporary populism. It argues that populism can capitalize on unique contextual fusions of religion and ethnic (secular) nationalism that originate from historical legacies and ideas of modern nation-building to (re)construct the antagonistic discourse dividing the society into two camps of 'the people' and 'the elites'. Empirically, by drawing upon discourse theory and empirical analysis of the AKP's public discourse, the study offers a nuanced approach to the AKP's much-debated stance on religion as an ideology versus instrument. Three areas are investigated to exemplify AKP's construction of populist dichotomy: a) ethnic and religious minorities, b) women, and c) youth. The analysis reveals that the AKP has built three different, and at times, contradictory articulations of 'people as underdogs', 'people as nation' and 'people as the ummah' against 'the secular elites', 'the enemies within' and 'the West', respectively.
This short article centers on the transformation of civil society and interest groups under the gradual and piecemeal process of democratic erosion. What happens to a formerly pluralistic civil society under steady democratic decline? How do interest groups respond under political repression? How do they adapt to remain relevant? I address these questions through the case of Turkey where gradual democratic erosion has resulted in regime change from electoral democracy to electoral autocracy
In: B. Yabanci, "Home-state Oriented Diaspora Organizations and the Making of Partisan Citizens Abroad: Motivations, Frames and Actions towards Coopting the Turkish Diaspora in Europe," Diaspora, 2021 27 (2).
Particularly in the aftermath of the 2016 coup attempt, the ruling Justice and Development party (AKP) has pushed its authoritarian agenda through religious, political and gender/sexual polarization. This study looks into new civic mobilizations that challenge, contest and seek to bridge the social and symbolic boundary imposed and entrenched by the AKP. The study particularly focuses on (i) the new forms of grassroots women's collective action defying the religious versus secular women dichotomy and (ii) dissident Islamist-leftist networks that seek to create shared definitions of justice and class issues across the left-right boundary. Based on interviews with activists, the study aims to answer 'what collective actions and mechanisms do these groups that initiate and constitute boundary change?' and 'What roles do they play in contesting authoritarian power structures in Turkey?' Overall, the study contributes to the understanding of the role of creative and novel forms of cross-boundary encounters and conversation and the ensuing civic resistance to authoritarian regime dynamics.
Under the Justice and Development Party (AKP) rule, Turkey's civil society has enlarged both in size and diversity of civic engagement. This development is puzzling since Turkey's weak democratic credentials do not allow an enabling political and legal setting for civil society's expansion. This study argues that the expansion can be explained through a particular dilemma of rulers in competitive-authoritarian (CA) regimes. The AKP is caught between the conflicting interests of appropriating and containing civil society. While the government needs to cherish civil society to sustain CA regime, it also needs to repress it, as civil society is the only arena where dissenting social forces can still carve pockets of resistance and challenge the dominant paradigms of the regime. Based on extensive fieldwork, this study discusses the patterns of containment and appropriation that have led to the steady expansion of civil society under pressure. The AKP's dilemma has also rendered Turkey's civil society 'tamed', namely politicized, disabled and segregated. The study broadens the understanding of relations between civil society and the state in CA regimes by offering essential insights into how these regimes are sustained, entrenched and also contested through and within civil society.