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"Allegations of Russian conspiracies to meddle in the affairs of Western countries have been a persistent feature of Western politics since the Cold War. Recent allegations of Russian interference in the 2016 US presidential election are only the most recent in a long series of conspiracy allegations that mark the history of the 20th century. However, Russian politics is rife with conspiracies about the West too. Everything bad that happens in Russia is traced back by some to an anti-Russian plot that is hatched in the West. Even the collapse of the Soviet Union this crucial turning point in world politics that left the US as the only remaining superpower was, according to some Russian conspiracy theorists, planned and executed by Russia's enemies in the West. Appearing first among post-Soviet Russian intellectuals, this notion became the driving force behind Russia's annexation of the Crimea, its military involvement in Ukraine and its suppression of dissenting voices in the country. This book is the first-ever study of Russian conspiracy theories in the post-Soviet period. It explores how the West is portrayed in these conspiracy theories and how this image is used to create public support for the Kremlin. It examines why these conspiracy theories have emerged and gained currency in Russia and what role intellectuals have played in this process. The book shows how, in the new millennium, the image of the 'dangerous, conspiring West' provides national unity and has helped legitimize Russia's rapid turn to authoritarianism under Vladimir Putin. Fortress Russia provides a unique and valuable insight into the political climate in Russia, where conspiracy theories play a significant role in shaping attitudes and policies towards the West. It will be of great interest to students and scholars of Russian politics and to anyone who wishes to understand Russia's role in the world today"--

This article explores the use of conspiracy theories by the Russian international television channel Russia Today ( RT). Based on Mark Fenster's definition of conspiracy theory as a populist theory of power, the article studies the process of how various conspiratorial notions in programmes broadcast by RT legitimise Russian domestic and foreign policies and, in turn, delegitimise policies of the American government. It argues that the conspiratorial component of RT's broadcasting appears as a political instrument in the context of the post-Cold War world and is applied to attract various global audiences with different political views.

This article studies the impact of conspiracy theories on post-Soviet Russian nation-building through the analysis of how the Pussy Riot trial was constructed by the Russian media. Conspiracy theory as a phenomenon is defined as a populist tool for relocation of power among different political actors, which creates identities and boosts social cohesion. This interpretation of conspiracy theories helps investigate how the media constructed the image of Pussy Riot and their supporters as a conspiring subversive minority, which threatened the Russian nation. The ability of conspiracy theory for swift social mobilization helped the authorities to strengthen the public support of its policies and model the Russian nation as ethnically and religiously homogeneous.

This article studies the impact of conspiracy theories on post-Soviet Russian nation-building through the analysis of how the Pussy Riot trial was constructed by the Russian media. Conspiracy theory as a phenomenon is defined as a populist tool for relocation of power among different political actors, which creates identities and boosts social cohesion. This interpretation of conspiracy theories helps investigate how the media constructed the image of Pussy Riot and their supporters as a conspiring subversive minority, which threatened the Russian nation. The ability of conspiracy theory for swift social mobilization helped the authorities to strengthen the public support of its policies and model the Russian nation as ethnically and religiously homogeneous. © 2014 © 2014 Association for the Study of Nationalities.

This article argues that today in Central and Eastern Europe self-censorship, journalistic freedom and autonomy are just as severely affected by economic constraints, oligarchic influences and new authoritarianism as they are by their Communist pasts. Either way, journalists know exactly what to report, what to omit and how to advance their careers. This is reminiscent of adekvatnost'; a distinct strategy employed by Russian journalists, who regard this skill as an expression of professionalism. It implies having a 'feel for the game' and the 'right instinct', which allows them to enjoy a certain level of freedom in their work and express their creativity. The authors' interviews with Latvian and Hungarian journalists, editors and producers examined the extent to which adekvatnost' might be a feature of journalism beyond Russia, in particular when a media system faces rising populism and authoritarianism, paired with oligarch-dominated ownership. As such, knowledge gained about journalistic practices in the countries under investigation might also be useful in understanding media development beyond the post-Communist space, including Western Europe.

This article considers two cases of antisemitic political rhetoric and explores the nature of anti-Jewish conspiracy theories in Putin's Russia. The author concludes that anti-Jewish conspiracy theories are a somewhat marginalised intellectual product. Unlike anti-Western conspiracy theories – which are a mainstream driver of political discussions, these are rarely used by the Russian political establishment for the pur-poses of political mobilisation.

This collection of articles deals with the history and the current state of Russia's media elite. It defines three groups of media elites; owners of media outlets, media managers and prominent journalists. All those groups are under pressure of being agreeable to the Kremlin and pleasing their audiences with their products and output. The Kremlin's tightened control over the media forced some media professionals out, losing their jobs or emigrating. The majority, however, have kept their positions. They are reasonably well networked and integrated into the political system and successfully employ strategies partly inherited from Soviet times. The collection of articles provides insights into the inner working of Russian media, delivering a nuanced understanding of media control, censorship and self-censorship.

Media managers are key in the relations between, on the one side the authorities, to whom they enjoy privileged access, and, on the other side the newsroom, the functioning of which they define. Contrary to the popular view, held both in Russia and abroad, that the Kremlin controls the majority of the country's media, we argue that media managers have a fair bit of agency and are players in their own rights, able to shape their audiences' attitudes and modify individual as well as collective behavior. To be able to exert this power they must, however, tread a very fine line: they have to demonstrate adekvatnost' (literally adequacy, but better translated as appropriateness, or 'the right feel for the game') and demand adekvatnost' from their journalists and editors. Focusing on two dimensions – elite theory and the concept of adekvatnost' – this article analyses the data gleaned from interviews with a range of media managers.