The Mistaken Reliance on Treasuries in Financial Regulation
In: Vanderbilt Law Research Paper No. 20-46
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In: Vanderbilt Law Research Paper No. 20-46
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We investigate the nature and extent of information asymmetry among traders in companies with government ownership. Consistent with a less transparent information environment, we find relatively less informed trading in the shares of firms with government presence, and specifically, fewer informed trades related to the skilled analysis of public information. At the same time, we also find that firms with government presence have a significantly higher proportion of informed trading that arises from explicitly private information, consistent with the literature on the self-serving influence of government stakeholders not necessarily committed to maximizing firm value.
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In: EFA 0372; London Business School, Institute of Finance & Accounting Working Paper No. 296
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In: Journal of Finance, Band 58, Heft 5
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In: Proceedings of the EUROFIDAI-ESSEC Paris December Finance Meeting 2023
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In: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis (Forthcoming)
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In: Black, Jeffrey R., Stock, Duane and Yadav, Pradeep K. (2016). The pricing of different dimensions of liquidity: Evidence from government guaranteed bonds. J. Bank Financ., 71. S. 119 - 133. AMSTERDAM: ELSEVIER. ISSN 1872-6372
There are three important dimensions of liquidity: trading costs, depth, and resiliency. We investigate the relevance of each of these three dimensions of liquidity - separately and in conjunction - for the pricing of corporate bonds. Unlike previous studies, our sample allows us to cleanly separate the default and non-default components of yield spreads. We find that each of the above three dimensions of liquidity are priced factors. Overall, in our sample, a one standard deviation change in trading costs, resiliency, and depth measures lead to a change in non-default spreads of 5.00 basis points, 2.27 basis points, and 1.27 basis points, respectively. We also find that both bond-specific and market-wide dimensions of liquidity are priced in non-default spreads. Finally, we find that there does exist in some periods a small residual non-default yield spread that is consistent with an additional flight-to-extreme-liquidity premium reflecting investor preference for assets that enable quickest possible disengagement from the market when necessary. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Seminal market microstructure literature identifies at least three important dimensions of liquidity: trading costs, depth, and resiliency. We investigate the relevance of each of these three dimensions of liquidity - separately and in conjunction - for the pricing of corporate bonds. Unlike previous studies, our sample allows us to cleanly separate the default and non-default components of yield spreads. We find that each of the above three dimensions of liquidity impact non-default spreads, with trading costs and resiliency being more important than depth. We also find that both bond-specific and market-wide dimensions of liquidity are priced in non-default spreads. Finally, we find that, even though these three dimensions of liquidity account for virtually the entire non-default spread, there does exist in some periods a small residual non-default yield spread that is consistent with an additional "flight-to-extreme-liquidity" premium reflecting investor preference for assets that enable quickest possible disengagement from the market when necessary.
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This study describes the Indian corporate governance system and examines how the system has both supported and held back India's ascent to the top ranks of the world's economies. While on paper the country's legal system provides some of the best investor protection in the world, enforcement is a major problem with slow, over-burdened courts and significant corruption. Ownership remains concentrated and family business groups continue to be the dominant business model. There is significant pyramiding and tunneling among Indian business groups and, notwithstanding copious reporting requirements, evidence of earnings management. However, corporate governance in India does not compare unfavorably with any of the other major emerging economies: Brazil, China and Russia. India ranks high on the ease of getting credit, and has a well-functioning banking sector with one of the lowest proportions of nonperforming assets. The two main Stock Exchanges have among the highest number of trades in the world, and the relatively young Securities and Exchanges Board of India has a rigorous regulatory regime to ensure fairness, transparency and good practice. Most importantly, the corporate governance landscape in the country has been changing fast over the past decade, particularly with the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley type measures and legal changes to improve the enforceability of creditor's rights. If this trend is maintained, India should have the quality of corporate governance necessary to sustain its impressive current growth rates.
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