Suchergebnisse

Preface -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- Acronyms and Abbreviations -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Weak Implementation of Chinese Law -- 1.2 Theoretical Basis for Studying Compliance in China -- 1.3 Pesticide Compliance in China: A Case Study -- 1.4 Research Questions -- 1.5 An Introduction to the Context of the Pesticide Case -- 1.6 Research Limitations -- 1.7 Research Outline -- References -- 2 Setting the Theoretical Framework and Methodology -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Operationalization of Compliance -- 2.2.1 Question One: What Are Compliance and Regulatory Compliance -- 2.2.2 Question Two: Why Compliance -- 2.2.2.1 Two Models -- 2.2.2.2 Eight Variables and Three Simpilfied Categories -- 2.2.3 Question Three: How to Measure Compliance -- 2.2.3.1 Definition of Pesticide -- 2.2.3.2 The Measurement of Pesticide Compliance Behavior -- 2.3 Methodology -- 2.3.1 Case Selection -- 2.3.2 Case Interview -- 2.3.2.1 Phase One: The Pilot Study Phase -- 2.3.2.2 Phase Two: The in-Depth Case Interview Phase -- 2.3.2.3 Phase Three: The Complementary Material Collection and Data Analysis Phase -- 2.3.3 Data Measurement as Well as Coding Method -- 2.4 Vegetable Farmers' Pesticide Compliance Behavior -- 2.5 Chapter Conclusion -- References -- 3 Subjective Rational Compliance Calculation and Deterrence: Theory and Empirical Evidence -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Towards Subjective, Rational, Amoral Calculation -- 3.3 Understanding Operational Costs and Benefits of Compliance -- 3.3.1 Subjective Operational Costs and Benefits of Compliance in Theory -- 3.3.2 Vegetable Farmers' Perceived Operational Cost-Benefit Calculation of Compliance -- 3.3.3 Operational Compliance Calculation and Farmers' Pesticide Compliance -- 3.4 Understanding Deterrence -- 3.4.1 Subjective Deterrence in Theory -- 3.4.2 State Enforcement/Objective Deterrence

While many have observed the importance of state regulators to the implementation of law, multiple decentralized regulators are crucial for achieving deterrence and compliance. Informed by the deterrence literature, this study conducts in-depth interviews with 150 Chinese farmers and experts and studies how regulated actors perceive detection possibility and sanction impact and how such perceptions shape compliance. The study finds that farmers perceive considerable deterrence risks from multiple actors, helping to explain their pesticide compliance. The study further finds that such perceived threats are linked to social relations or guanxi between farmers and multiple regulators, which are built on frequency of contact, mutual trust and personalized networks among the actors involved. Social relations or guanxi could help to predict sources of deterrent threats and the degree of tolerance for potentially violent actions. Deterrence and regulatory compliance are frequently enhanced when there are close relations between the regulated and regulators. Policymakers and practitioners might want to create a risk environment by first deliberating the relations between polycentric regulation and the generally authoritarian nature of the Chinese state, understanding the regulatory logic of social relations, and then by determining the relevant third parties and formulating policy incentives for utilizing such threats.

Through interviews and comparison of practices in two Chinese cities, this article argues that local governments are forced to shift some of their excessive responsibilities to new actors. This produces a limited kind of pluralism: government organizations remain in charge of community governance.

AbstractThis article applies crisp set qualitative comparative analysis (csQCA) to gain insight into the compliance motivations and behaviors of 101 Chinese farmers. It seeks to understand how eight motivations (capacity to comply, legal knowledge, deterrent effect of sanctions, cost–benefit analysis, descriptive social norms, morals, general duty to obey, and procedural justice) combine in compliant and non‐compliant behavior, and whether there is only one combination of motivations or several that lead to compliance and non‐compliance. It illustrates how csQCA assists in making visible and analyzing situations of interacting compliance motivations (conjunctural causality) and situations where different combinations of motivations result in similar compliance behavior (equifinality). It identifies symmetrical and non‐symmetrical relationships between specific compliance motivations and compliance behaviors – indicating that motivations for non‐compliance are not necessarily the opposite of those for compliance. This non‐symmetry may logically be explained because deterrence plays a different role in compliance decisions than in non‐compliance decisions. The article concludes by highlighting the relevance of such insights for theorizing on compliance and for law enforcement, and the limitations of the method applied.

This article analyzes how cost‐benefit calculation influences compliance with pesticide regulation by Chinese farmers. Building on a study including 150 farmers and experts, it studies how operational costs and benefits and deterrence affect compliance. Moreover, it studies what variation in cost‐benefit perceptions there are with different types of rules, farms, and villages. It finds that, in this context, cost‐benefit calculation matters for compliance; with operational costs and benefits being more clearly related to compliant behavior than deterrence. It highlights that perceptions about costs and benefits are situational and vary along the type of legal rule and the type of regulated actor. It also shows that such perceptions are individually subjective, as even with similar rules and similar types of actors, perceptions vary. The paper concludes by stating expectations on how the situational and subjective nature of cost‐benefit calculation can inform regulators seeking to enhance compliance.

This article applies crisp set qualitative comparative analysis (csQCA) to gain insight into the compliance motivations and behaviors of 101 Chinese farmers. It seeks to understand how eight motivations (capacity to comply, legal knowledge, deterrent effect of sanctions, cost-benefit analysis, descriptive social norms, morals, general duty to obey, and procedural justice) combine in compliant and non-compliant behavior, and whether there is only one combination of motivations or several that lead to compliance and non-compliance. It illustrates how csQCA assists in making visible and analyzing situations of interacting compliance motivations (conjunctural causality) and situations where different combinations of motivations result in similar compliance behavior (equifinality). It identifies symmetrical and non-symmetrical relationships between specific compliance motivations and compliance behaviors - indicating that motivations for non-compliance are not necessarily the opposite of those for compliance. This non-symmetry may logically be explained because deterrence plays a different role in compliance decisions than in non-compliance decisions. The article concludes by highlighting the relevance of such insights for theorizing on compliance and for law enforcement, and the limitations of the method applied.

This article applies crisp set qualitative comparative analysis (csQCA) to gain insight into the compliance motivations and behaviors of 101 Chinese farmers. It seeks to understand how eight motivations (capacity to comply, legal knowledge, deterrent effect of sanctions, cost-benefit analysis, descriptive social norms, morals, general duty to obey, and procedural justice) combine in compliant and non-compliant behavior, and whether there is only one combination of motivations or several that lead to compliance and non-compliance. It illustrates how csQCA assists in making visible and analyzing situations of interacting compliance motivations (conjunctural causality) and situations where different combinations of motivations result in similar compliance behavior (equifinality). It identifies symmetrical and non-symmetrical relationships between specific compliance motivations and compliance behaviors - indicating that motivations for non-compliance are not necessarily the opposite of those for compliance. This non-symmetry may logically be explained because deterrence plays a different role in compliance decisions than in non-compliance decisions. The article concludes by highlighting the relevance of such insights for theorizing on compliance and for law enforcement, and the limitations of the method applied.