On expressive voting: Evidence from the 1988 U.S. presidential election
In: Public choice, Band 108, Heft 3, S. 295-312
ISSN: 0048-5829
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In: Public choice, Band 108, Heft 3, S. 295-312
ISSN: 0048-5829
In: The Canadian Journal of Economics, Band 26, Heft 2, S. 469
In: Economic Inquiry, Band 53, Heft 2, S. 889-905
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In: Pacific Economic Review, Band 19, Heft 4, S. 466-482
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In: Contemporary Economic Policy, Band 32, Heft 2, S. 435-450
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In: Journal of economic dynamics & control, Band 25, Heft 11, S. 1827-1840
ISSN: 0165-1889
In: Journal of international economics, Band 32, Heft 3-4, S. 369-377
ISSN: 0022-1996
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In: FRB St. Louis Working Paper No. 2017-3
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Working paper
In: Contemporary economic policy: a journal of Western Economic Association International, Band 32, Heft 2, S. 435-450
ISSN: 1465-7287
The environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) could arise from the scale effect in abatement technology as emphasized by Andreoni and Levinson (2001) or from the induced policy response as suggested by Grossman and Krueger (1995). This paper incorporates these two contrary views into a model and quantitatively evaluates their relative importance in shaping the EKC of U.S. water pollution. Our main findings include: (a) some scale effect in abatement technology must exist, otherwise the turning point of the EKC will be unreasonably high; (b) the scale effect alone is not sufficient to explain the practical occurrence of the turning point of the EKC; and (c) the scale effect features critically in the induced policy response as well. (JEL H41, O40, Q20)
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Working paper
In: International review of law and economics, Band 20, Heft 1, S. 35-51
ISSN: 0144-8188
In: Scottish journal of political economy: the journal of the Scottish Economic Society, Band 62, Heft 5, S. 546-566
ISSN: 1467-9485
AbstractThis article offers experimental evidence to examine an important case in politics where a monopolistic proposer seeks a majority's consent from competitive responders to split the gain. The unique subgame perfect equilibrium prediction is that the side of trade with a monopoly will exploit the side of trade with competition to reap almost all of the gain. Our experimental evidence reveals that while responders do compete with each other to race to the bottom (consistent with the prediction), the monopolistic proposer settles down to offer a 'fair' share of the pie to those from whom he or she seeks majority support (contrary to the prediction).