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Using first-hand interview data, Yang Jiang reveals the key trends of China's trade and financial politics after its WTO accession. In particular, she highlights the influence of competing domestic interests, government agencies and different ideas on China's foreign economic policy

Yang Jiang opens the black box of China's policymaking for free trade agreements and key regional financial initiatives. Using first-hand interview data, she sheds light on the key trends of China's trade and financial politics after its WTO entry in 2001. In particular, she highlights the influence of competing domestic interests, protectionist and conservative forces vis-à-vis liberal and reformist forces; government agencies, ministries and national commissions, local governments; and different ideas on China's foreign economic policy. In doing so, she also provides interesting comparisons between China and other countries in international negotiations. Her investigation offers a fresh look into China, its changing decision-making under different generations of leadership, and the basis for its current and potential contribution to international economic cooperation.

Greenland is important to Denmark's position in international politics, and it has become an arena of increasing competition between great powers. Of all China's shipping, investment and scientific exploration activities in the Arctic, Chinese investments in Greenland have become the most controversial issue. For Washington DC, Copenhagen, and the IA Party that won the Greenlandic general election in April 2021, China's political influence and the environmental impacts that might come with investment are a major concern. Behind the concern is the view that Chinese investments are driven and coordinated by the Chinese state for strategic purposes, but there is a lack of studies on how close state-business relations are and to what extent the domestic reforms in China have pushed Chinese companies to seek out Greenland. Therefore, this DIIS report seeks to inform debates around the role of China in Greenland by delving into the following questions: Why would Chinese companies invest in mining projects in Greenland, and how have they obtained access? How have the projects progressed? To what extent have Chinese state actors participated in these projects?

Igennem de sidste to år (2018–2019) er den førte danske politik i forhold til Kina blevet mere ambivalent. Særligt når det gælder kinesiske investeringer, er Danmark blevet mere forsigtig. Denne artikel undersøger hvilke faktorer, der har haft betydning for Danmarks skiftende politik i forhold til kinesiske investeringer, gennem to større case-studier: Kinesiske investeringer i Grønland og Huawei i Danmark. Kort fortalt udpeges her tre faktorer, der er afgørende for Danmarks politik i forhold til kinesiske investeringer: for det første landets langvarige økonomiske ideologi som en lille, åben økonomi, svarende til øvrige nordiske lande og som medlem af EU, med et pragmatisk behov for udenlandske markeder; for det andet en stærk, national tro på demokrati og statens forsvarsalliance med USA, herunder dets dedikerede medlemskab af NATO; og for det tredje opkomsten af fremmedfjendske og nationalistiske politiske partier, der udfordrer den tidligere mere afbalancerede og pragmatiske tilgang kendetegnende for større partier samt går ind for et mere anti-kinesisk standpunkt.
Abstract in English:Denmark's Policy on Chinese Investments: Pragmatism Balancing with Increasing Threat PerspectivesDuring the past two years (2018–2019), Denmark's policy towards China has become more ambivalent. In particular, Denmark has become more cautious about inward Chinese investments. This article examines the factors that have affected Denmark's changing policy on Chinese investment, with two major case studies: Chinese investments in Greenland, and Huawei in Denmark. In a nutshell, it points out three decisive factors: first, the country's long-term ideology as a small, open economy, similar to other Nordic countries and as a member of the EU, with a pragmatic need for foreign markets; second, a strong national belief in democracy and the state's defense alliance with the United States, including its dedicated NATO membership; and third, the rise of xenophobic and nationalist political parties, challenging the earlier more balanced and pragmatic approach characteristic of larger parties as well as advocating a more anti-Chinese stance.

In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, with the world in search for new economic engines, China and Japan have explicitly given their answer through their expansion of overseas infrastructure investments. This study focuses on the flagship sector of high-speed railways (HSR) and examines what kinds of development financing China and Japan have adopted in making these investments. It asks the following questions: What similarities are there in the Chinese and Japanese approaches to investments in overseas infrastructure, and how do they differ from traditional Western development financing? Also, in what ways have China and Japan changed their approaches to overseas infrastructure projects during this process? It argues that in the process of expanding overseas infrastructure investments and competing for infrastructure projects, China and Japan have become 'competitive partners' in challenging the traditional norms of development financing represented by the Washington Consensus and the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). To be more specific, China and Japan have adopted each other's practices of tied commercial financing, heavy government involvement, focusing on physical infrastructure and industrialization, and showing respect for host-country forms of governance. In particular, by joining China in the new game of exporting infrastructure and through its own 'quality infrastructure investment' initiative, Japan has broken out of the constraints of DAC norms as an aid donor and endorsed some fundamental Chinese approaches to development and development cooperation, which in their turn were inspired by earlier Japanese practices. (Pac Rev/GIGA)

Our thesis has focused on the problem of ageing and by combination of theoretical and numerical methods we were able to show that to insure against the longevity risk, individual decisions are very different from macroeconomic optimal choices. Private annuities may be attractive to some healthy individuals but opening up an annuity market is by no means beneficial to the society. The value of annuities (annuity market) should be examined in a general equilibrium framework, in tandem with bequest motives. We also explored the optimal fertility for the society, which generally does not coincide with individual choices in {it laissez faire}. With Child taxes and intergenerational transfers, however, the government may induce individuals to choose the optimal quantity and quality of children the society needs. After all, with the prevalence of public pension programs, what provides a better insurance to the old generation than a well-educated right-sized population of the next generation?

This article seeks to explain why the Free Trade Agreement negotiation between Australia and China has been extremely difficult, despite political goodwill from Beijing and Canberra. It first argues that the reason for the slow progress of the negotiation is not caused by lack of motivation from the Chinese government. It then lists the differences in negotiation between China and Australia, focusing on their respective selective vs. comprehensive, border vs. behind-the-border, flexible vs. rigid and state vs. market approaches. It then looks into domestic politics in China to explain why China has taken such a stance, underlining domestic resistance from sectors like agriculture and services in a dynamic domestic political environment on the one hand, and the structure of the policy making institution that constrains the power of trade negotiators on the other. It concludes by pointing out where the potential for a breakthrough in the FTA negotiation lies.

This article seeks to explain why the Free Trade Agreement negotiation between Australia and China has been extremely difficult, despite political goodwill from Beijing and Canberra. It first argues that the reason for the slow progress of the negotiation is not caused by lack of motivation from the Chinese government. It then lists the differences in negotiation between China and Australia, focusing on their respective selective vs. comprehensive, border vs. behind-the-border, flexible vs. rigid and state vs. market approaches. It then looks into domestic politics in China to explain why China has taken such a stance, underlining domestic resistance from sectors like agriculture and services in a dynamic domestic political environment on the one hand, and the structure of the policy making institution that constrains the power of trade negotiators on the other. It concludes by pointing out where the potential for a breakthrough in the FTA negotiation lies.

How dangerous is Chinese outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) because of the state's influence over business, particularly state-owned enterprises (SOEs)? To what extent are business and politics interwoven in Chinese investment decisions? Crucial knowledge is lacking on the relationship between the state and companies in China's OFDI. This study does not claim to completely refute the conventional view that Chinese companies, particularly SOEs, are controlled by the state in their OFDI activities. However, it tries to provide some evidence that suggests the need for a revised look at them. It argues that although Chinese SOEs are supported by Chinese diplomacy and loans in their OFDI and have a tacit understanding of certain strategic goals of the state, they enjoy autonomy to make business decisions and have prioritized maximizing their own business interests. Importantly, this is enabled by the state's view that the profit of SOEs is consistent with national interests.

This paper discusses the role of the Beijing Consensus type of foreign and economic policymaking in China's development since the Asian financial crisis and in its response to the global crisis, and argues that it has been a double-edged sword, as reflected in several aspects. First, the lesson that China learned from the Asian financial crisis was not the importance of liberalisation but prudence or conservativeness, which despite serving as a shield this time sustains problems in the long term. Second, an obsession with foreign reserves accumulation and the pursuit of political influence have for a long time overshadowed the increasing dependence on the US market, putting China in a dilemma now in both development and diplomatic strategies. Third, centralised decision-making may be faster than democratic processes, but it may also go against the principle of "scientific decision" as proposed by the Chinese leadership. A prominent feature of China's responses to the crisis is a bias towards state-owned enterprises and the public sector, which exacerbates the existing problems of monopoly, over-capacity, inequality, the regulators being "captured" by industrial interests and protectionism. Given limited economic resources, domestic political contentions and the questionable credibility of the China Model, it would be difficult for China to practice 'responsible great power' diplomacy or assume leadership in the region or globally. (Pac Rev/GIGA)

AbstractChina's ascendance attracts concern, even though Beijing claims to be a responsible great power and tries to demonstrate its 'great power style' in economic diplomacy. This article therefore discusses the following questions: to what extent does the current notion and practice of Chinese 'great power style' in economic diplomacy comply with, or differ from, the criteria of benign hegemony; and what are the major constraining factors? Conceptually, China's 'great power style' is rooted in ancient Chinese political philosophy and institution, but it highly resembles the Western notion of benign hegemony. Empirically, China has started to provide more public goods in trade, finance and aid, and it seeks voting powers at international institutions. However, it is still far from being a benign hegemon because of its level of development, domestic political constraints, and tension between political and economic interests.