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"Designed for those who want a better grasp of the nature and existential threat of today's information wars. It uses a conceptual approach to explain the relevant concepts as well as the structural challenges and responsibilities with which policy makers struggle and practitioners must work"--

This book brings together some of the world's most distinguished military leaders, scholars, cyber operators, and policymakers in a discussion of current and future challenges that cyberspace poses to the United States and the world.

International Journal of Cyber Warfare & Terrorism, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 1-14 ; A cyberweapon can be as dangerous as any weapon. Fortunately, recent technology now provides some tools for cyberweapons control. Digital forensics can be done on computers seized during or after hostilities. Cyberweapons differ significantly from other software, especially during their development, and recent advances in summarizing the contents of storage media can locate possible cyberweapons quickly. In addition, use of cyberweapons can be distinguished from the usual malicious Internet traffic by being aimed at targets associated with political, social, and cultural issues that are often known well in advance, and we can monitor those targets. Cyberweapons are relatively unreliable compared to other kinds of weapons because they depend on flaws in software, and flaws can get fixed; cyberweapons therefore require considerable testing, preferably against live targets, and this testing may be observable. So international "cyberarms agreements" could provide for forensics on cyberweapons and usage monitoring. Agreements can also encourage cyberweapons use to be more responsible by stipulating attribution and reversibility. We conclude with a discussion of the kinds of international agreements that are desirable, and examine the recent increasing interest of the United States government in such agreements. ; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

A cyberweapon can be as dangerous as any weapon. Fortunately, recent technology now provides some tools for cyberweapons control. Digital forensics can be done on computers seized during or after hostilities. Cyberweapons differ significantly from other software, especially during development, and recent advances in summarizing the contents of storage media can locate possible cyberweapons quickly. Use of cyberweapons can be distinguished in the usual malicious Internet traffic by being aimed at targets associated with political, social, and cultural issues that are often known in advance, and those targets can then be monitored. Cyberweapons are relatively unreliable compared to other kinds of weapons because they are susceptible to flaws in software; therefore, cyberweapons require considerable testing, preferably against live targets. Thus, international "cyberarms agreements" could provide for forensics on cyberweapons and usage monitoring. Agreements also encourage more responsible cyberweapons use by stipulating attribution and reversibility. The authors discuss the kinds of international agreements that are desirable, and examine the recent interest of the U.S. government in such agreements.

This paper appeared in the Proceedings of the 10th European Conference on Information Warfare and Security, Tallinn, Estonia, July 2011. ; Cyberweapons are difficult weapons to control and police. Nonetheless, technology is becoming available that can help. We propose here the underlying technology necessary to support cyberarms agreements. Cyberweapons usage can be distinguished from other malicious Internet traffic in that they are aimed precisely at targets which we can often predict in advance and can monitor. Unlike cybercriminals, cyberweapons use will have political goals, and thus attackers will likely not try hard to conceal themselves. Furthermore, cyberweapons are temperamental weapons that depend on flaws in software, and flaws can get fixed. This means that cyberweapons testing will be seen before a serious attack. As well, we may be able to find evidence of cyberweapons on computers seized during or after hostilities since cyberweapons have important differences from other software and are difficult to conceal on their development platforms. Recent advances in quick methods for assessing the contents of a disk drive can be used to rule out irrelevant data quickly. We also discuss methods for making cyberweapons more responsible by attribution and reversibility, and we discuss the kinds of international agreements we need to control them. ; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.