Suchergebnisse

This is the first book that focusses on how proportionality analysis - a legal transplant from the West - is applied by courts around Asia, and it explores how a country's commitment to democracy and the rule of law is fundamental to the success of the doctrine's judicial enforcement. This book will appeal to lawyers, political scientists, and students of law and political science who seek to understand how proportionality analysis is blossoming and, in some cases, flourishing in Asia.

Many jurisdictions in Asia have vested their courts with the power of constitutional review. Traditionally, these courts would invalidate an impugned law to the extent of its inconsistency with the constitution. In common law systems, such an invalidation operates immediately and retrospectively; and courts in both common law and civil law systems would leave it to the legislature to introduce corrective legislation. In practice, however, both common law and civil law courts in Asia have devised novel constitutional remedies, often in the absence of explicit constitutional or statutory authorisation. Examining cases from Hong Kong, Bangladesh, Indonesia, India, and the Philippines, this collection of essays examines four novel constitutional remedies which have been judicially adopted - Prospective Invalidation, Suspension Order, Remedial Interpretation, and Judicial Directive - that blurs the distinction between adjudication and legislation.

What is the relationship between the strength of a country's democracy and the ability of its courts to address deficiencies in the electoral process? Drawing a distinction between democracies that can be characterised as 'dominant-party' (for example Singapore, Malaysia, and Hong Kong), 'dynamic' (for example India, South Korea, and Taiwan), and 'fragile' (for example Thailand, Pakistan ,and Bangladesh), this book explores how democracy sustains and is sustained by the exercise of judicial power. In dominant-party systems, courts can only pursue 'dialogic' pathways to constrain the government's authoritarian tendencies. On the other hand, in dynamic democracies, courts can more successfully innovate and make systemic changes to the electoral system. Finally, in fragile democracies, where a country regularly oscillates between martial law and civilian rule, their courts tend to consistently overreach, and this often facilitates or precipitates a hostile take-over by the armed forces, and lead to the demise of the rule of law.

"In the past century, Asian nations have experienced a wave of democratisation as countries in the region have gained independence or transitioned from authoritarian military rule towards more participatory politics. At the same time, there has been an expansion of judicial power in Asia, whereby new courts or empowered old ones emerge as independent constraints on governmental authority. This is the first book to assess the judicial review of elections in Asia. It provides important insights into how Asian courts can strategically engage with the political actors in their jurisdictions and contribute to a country's democratic discourse. Each chapter in the book sheds light on the judicial review of elections and the electoral process in a specific Asian jurisdiction, including Common Law Asia, namely Hong Kong, India Malaysia, and Singapore, as well as jurisdictions in Civil Law Asia, namely Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. It fills a gap in the literature by addressing a central challenge to democratic governance, namely the problem of partisan self-dealing in the electoral processes. By exploring the constantly evolving role of the courts in addressing pivotal constitutional questions, this book will be of interest to students and scholars of Asian Law, Governance, and Politics"--Page iii

In a comprehensive examination of the constitutional systems of Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore, Po Jen Yap contributes to a field that has traditionally focused on Western jurisdictions. Drawing on the history and constitutional framework of these Asian law systems, this book examines the political structures and traditions that were inherited from the British colonial government and explores how dialogic review can be applied to four core constitutional concerns: freedom of expression, freedom of religion, right to equality, and criminal due process rights

AbstractWhile proportionality analysis (PA) may have originated from Germany, it has not remained a European product. PA has been locally transplanted across Anglophone nations, found in mixed legal systems that are rooted in the common law and even adapted in parts of Latin America and Asia. This article explains why PA is flourishing in parts of Asia – for example, South Korea and Taiwan – and why it is faltering in other countries, such as Singapore and China, where the absence of PA can be attributed to the non-fulfilment of Kant's first prerequisite for perpetual peace: a republican government (liberal democracy).

Constitutional landscapes in Asia are littered with fig leaves. These proverbial fig leaves are legal principles, doctrines, and theories of interpretation that judges appeal to when resolving constitutional disputes. This article uncovers and examines three constitutional fig leaves that are prevalent and flourishing in Asia: 1) formalism and its conceptual variants; 2) the exercise of judicial review that is merely symbolic; and 3) the invocation of vacuous constitutional doctrines. This article further argues that judicial recourse to fig leaves is not intended to deceive anyone about what courts are doing; the fig leaves are on public display merely to demonstrate that judges accept the role they are expected to play within their political systems. For better or worse, it would appear that Asian judges believe that these fig leaves are necessary to legitimize their actions, and, insofar as Asian judges are doing very little, these legal loincloths are vital to preserve judges' modesties.

AbstractNational courts, largely in South Asia and Latin America, have deemed unconstitutional certain constitutional amendments that have been enacted into law in their respective jurisdictions. In the article, this author explores the normative arguments for and against the judicial enforcement of implicit substantive constraints on formal constitutional changes. In essence, the author argues that, in determining whether judges should render the substance of constitutional amendments unconstitutional, one must examine how the impugned constitutional amendment was passed. In jurisdictions where a constitutional amendment can be passed by a dominant party/coalition without bipartisan support or the general support of the people, the courts may intervene, but only where the constitutional amendment(s) in question is/are so manifestly unreasonable that such a revision is akin to a substantial destruction of the pre-existing constitution. But no constitutional amendment should ever be judicially invalidated for violating any implied 'basic features' of the constitution when the amendment process is particularly cumbersome and requires significant bipartisan support and the general public's express or implicit endorsement for the amendment to pass.