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Working paper
A Lattice-Theoretical Optimization Approach to Nash Equilibria in Two-Person Games
In: JME-D-22-00022
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Repeated Cooperation with Outside Options
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Folk Theorem under Bankruptcy
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Oligopolistic equilibrium and financial constraints
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 51, Heft 1, S. 279-300
ISSN: 1756-2171
AbstractWe model a dynamic duopoly in which firms can potentially drive their rivals from the market. For some parameter values, the Cournot equilibrium outcome cannot be sustained in an infinitely repeated setting. In those cases, there is a Markov perfect equilibrium in mixed strategies in which one firm, eventually, will exit the market with probability one. Producer surplus in the maximum collusive outcome is greater under bankruptcy consideration, because the outcome that maximizes joint profits is skewed in favor of the more efficient firm. Consumer surplus and social welfare also increase in many cases, although those effects are generally ambiguous.
Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice: The "Boston Mechanism" Reconsidered
In: American economic review, Band 101, Heft 1, S. 399-410
ISSN: 1944-7981
Despite its widespread use, the Boston mechanism has been criticized for its poor incentive and welfare performances compared to the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm (DA). By contrast, when students have the same ordinal preferences and schools have no priorities, we find that the Boston mechanism Pareto dominates the DA in ex ante welfare, that it may not harm but rather benefit participants who may not strategize well, and that, in the presence of school priorities, the Boston mechanism also tends to facilitate greater access than the DA to good schools for those lacking priorities at those schools. (JEL D82, I21, I28)