Suchergebnisse

"The book addresses the timely question of ideological change and secularization of religious political parties. In a striking comparative analysis, this book traces the similar historical origins of Islamist and Catholic parties in the Middle East and Western Europe, chronicles their conflicts with existing religious authorities, and analyzes their subsequently divergent paths"--

A. Kadir Yildirim and other scholars have used the term "Muslim Democrat" to describe moderate Islamist political parties, suggesting a parallel with Christian Democratic parties in Europe. These parties (MDPs) are marked by their adherence to a secular political regime, normative commitment to the rules of a democratic political system, and the democratic political representation of a religious identity. In this book, Yildirim draws on extensive field research in Turkey, Egypt, and Morocco to examine this phenomenon and assess the interaction of economic and political factors in the development of MDPs. Distinguishing between "competitive [economic] liberalization" and "crony liberalization," he argues that MDPs are more likely to emerge and succeed in the context of the former. He summarizes that the broader implication is that the economic liberalization models adopted by governments in the region in the wake of the Arab Spring have significant implications for the future direction of party systems and democratic reform

In this article, I examine the rising significance of a moderate kind of Islamist party emerging in the Middle East in recent years—Muslim democratic parties—and, the factors underlying their electoral success. In this, the manuscript takes a closer look at an important constituency of Islamist parties, the small and medium business owners (smes). Briefly, I argue that smes' support underlies the success of moderate Muslim democratic parties as opposed to more conservative Islamist parties, and what determines smes' support for a moderate party is the change in their political preferences. The change in sme preferences, I show, is due to the form that economic liberalization takes, whether economic liberalization is more inclusive (what I call competitive liberalization) or exclusive/selective (what I call crony liberalization). Empirically, I rely on original field interviews I conducted with party officials and business owners in Egypt, Morocco, and Turkey. I also integrate primary sources such as party publications into the analysis.

AbstractIslamist parties' electoral performance is a hotly debated question. Two arguments dominate the literature in terms of Islamist parties' performance in democratic elections. The conventional argument has been the "one man, one vote, one time" hypothesis. More recently, Kurzman and Naqvi challenge this argument and show that Islamists tend to lose in free elections rather than win them. We argue that existing arguments fall short. Specifically, we theorize that moderateness of Islamist platform plays a key role in increasing the popularity of these parties and leads to higher levels of electoral support. Using data collected by Kurzman and Naqvi, we test our hypothesis, controlling for political platform and political economic factors in a quantitative analysis. We find that there is empirical support for our theory. Islamist parties' support level is positively associated with moderateness; however, this positive effect of moderation is also conditioned by economic openness.

Although economic liberalization has been argued to promote political liberalization, this relationship is poorly understood and we do not consistently observe greater economic openness leading to more open and moderate political systems. We examine the connection between liberalization and moderation in the context of Islamist and Communist parties, both of which are characterized by ideologies opposed to democracy and the market. When will these ideological parties moderate by adopting more pragmatic agendas? We argue that competitive liberalization spurs the emergence of more moderate parties, but crony liberalization does not. In support of this, we use two sets of most different case comparisons in which we compare two instances of competitive liberalization (Turkey and Hungary) and two instances of crony liberalization (Egypt and Bulgaria). Our research offers an important clarification to existing explanations and a more generalizable theory of how and why liberalization is linked to political moderation. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]