Suchergebnisse

AbstractExisting literature focuses on how domestic and international institutions address investor–state disputes and attract foreign direct investment (FDI). However, contractual disputes between foreign and domestic firms are largely neglected. For foreign investors, dispute resolution mechanisms that can effectively resolve contractual disputes are very important as well. In this article, I examine the effect of institutions that conduct arbitrations for disputes between foreign and domestic firms on FDI inflows. Focusing on the within-country variation of China, I find that provinces with CIETAC (China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission) agencies receive a higher level of FDI. These agencies attract FDI because they can credibly signal that local governments are truly willing to treat foreign investors fairly when they have disputes with local firms. In sum, this article highlights an institutional variable that has received little attention in the literature on the politics of FDI.

While a large literature argues negative climate shocks can trigger conflicts, recent findings suggest moderate climatic conditions lead to war. This article proposes a conditional theory by incorporating political institution as a moderating variable. I argue that, under the impact of negative climate shocks, centralized societies can mobilize more resources for war, compared to decentralized societies. Thus, the former is more likely to resort to well-organized plundering to address the scarcity problem caused by detrimental climate shocks. Besides, centralized societies have little incentive to plunder when the climatic conditions are moderate, as they can collect taxes regularly through centralized institutions. A comparison between the more centralized Manchurian and the less centralized Mongols on their conflictual behavior serves as an empirical test. I find that temperature was negatively associated with the probability of Manchurian invasion after they embraced centralization but had a positive effect on the likelihood of Mongol invasion.

While a large literature argues negative climate shocks can trigger conflicts, recent findings suggest moderate climatic conditions lead to war. This article proposes a conditional theory by incorporating political institution as a moderating variable. I argue that, under the impact of negative climate shocks, centralized societies can mobilize more resources for war, compared to decentralized societies. Thus, the former is more likely to resort to well-organized plundering to address the scarcity problem caused by detrimental climate shocks. Besides, centralized societies have little incentive to plunder when the climatic conditions are moderate, as they can collect taxes regularly through centralized institutions. A comparison between the more centralized Manchurian and the less centralized Mongols on their conflictual behavior serves as an empirical test. I find that temperature was negatively associated with the probability of Manchurian invasion after they embraced centralization but had a positive effect on the likelihood of Mongol invasion.

AbstractIt has been one of the most debated puzzles in the study of political economy of terrorism whether economic development can curb terrorism. In Xinjiang, a multi-ethnic region in West China, it is widely believed that higher income levels can decrease the likelihood of terrorism conducted by Uyghur separatists or Islamic extremists. However, the county-level data for the year of 2013 show that better economic performance may not work as is expected. Instead, empirical evidence indicates that income is positively associated with the probability of terrorist attacks, and the effect is statistically significant. Projects that are aimed at boosting local economic growth result in a flood of migrants, and the local Uyghurs are disadvantaged in the employment market. Consequently, economic grievances will be generated. Some, but not all, Uyghurs have a shared motivation to resist, but tight social control in the region constrains the form of resistance, in the sense that neither mass protests nor armed rebellion are feasible. Terrorist attacks that come at a lower cost become a preferable choice. In addition to economic grievances and tight control, external factors also help to boost terrorist activities in Xinjiang, but more empirical and field research is needed before we could clarify how external factors, such as the international jihadist movement, interact with local conditions and result in terrorism in the region.

In this paper, we introduce the causal forests method (Athey et al., 2019) and illustrate how to apply it in social sciences to addressing treatment effect heterogeneity. Compared with existing parametric methods such as the multiplicative interaction model and traditional semi-/non-parametric estimation, causal forests are more flexible for complex data generating processes. Specifically, causal forests allow for nonparametric estimation and inference on heterogeneous treatment effects in the presence of many moderators. To reveal its usefulness, we revisit existing studies in political science and economics. We uncover new information hidden by original estimation strategies while producing findings that are consistent with conventional methods. Through these replication efforts, we provide a step-by-step practice guide for applying causal forests in evaluating treatment effect heterogeneity.

Scholars and practitioners have provided two main explanations for the rising exclusionary localist identity in Hong Kong: the rising economic pressures on grassroots citizens and the political discontent caused by the delayed political reforms. However, little research has systematically investigated the identity shift in Hong Kong after 1997. Using the Public Opinion Survey data and time-series analysis methods, the authors find that housing prices positively contribute to the salience of localist identity in Hong Kong and this effect is particularly strong among the younger generation. In contrast to the claims of pro-democracy activists, Beijing's political intervention has a negligible impact on Hong Kong people's identity transition. (China/GIGA)

AbstractIn this research note, we examine how Hong Kong voters respond to police violence in the recent social movement. We use causal forests, a machine learning algorithm, to estimate the impact of tear gas usage specific to each constituency. Based on the 2019 District Council Election outcome, we find that there is heterogeneity in the effect of state coercion on the vote share of pro-democracy candidates, depending on many socioeconomic characteristics of the constituency. The results imply that economic concerns still matter in the struggle to obtain democracy: citizens who sense economic insecurity in social unrest show less disapproval of state violence.

AbstractWe examine the global ownership structure of firms in the context of the investment regime. Investment agreements extend valuable privileges to firms invested abroad. But, these privileges only apply to firms whose assets are owned in a country that has signed an agreement with their host market; firms lack protections under investment agreements for many of their target markets. We argue that, by strategically locating subsidiaries in 'transit' countries, firms systematically expand their access to investment agreements. This firm-specific access to investment agreements through transit countries also has implications for investment flows: Transit countries receive more inflows and outflows of investment. Moreover, the impact of agreements declines over time and treaty partners, as seemingly newly protected firms have previously gained coverage through subsidiaries. Drawing on subsidiary location choices of the world's largest firms, as well as data on firm ownership structures and aggregate investment flows, we present systematic evidence consistent with this argument. The paper highlights the importance of the global ownership structure of firms in an environment of heterogeneous international rules and discusses new distributional consequences of the investment regime.