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Cover -- Copyright -- Contents -- Foreword -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction Political Disorder and Decay -- PART I ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION -- 1. Majoritarian logic -- 2. Rationality as Prudence: Another Reason for Rules -- 3. The efficacy of arbitrary rules -- 4. Variations on Tullock's road model -- 5. SYMMETRIC TRAGEDIES: COMMONS AND ANTICOMMONS -- 6. MAJORITARIAN MANAGEMENT OF THE COMMONS -- 7. Universalism through Common Access: An Alternative Model of Distributive Majoritarian Politics -- 8. Majoritarian exploitation of the fiscal commons: general taxes-differential transfers -- 9. All voting is strategic -- 10. Public Choice and the Extent of the Market -- 11. Choosing for others: A neglected element in the theory of collective action -- 12. The costs of collectivization, per se -- PART II AMERICA'S FISCAL TRAGEDY -- 13. Institutional sources of America's fiscal tragedy -- Index

SUMMARYIn analyzing political processes, public choice scholars invoke a two‐level choice, choices within rules and constitutional choices among sets of rules. This paper considers rules that set the limits for market choice through the political‐collective action. Three familiar categories of institutional constraints are examined: prohibition, regulation, and taxation‐public spending, that are significant in limiting the trading process. The motivation for institutional‐constitutional construction may originate from sources other than economic objectives. We note that institutional parameters include political and legal constraints, as supplemented by traditions and conventions which may affect choice behavior. We relate the analysis to Adam Smith's vision of the achievement of natural liberty and economic progress through his theorem that economic productivity depends on market size.

Do majoritarian democracies overexploit the general tax base, akin to the tragedy of the commons? Or, apart from any consideration of efficiency norms, are there "natural" forces in majoritarian politics that keep tax rates below revenue-maximizing limits? This paper formulates the fiscal process through the metaphor of the commons & analyzes the equilibrium that emerges in settings where differing majority coalitions may operate simultaneously to place charges on the general taxable capacity of the economy. The presence of a "membership externality," emergent from the necessary intersections of members among separate majority coalitions, acts to limit fiscal exploitation, even in the pure transfer settings. 2 Tables, 2 Figures, 3 Appendixes, 17 References. [Copyright 2004 Elsevier B.V.]

This paper corrects a long-standing error in elementary geometrical constructions that involve collective choices in multidimensional settings. The seemingly innocuous assumption of separability among arguments in individual utility functions does not imply symmetric indifference contours in shared goods space. Shared goods necessarily become gross substitutes when resource or budgetary constraints are introduced. The corrected construction suggests that issue-by-issue voting is less efficacious than is indicated in the conventional analysis. 5 Figures, 1 Appendix, 15 References. Adapted from the source document.

The article examines globalization according to trade logics based on the economic models of Adam Smith & David Ricardo. The Smithean model emphasizes trade specialization; the Ricardan model is based on differences. Smithean logic bolsters market extension more efficiently than does Ricardan logic, despite neoclassical economists' propensity toward the latter. The two systems also reveal differing empirical & epistemological perspectives relevant to policy & political choices concerning global markets (eg, immigration, national identity, & compensation for displaced domestic workers). The distinction between the two logics has implications for democracy itself, since Smith presupposes economic equality among all citizens, whereas Ricardo presupposes disparities. 2 References. K. Coddon