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On 18 August, the leaders of the United States, South Korea and Japan met at Camp David for their first trilateral summit. The resulting agreement to deepen military and intelligence cooperation has steered Northeast Asian ...

De troublantes similitudes existent entre l'Asie d'aujourd'hui et l'Europe d'avant 1914. La Chine exige de jouer un rôle à la mesure de ses ambitions, comme l'Allemagne à la fin du xix e siècle. La puissance dominante, les États-Unis, ne sait pas plus limiter l'expansion de la puissance émergente que la Grande-Bretagne il y a un siècle. Face à l'exacerbation du nationalisme en Asie, les leçons de la Première Guerre mondiale doivent être retenues pour éviter une escalade dangereuse.

Despite grand visions of a cosmopolitan planet living in peace, the first globalization at the turn of the 20th century descended into World War I as the old empires scrambled to preserve themselves as others sought self‐determination. Powers on the losing end of that war reasserted themselves in yet another worldwide calamity within decades.After World War II, in the early 1950s, with the victorious American‐led alliance in the driver's seat, institutions such as the United Nations and the Bretton Woods arrangements created a global stability that enabled peace, prosperity and the "rise of the rest."In 2014, the world order is shifting again with the rise of China reviving in Asia the very kind of nationalist rivalries that led Europe to war twice in the 20th century.Will we be able to build new institutions that accommodate the new powershift without resorting to war, or will the second globalization collapse as well? Top strategists from the US, Japan and China respond to this momentous question.

There are some disturbing similarities between present-day Asia and pre-1914 Europe. China demands a role that is commensurate with its ambitions, just like Germany at the end of the 19th century. Neither Great Britain nor the dominant power, the United States, knew how to curb the expansion of the emerging power. Given the exacerbation of nationalist sentiment in Asia, lessons from the First World War must be remembered in order to avoid a dangerous escalation. Adapted from the source document.

The issue of Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI) has attracted scant attention because of its relative insignificance to the Japanese economy before the 1980s. In the 1970s only a few analysts explained the Japanese FDI behavior from a macroeconomic perspective. This paper argues that there has been a noticeable change in the nature of Japanese FDI in the 1980s, a position that supports the traditional microeconomic explanation based on the oligopolistic market theory. This convergence toward the "Western" style of FDI reflects a fundamental shift of the Japanese economy from a trade-oriented economy to one that is foreign investment—oriented. However, as the experiences of two hegemonic states (Great Britain and the United States) have shown, foreign investment is not the best economic strategy from a long-term perspective. Preliminary evidence in recent years indicates that increasing FDI affects Japan's productivity growth negatively by weakening both the production base and the various sources of Japanese competitiveness.