Suchergebnisse

AbstractGovernance structures such as the American system of federalism create the incentive structure and framework for collaboration between local governments. This interlocal collaboration is crucial to helping governments deal with contemporary issues such as energy efficiency and climate policy where collective action can solve problems more successfully. The goal of this study is to examine how external rules such as federal grant regulations and the current scope of interlocal collaboration affect the choice of interlocal collaboration over time. We do this in the context of energy efficiency and climate policy using the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant Program.

In the last two decades, local governments have increasingly engaged in energy conservation and sustainability programs and policy. However, the benefits of these policies (i.e., cleaner air, less congestion, etc.) are often perceived as dispersed and costly. As such, localities consider collaborating with one another. However, decisions to collaborate pose considerable risks that can be magnified or mitigated by the mechanisms through which collaboration occurs. We investigate decisions to engage in formal and informal collaboration in the area of energy efficiency and conservation as a response to collaboration risks.