[Conclusion] This chapter has challenged the common perception that the EC's foreign economic policy is firmly supranational (see, for example, M. E. Smith, 2001). It has also illustrated how the institutional context in which the member governments choose whether to cooperate has changed over time and not always in ways that they favoured. Thus this chapter has demonstrated that the EC's status as an international actor is complicated even within economic policy. In doing so it has revealed that there are a variety of forms of cooperation among which the EC's member governments can choose if they decide to cooperate. This suggests that it may be worth thinking about the different forms of cooperation in EC foreign economic policy as forming a spectrum ranging from no cooperation through 'soft' cooperation to 'hard' cooperation, where exclusive EC competence applies. Considered in this light, the differences between the practices in the EC's different external policies may not be so stark as it might at first appear.
Conclusions: This paper argues that an increasingly important aspect of the EU's trade policy is the external impact of internal rules adopted for regulatory rather than trade reasons. The most trade-impeding of these rules tend to cluster where the regulatory differences, particularly with regard to risk management, among the member states are most pronounced. Trade-barriers stemming from such measures are particularly difficult to resolve for two reasons: 1)they may not contravene international rules and 2) there is particularly strong political resistance to policy change. Trade barriers stemming from the EU's regulation of risks may not contravene multilateral rules, because those rules strike a balance between permitting protection and prosecuting protectionism. Such exceptions to free trade are a necessary part of the deal for making extensive behind-the-border liberalisation politically acceptable. In this sense they are an extension of the compromise of 'embedded liberalism' between liberal internationalist orthodoxy and domestic interventionism that permitted the creation of the Bretton Woods System (Ruggie, 1982: 209). This paper, while preliminary and unrepresentative, suggests that both EU and WTO rules favour letting a guilty party go free rather than convicting an innocent. Consequently, governments retain a significant degree of regulatory autonomy despite deeper integration. Even where the EU's measures contravene international rules, the EU has often been resistant to policy change. Although this paper has focused on the EU, such resistance to policy change is not unique to the EU and may be common to more divided systems of government, of which the United States is the other prime example. Political resistance to change and the trade-barriers' roots in profoundly different regulatory approaches mean that negotiated solutions to such trade barriers are highly unlikely. Although governments readily resort to the WTO's binding dispute settlement proceedings in many areas, with respect to such politically sensitive issues they proceed with considerable caution. The related combination of legitimate exceptions to free trade and the cautious prosecution of some regulatory trade barriers by governments mean that a degree of trade friction will be an enduring feature of international trade. Thus 'system friction' would seem to be an inevitable consequence of deeper integration. Arguably, this is not too heavy price to pay for political acceptance of the project of further trade liberalisation.
While the number of interest groups competing for influence at the European level has exploded, the EU policy process is usually described as strikingly apolitical. The initial surge in interest group participation was principally a consequence of the transfer of authority to the EU, and of greater policy activity in the wake of the single market program. Subsequent efforts to integrate interest groups more fully into the policy process reflected an effort to extend democracy. The still-limited scope of EU authority, however, also restricts the successful extension of democracy at the European level.
This paper analyses the role of the European Union in promoting liberalisation among its member states and in crafting the multilateral regime for telecommunications services. It begins by analysing the origins of the EU regime, describing its contours and assessing its implementation. It then examines the interaction between the EU and the multilateral regime, examining the Uruguay Round and post-Uruguay Round negotiations on telecommunications services and outlining the issues under consideration in the GATS 2000 negotiations. It then proceeds to assess how the regulatory developments at the national, European and multilateral levels coexist and interact. ; Dieses Papier analysiert die Rolle der Europäischen Union bei der Liberalisierung der Telekommunikationsmärkte ihrer Mitgliedstaaten und bei der Formung des multilateralen Regimes für Telekommunikationsdienstleistungen. Es beginnt mit einer Darstellung der Ursprünge des EU-Regimes, beschreibt seine Merkmale und beurteilt seine Umsetzung. Dann untersucht das Papier die Zusammenhänge zwischen dem EUund dem multilateralen Regime, analysiert die Uruguay-Runde und die Folgeverhandlungen bezüglich der Telekommunikationsdienstleistungen und skizziert einige Themen der neuen GATS 2000-Runde. Schließlich beschäftigt es sich mit der Frage, wie die nationalen, europäischen und multilateralen Entwicklungen bei der Regulierung der Telekommunikationsmärkte verlaufen und wie sie aufeinander einwirken.
