Suchergebnisse

Focusing on the protection of rights in the UK, this book establishes a framework for interactions to better protect rights, facilitate deliberation, engage citizens, and provide for checks and balances. It further evaluates how well these values are achieved in the UK constitution now, and in light of a British Bill of Rights and Brexit.

Focusing on the protection of rights in the UK, this book establishes a framework for interactions to better protect rights, facilitate deliberation, engage citizens and provide for checks and balances. It further evaluates how well these values are achieved in the UK constitution now, and in light of a British Bill of Rights and Brexit

1 INTRODUCTION -- I. Defining Parliamentary Sovereignty: Dicey's Conception -- II. The Compatibility of the Human Rights Act 1998 with Dicey's Theory of Parliamentary Sovereignty -- III. Sovereignty Explored -- IV. In Defence of the Human Rights Act 1998 -- V. In Defence of Dicey -- 2 INTERPRETATION AND IMPLIED REPEAL -- I. Continuing Parliamentary Legislative Supremacy and the Doctrine of Implied Repeal: the Orthodox Account -- II. The Narrow Scope of Implied Repeal -- III. How to give Human Rights an 'Entrenchment Effect' -- IV. Conclusion -- 3 REDEFINITION AND THE RULE OF RECOGNITION -- I. Continuing and Self-embracing Parliamentary Legislative Supremacy -- II. Manner and Form and Redefinition -- III. Methods of Entrenchment -- IV. Conclusion -- 4 DEMOCRACY AND RIGHTS -- I. Dicey and Democracy -- II. Constitutional Rights -- III. Democratic Dialogue -- IV. Conclusion -- 5 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998 -- I. Models of Dialogue -- II. Justification of Democratic Dialogue -- III. Justifications of the Human Rights Act 1998 -- IV. Dialogue and Institutional Competences -- V. Towards a Theory of Adjudication -- VI. Conclusion -- 6 A THEORY OF ADJUDICATION -- I. The Current Legal Test -- II. A New Theory of Adjudication -- III. Conclusion -- 7 CONCLUSION -- I. A Modest Defence of Continuing Parliamentary Legislative Supremacy -- II. Conclusion

In "the constitutional case of the century", the UK Supreme Court concluded that the Government did not possess the prerogative power to withdraw from the European Union. However, whilst it may be clear that legislation was required to empower the Government to notify the European Union of its intention to leave, it is not necessarily clear when legislation would be required to withdraw from international Treaties. There is also considerable controversy as to whether the Supreme Court reached the right conclusion. It is hard to determine how far Miller would apply to other international Treaties. At its broadest, it would apply to the withdrawal from any Treaty which had created rights for individuals, regardless of whether this Treaty had been implemented into domestic law or not. At its narrowest, it only applies to the European Union Treaties, which created a set of arrangements in international law that are so esoteric, they are unique to the European Union. To demonstrated how one judgment can generate such a plethora of interpretations, we need to revisit the original criticisms and unravel the different strands of argument running through the decision.

Considers, in light of the ruling in R. (on the application of Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union (SC), whether the royal prerogative could be invoked to withdraw the UK from the ECHR while the Human Rights Act 1998 remained in force. Reviews the facts of Miller, and evaluates the conflicting dependence and bifurcation arguments on whether the provisions of the 1998 Act could operate as free-standing measures.

In this collection, leading figures in UK and EU public law address seismic changes the field and reflect upon the implications of these changes, the fundamentals of public law, and the interrelationship between them across six themes: legislation, case law, theory, institutions, process, and constitutions.