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This paper formulates and discusses a series of sequential decision problems of the following common structure: A decision alternative of multiple attributes‐that is, a job, an employee, or an investment alternative‐is to be selected within a certain fixed length of time. An unknown number of alternatives are presented sequentially, either deterministically or in a random manner. The decision maker can rank all the alternatives from best to worst without ties, and the decision to accept or reject an alternative is based solely on the relative ranks of those alternatives evaluated so far. The nonparametric sequential decision problem is first studied for a model involving a discrete time period and then generalized in terms of continuous time. Also considered is a variant of this problem involving a Bayesian estimation of (1) the uncertain probability of having an alternative at a given stage in the discrete‐time model and (2) the arrival rate of alternatives in the continuous‐time model. The optimal selection strategy that maximizes the probability of selecting the absolute best alternative is illustrated with the job search problem and the single‐machine job assignment problem.

For the so‐called group interview problem in which several groups of choice alternatives are presented sequentially to the decision maker, the optimal selection strategy is derived that minimizes the expected rank of the selected choice or purchased product. For the case in which the sequence of groups can be rearranged by the decision maker, a simple heuristic procedure is proposed for obtaining a near‐optimal sequence of groups, and the performance of the heuristic procedure in a Monte Carlo simulation is accessed. According to the heuristic procedure, the consumer is advised to visit smaller stores first and then move to larger stores later to increase the likelihood of finding a better product. Finally, the optimal selection strategy and the heuristic procedure are compared with those proposed by Chun, Moskowitz, and Plante (1993) and the problem of locating a new store in an area where there are several competing stores is discussed. The optimal selection strategy and the heuristic procedure can be applied to many sequential decision problems such as the consumer search and purchase process.

To those who wonder how Britain's East India Company managed to dominate the vast Indian sub-continent, this book provides at least part of the answer. Written by a former Indian Army officer, it describes the company's military organisation in India, especially its ordnance departments, and the factories it set up in Bombay, Bengal, Madras and elsewhere to manufacture the gunpowder and other explosives it used to subdue the recaltricent sub-continent. Of interest both to gunnery specialists

Social norms are patterns of behavior that are self-enforcing at the group level: everyone wants to conform when they expect everyone else to conform. There are multiple mechanisms that sustain social norms, including a desire to coordinate, fear of being sanctioned, signaling membership in the group, or simply following the lead of others. This article shows how stochastic evolutionary game theory can be used to study the dynamics of norms. We illustrate with a variety of examples drawn from economics, sociology, demography, and political science. These include bargaining norms, norms governing the terms of contracts, norms of retirement, duelling, footbinding, medical treatment, and the use of contraceptives. These cases highlight the challenges of applying the theory to empirical cases. They also show that the modern theory of norm dynamics yields insights and predictions that go beyond conventional equilibrium analysis.

School governing bodies in England have considerable powers and duties and their formal role positions them as decision-makers. This paper draws on qualitative research in the governing bodies of four maintained schools. Using deliberative democracy as a sensitising concept, it considers some processes by which decisions are made (or not made) in governing bodies. Without claiming that governors never make decisions, it explores constraints and limitations on their ability to do so. Governors exhibit a paradoxical combination of busy-ness and passivity. On the one hand, governing bodies are constituted and structured around activity and technically decisions were made. On the other hand, it was rare that decisions could be attributed to active choices by governors. Rather, their more passive agreement to actions and positions was presented as almost unavoidable 'common sense', either due to the national policy context or to the headteacher's presentation of the available options.

School governing bodies in England have considerable powers and responsibilities with regard to the education of pupils. This paper draws on an analysis of policy and on qualitative research in the governing bodies of four maintained schools. It explores two policy technologies through which education and the work of school governing bodies are constituted as apolitical. Firstly, it considers the move to recruit governors with (unspecified) 'skills' rather than those with a representative role who might provide diverse perspectives. Secondly, it considers the technology of 'prescribed criticality' through which 'effective' governors are provided with the 'right' questions to ask. The paper argues that the operation of these policy technologies has significant implications for possibilities for democratic engagement in schools.

School governing bodies in England have considerable formal powers and responsibilities. This qualitative research study explored their concrete practices drawing on understandings of deliberative democracy and citizenship as sensitising concepts. The empirical research was broadly ethnographic and took place in two primary and two secondary maintained schools. Data was generated primarily from interviews and observations. Considering school governors from the perspectives of deliberative democracy and citizenship draws attention to ambivalences and ambiguities in their role. These ambivalences and ambiguities cover issues of agency, representation, exclusion, knowledge and a singular conception of a 'common good'. Firstly, despite their busy-ness, governors are largely passive in relation to decision making and dissensus can be socially awkward. Consensus is underpinned by a singular conception of the 'common good'. Secondly, the voices of certain governors are marginalised. Some governors are positioned as representatives and their constitution as partial masks the partiality of all governors. Thirdly, there are ambiguities in relation to the valuing of different knowledges. Educational knowledge is valued but also inflected by managerial knowledge. The policy emphasis on the value of managerial knowledge and measurable data tends to displace other possible 'lay' knowledges. Fourthly, education and governing are constituted as apolitical and there is limited discussion of educational aims, principles and values. In all this, despite policy describing governors as 'strategic', their work is largely technical and operates within a constrained national performative system that renders alternative conceptions of 'good' education unsayable or unthinkable. These ambivalences and ambiguities operate, together with a dominant discourse of skills and effectiveness, to obscure possibilities for thinking otherwise about education.

Theories of rational addiction posit that certain habit‐forming goods—characterized by an increasing marginal utility of consumption—generate predictable dynamic patterns of consumer behavior. It has been suggested that attendance at sporting events represents an example of such a good, as evidenced by the pricing strategies of commercial sports interests. In this essay, we provide new evidence in support of rational addiction for the case of Major League Baseball but fail to find such support in data from the Korean Professional Baseball League. We then review the scientific literature on sports fans from the perspective of human behavioral ecology and propose a theory of endogenous habit formation among sports fans that could explain our findings. (JEL C32, D83, D87, D91, L83)