Suchergebnisse

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- 1. Overview -- 2. Equity and Priority -- 3. Equity as Near as May Be -- 4. Equity, Equality, Proportionality -- 5. Cost Sharing -- 6. Progressive Taxation -- 7. Fair Bargains -- 8. Fair Process -- 9. Equity, Envy, and Efficiency -- 10. Conclusion -- Appendix: The Mathematical Theory of Equity -- Bibliographical Notes -- Bibliography -- Index

Frontmatter -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- Chapter 1. OVERVIEW -- Chapter 2. LEARNING -- Chapter 3. DYNAMIC AND STOCHASTIC STABILITY -- Chapter 4. ADAPTIVE LEARNING IN SMALL GAMES -- Chapter 5. VARIATIONS ON THE LEARNING PROCESS -- Chapter 6 LOCAL INTERACTION -- Chapter 7. EQUILIBRIUM AND DISEQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN GENERAL GAMES -- Chapter 8. BARGAINING -- Chapter 9. CONTRACTS -- Chapter 10. CONCLUSION -- Appendix. PROOFS OF SELECTED THEOREMS -- NOTES -- BIBLIOGRAPHY -- INDEX

This book examines a conceptual framework for studying strategic learning. Topics include interactive learning problem; reinforcement and regret; equilibrium; conditional no-regret learning; prediction, postdiction, and calibration; fictitious play and its variants; Bayesian learning; and hypothesis testing.

New ideas, products, and practices take time to diffuse, a fact that is often attributed to some form of heterogeneity among potential adopters. This paper examines three broad classes of diffusion models—contagion, social influence, and social learning—and shows how to incorporate heterogeneity into each at a high level of generality without losing analytical tractability. Each type of model leaves a characteristic "footprint" on the shape of the adoption curve which provides a basis for discriminating empirically between them. The approach is illustrated using the classic study of Ryan and Gross (1943) on the diffusion of hybrid corn. (JEL D83, O33, Q16, Z13)

An office, or a mistress, cannot be apportioned out like a common. Jeremy Collier, Essays Upon Several Moral Subjects

Survey data suggest that cropsharing contracts exhibit a much higher degree of uniformity than is warranted by economic fundamentals. We propose a dynamic model of contract choice to explain this phenomenon. Landowners and tenants recontract periodically, taking into account expected returns as well as conformity with local practice. The resulting stochastic dynamical system is studied using techniques from statistical mechanics. The most likely states consist of patches where contractual terms are nearly uniform, separated by boundaries where the terms shift abruptly. These and other predictions of the model are borne out by survey data on agricultural contracts in Illinois. (JEL J43, C73)