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This reference guide throws light on almost every aspect of postwar international history from the rise of Mao's China to the Bosnian Civil War. It provides a huge wealth of information on East-West relations setting events, crises and conflicts in their full international context.

In contrast to most works of international history, which dwell on particular relationships, strategies, wars or crises, the questions in this book are about how diplomacy was actually conducted. The period 1963-76 saw significant changes in diplomatic practice globally. It was particularly a time of change for Britain as the country negotiated its declining world power and joined the European Community and economic problems forced spending cuts. Looking at the reform of the British Diplomatic Service and Foreign Office as well as the role of ambassadors, the use of 'special' envoys, summits and state visits, John Young sheds light on how diplomacy was organised in order to put into effect the country's foreign policy and on how diplomatic practice changed over time to make it more effective. Drawing comparisons with other countries, especially the United States, this study focuses on the means of diplomacy rather than the ends

In contrast to most works of international history, which dwell on particular relationships, strategies, wars or crises, the questions in this book are about how diplomacy was actually conducted. The period 1963–76 saw significant changes in diplomatic practice globally. It was particularly a time of change for Britain as the country negotiated its declining world power and joined the European Community and economic problems forced spending cuts. Looking at the reform of the British Diplomatic Service and Foreign Office as well as the role of ambassadors, the use of 'special' envoys, summits and state visits, John Young sheds light on how diplomacy was organised in order to put into effect the country's foreign policy and on how diplomatic practice changed over time to make it more effective. Drawing comparisons with other countries, especially the United States, this study focuses on the means of diplomacy rather than the ends

Lord Kitchener was a popular choice as Britain's Secretary for War in 1914, butmany facts about his selection are contested, including why he was recalled toLondon and who did most to urge the appointment. While some have argued thatthe decision was forced on the Liberal government by the Conservative oppositionand the Press, this interpretation was dismissed as a 'silly figment' by the PrimeMinister, H. H. Asquith. This article provides a detailed consideration of theappointment, considers possible reasons for Asquith's action, seeks to resolveambiguities in the evidence, but also raises doubts about widely-accepted details.

Recent decades have seen growing historical interest in the phenomenon of rumours, how they arise, their impact on events and what they reveal about those who circulate them. This has included a number of studies relevant to the outbreak of the First World War, not least, in Great Britain's case, of the so-called 'spy scare', which led to thousands of aliens facing police investigation and heightened fear of Germany. The focus of this article is on exaggerations in Britain of German aggression in early August 1914, including rumours that Germany had attacked France without a formal declaration of war, that Berlin delivered an ultimatum to Italy, demanding it enter the conflict, and that the Germans also had invaded such neutral states as Holland and Switzerland. These rumours, it is argued, served a similar purpose to the 'spy scare', deepening patriotic feeling and consoling Britons that their government's decision to fight was justified. But the article also shows that exaggerations of German aggression may have impacted on the government decision, that some Cabinet ministers may have believed the stories circulating about Germany and that the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, made his own contribution to the rumour mill.

As first lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill was at the centre of the Liberal government's decision-making during the July crisis. The July crisis unfolded quickly. Britain's preoccupation for most of the month was Ireland, where civil war threatened to break out over the government's introduction of Home Rule. This issue was foremost in the minds of Churchill and Grey when they met on the evening of 21 July and the first lord warned his wife, Clementine, the following day that Irish troubles "will make Europe take unfortunate views of the British situation". Most studies of the July crisis ignore or only briefly mention the Royal Navy's preparations, despite it being the "Senior Service" amongst Britain's armed forces and the world's largest fleet; and despite the importance of such preparations as diplomatic signals of British intentions. Ironically, Churchill might have agreed with some of his critics' remarks. His own emotional excitement during the crisis troubled him.