Suchergebnisse

Reviews privatization in the Middle East, concentrating primarily on Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco. Traces the (uncertain) moves away from state enterprise and state control towards a more entrepreneurial economy. Discusses the role of external bodies, such as the IMF, as well as internal obstructions to privatization ‐ legal frameworks, political uncertainties, the weakness of local entrepreneurial cultures and so on. Shows that privatization has been a limited undertaking only, noting that caution has been paramount and significant change apparently small, and that there has been no Arab equivalent of the privatizing zeal of, say, recent UK governments. Claims that assessments of success or failure are hampered by a lack of clarity about government targets, as well as by an absence of comparative data.

Analyzes coverage of events in the Middle East by the media of Great Britain and the US and deplores the stereotyped image of the Arab thereby created.

Details the findings of research into the establishment of the
Cities and Villages Development Bank (CVDB) of Jordan. The structure of
the bank, its objectives and its internal procedures and mechanisms for
providing assistance to local authorities in identifying priorities for
area development are also set out. The role of the CVDB in providing
funding and technical expertise, and in project administration and
budgetary control is also discussed. Describes the types of project to
which the bank is intended to lend support, and the actual borrowing by
local councils in the Al‐Balqa governate in 1987 and 1988.

Obgleich die Vergabe von Agrarkrediten ein wirksames Instrument der Agrarentwicklungspolitik sein kann, hat die Einrichtung spezieller Agrarkreditinstitutionen in den meisten Entwicklungsländern nicht zum gewünschten Erfolg geführt. Die Ursachen für diese Ineffizienz werden am Beispiel der drei wichtigsten Agrarkreditinstitutionen in Jordanien diskutiert: Dichotomie zwischen dem Zwang zu wirtschaftlicher Überlebensfähigkeit der Kreditinstitutionen und dem Ziel, die sozio-ökonomische Entfaltung gerade der armen ländlichen Bevölkerung voranzutreiben; organisatorische Mängel der Kreditvergabe; Fehlen unterstützender Maßnahmen in anderen Bereichen der Agrarentwicklungspolitik. (DÜI-Hns)

Synopsis of specialized farm credit institutions. The Agricultural Credit Corporation, Jordan Cooperative Organization, and Jordan Valley Farmers Association.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to examine the organizational antecedents and management of the bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) epidemic in the UK in the 1990s in order to answer the following questions. What organizational factors contributed to the development of the epidemic? How did they do so? What can we learn from the management of BSE that can help us in tackling future epidemics?Design/methodology/approachThe research involved content analysis of the most extensive documentation of the crisis, the Philips Report, and other official and non‐official sources, to gain a phenomenological understanding of the organizational/departmental/financial contexts in which key decisions were taken.FindingsThe organization of the institutions charged with managing BSE ensured slow, shortsighted and atomized decision‐making, inappropriate to the management of an epidemic. Organization‐ and department‐specific priorities, budgets and boundaries ensured piecemeal, "locally rational" responses to BSE, which cumulatively exacerbated the crisis.Research limitations/implicationsThe research is limited by the fact that it is based upon the Philips Report, and other official and non‐official sources. Further studies could assess these research findings through direct interviews with those involved. The implications of the study are that rapid and appropriate responses to epidemics do not necessarily arise spontaneously from co‐operation between bureaucratic institutions.Practical implicationsThrough identifying the organizational reasons for the inadequate responses to BSE, this research clearly shows the need for pan‐ or super‐institutional emergency teams, able to address future epidemics unhindered by localized bureaucratic imperatives.Originality/valueThe phenomenological analysis is new and significant in that it highlights the localized rationality of decision‐making before and during the crisis, and shows how locally rational decisions cumulatively exacerbated the epidemic. The research will be of interest to those involved in the prevention and management of epidemics.

"This title was first published in 2000: This timely volume makes a valuable contribution to our understanding of the issues faced by developing countries embarking on the path of democracy and economic development. Accountability in public management and administration is an essential element in the decision making process. It provides a comprehensive study of public institutions and their management in a developing context."--Provided by publisher.

The second of a two‐part article (Part I published in IJPSM
, Vol. 5 No.1) which continues the historical overview from 1949 when
the new democratic government instigated administrative reforms based on
initiatives from foreign research. In the period after the Second World
War attempts at reform were hindered by increased number of Civil
Servants and economic problems, particularly inflation and a fall in the
standard of living. Traces the difficulties which emerged between the
bureaucracy and successive governments as a direct result of their
failure to appreciate the role of the bureaucracy. The 1960 revolution
led to the establishment of three bodies with specific tasks to change
the structure of the economic and administrative systems and to
implement five‐year plans, but which met with limited success. Discusses
the ensuing excessive review and evaluation in every sphere of state
activity which has continued to date.