Suchergebnisse

The Taiwan government has started to promote the "Plain Landscape Afforestation and Greening Program" since 2002. A key task of the program was the payment for environmental services (PES), entitled the "Plain Landscape Afforestation Policy" (PLAP), which was certificated by the Executive Yuan on August 31, 2001 and enacted on January 1, 2002. According to the policy, it is estimated that the total area of afforestation will be 25,100 hectares by December 31, 2007. Until the end of 2007, the policy had been enacted for six years in total and the actual area of afforestation was 8,919.18 hectares. Among them, Taiwan Sugar Corporation (TSC) was accounted for 7,960 hectares (with 2,450.83 hectares as public service area) which occupied 86.22% of the total afforestation area; the private farmland promoted by local governments was accounted for 869.18 hectares which occupied 9.75% of the total afforestation area. Based on the above, we observe that most of the afforestation area in this policy is executed by TSC, and the achievement ratio by TSC is better than by others. It implies that the success of the PLAP is seriously related to the execution of TSC. The objective of this study is to analyze the relevant policy planning of TSC's participation in the PLAP, suggest complementary measures, and draw up effective adjustment mechanisms, so as to improve the effectiveness of executing the policy. Our main conclusions and suggestions are summarized as follows: 1. The main reason for TSC's participation in the PLAP is based on their passive cooperation with the central government or company policy. Prior to TSC's participation in the PLAP, their lands were mainly used for growing sugarcane. 2. The main factors of TSC's consideration on the selection of tree species are based on the suitability of land and species. The largest proportion of tree species is allocated to economic forests, and the lack of technical instruction was the main problem during afforestation. Moreover, the method of improving TSC's future ...

To respond to the Kyoto Protocol, the policy of Payment for Environmental Service (PES), which was entitled "Plain Landscape Afforestation Program (PLAP)", was certified by Executive Yuan in Taiwan on 31 August 2001 and has been implementing for six years since 1 January 2002. Although the PLAP has received a lot of positive comments, there are still many difficulties during the process of implementation, such as insufficient technology for afforestation, private landowners- low interests in participating in PLAP, insufficient subsidies, and so on, which are potential threats that hinder the PLAP from moving forward in future. In this paper, selecting Ping-Tung County in Taiwan as a sample region and targeting those private landowners with and without intention to participate in the PLAP, respectively, we conduct an empirical analysis based on the Logit model to investigate the factors that determine whether those private landowners join the PLAP, so as to realize the incentive effects of the PLAP upon the personal decision on afforestation. The possible factors that might determine private landowner-s participation in the PLAP include landowner-s characteristics, cropland characteristics, as well as policy factors. Among them, the policy factors include afforestation subsidy amount (+), duration of afforestation subsidy (+), the rules on adjoining and adjacent areas (+), and so on, which do not reach the remarkable level in statistics though, but the directions of variable signs are consistent with the intuition behind the policy. As for the landowners- characteristics, each of age (+), education level (–), and annual household income (+) variables reaches 10% of the remarkable level in statistics; as for the cropland characteristics, each of cropland area (+), cropland price (–), and the number of cropland parcels (–) reaches 1% of the remarkable level in statistics. In light of the above, the cropland characteristics are the dominate factor that determines the probability of landowner-s participation in the ...

ObjectiveIs there a tradeoff between democratization and stability? This article investigates this question through a typological analysis of the "third‐wave" countries. Specifically, it addresses two issues. First, are there more countries losing stability than gaining it after democratization? Second, between the "stability losers" and "stability gainers," which camp has experienced a larger scale of change?MethodsThis article adopts both data set matching and case knowledge. By matching data sets on democratization (Polity IV) and violence episodes (Major Episodes of Political Violence), as well as by bringing in case knowledge, this study categorizes the third‐wavers into three groups (the stability losers, the gainers, and the no‐changers) and compares their proportion as well as scale of change.ResultsThis study discovers that, among the 108 "third‐wavers," the ratio of "stability gainers," "no‐changers," and "stability losers" is 36:45:27. The scale of change is also bigger among the stability gainers than among the losers. Particularly, the chance of very bloody conflicts is much bigger under authoritarianism than after democratic transition.ConclusionWhile a level of caution for democratization is healthy, this topological analysis suggests a more balanced view. Democratization can be dangerous. The resistance to it can also be, if not more so.