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AbstractBeijing played a critical role in establishing the SCO in the aftermath of the break of the former Soviet Union in response to the emerging non-traditional security challenges. Overtime, the SCO has evolved into a regional institution critical to China's growing interests in Central Asia/Eurasia and increasingly, Beijing seeks to influence and shape the organization in support of its institutional balancing strategy—inclusive in soliciting Russian endorsement of its diplomatic agendas in the region ranging from energy security and greater economic integration, and exclusive in resisting and preventing US influence in the region. Lately, that strategy has also been displayed in the SCO membership expansion to India to minimize chance of a Washington–Delhi axis against China, at least not where SCO-wide (that would include China) interests are concerned. But the most critical transformation of the SCO as a regional institution is its utility in Beijing's exclusive institutional balancing strategy against the US, to prevent the latter from gaining access and influence in Central Asia/Eurasia; to foster trust among member states, and develop the SCO into a regional security community, and to safeguard Chinese interests in both geo-economic (trade and energy) and geopolitical (security and regional stability) terms.

Australia–China relations are at a turning point 50 years after diplomatic recognition. While the past five decades have witnessed extensive growth in economic exchanges, in recent years, bilateral ties have experienced serious deterioration. Australia's alliance with the United States, domestic politics—in particular the two major parties' approaches to foreign policy—and economic interdependence are important variables in Canberra's approach to China. There will be no exception for the incoming Australian Labor Party government to deal with these.

China remains an indispensable player in the peninsular denuclearisation process. Beijing seeks to foster peace and stability in the region, maintain a balanced two-Korea policy, and manage the North Korean nuclear challenge in the broader contexts of growing strategic rivalry with the United States, including disputes over trade, Taiwan and the South China Sea. Recent developments in China-DPRK relations indicate that Beijing continues to view North Korea as a strategic asset.

China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is an ambitious project aiming to transform the economic landscape along its route in the areas of trade, investment, and energy supplies. It makes as its focal point the connectivity between China and Eurasia, South Asia, and the Indian Ocean. South Asia's location presents China with significant strategic opportunities as Beijing seeks to expand its economic presence in the subcontinent by providing resources in infrastructural development, particularly the construction of seaports. With growing Chinese trade and investment in the region, Beijing is also extending its diplomatic influence into what has long been considered as India's sphere of influence. With longstanding strategic distrust and unresolved territorial disputes, New Delhi is suspicious of Beijing's intentions and concerned over the latter's growing influence into a region it has long considered its sphere of influence. In this context, the BRI has the potential to intensify Sino–Indian rivalry, and the Modi government has indeed explored and launched initiatives to counter Chinese diplomatic activities. It remains a challenge whether and how Asia's rising powers can reduce their trust deficits and explore areas of cooperation made possible by the BRI, working toward a cooperative, mutually beneficial future for Sino–Indian relations and the region as a whole.

The year 2018 saw a reduction in tensions on the Korean Peninsula and one of active diplomacy and summitry, including a historic meeting between North Korean President Kim Jong-un and US President Donald Trump. However, the momentum had stalled due to different interpretations of the denuclearisation pledge and divergent priorities between the two countries. China remains a key player as Pyongyang and Washington contest over the substance and processes of difficult negotiations ahead.

This article takes stock of the evolution of bilateral economic ties between China and India since the early 1990s. It analyses the factors that have contributed to the expansion of this important aspect of their relationship, but also highlights the obstacles, in particular the politico-strategic variables, to further expansion of economic ties, including investments. It argues that while both Beijing and New Delhi recognise the importance of trade and investment in their relationship, future growth in bilateral economic ties depends on how the two countries can successfully deal with issues such as trade imbalance, market access, infrastructure, and regulatory environment. But more importantly, Beijing and New Delhi must seriously address each other's security concerns, including those areas that affect their perceptions of economic security and consequently their policies towards bilateral and regional cooperation. (GIGA/J Current Ch Affairs)