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This article investigates the impact of environmental regulations on energy consumption. As the main way for the government to protect the environment, the implementation of environmental pollution tax has played an important role in China's energy consumption. This article uses data from the implementation of environmental pollution tax in Chinese cities to match with urban energy consumption data, and uses the difference-in-difference method (DID) to estimate the impact of environmental regulations on energy consumption. We find that the implementation of environmental pollution tax has reduced energy consumption, but this effect is mainly effective in the central and western regions and two-controlled areas. Further analysis shows that the reduction of energy consumption by environmental pollution tax is mainly attributed to improving technological innovation capabilities, optimizing industrial structure, and increasing tax collection intensity. The results in this study provide evidence for achieving an environmentally friendly society and sustainable development.

This paper extends the nonparametric method to estimate labor supply developed by Blomquist and Newey (2002) to handle cases in which there are individuals who do not work. The method is then applied to married women in Sweden from 1973 to 1999. For 1999, I find an aggregate uncompensated wage elasticity around 1 and an aggregate income elasticity around -0.05. Furthermore, marginal tax rates are beyond the net government revenue maximizing rates. Despite large labor supply effects, the dramatic evolution of the tax system can only explain a small share of the 58 percent rise in female labor supply during this period.

This paper extends the nonparametric method to estimate labor supply developed by Blomquist and Newey (2002) to handle cases in which there are individuals who do not work. The method is then applied to married women in Sweden from 1973 to 1999. For 1999, I find an aggregate uncompensated wage elasticity around 1 and an aggregate income elasticity around -0.05. Furthermore, marginal tax rates are beyondthe net government revenue maximizing rates. Despite large labor supply effects, the dramatic evolution of the tax system can only explain a small share of the 58 percent rise in female labor supply during this period.

This paper first formulates a model of how the politicians in a local government collectively lobby to raise intergovernmental grants to their local government. The model identifies a relationship between council size and grants received. I then study this relationship empirically using the distribution of intergovernmental grants to the Swedish local governments. I use a fuzzy regression-discontinuity design that exploits a council size law to isolate exogenous variation in council size and find a large negative council size effect. This pattern provides indirect evidence for the occurrence of lobbying. The direction of the effect could be explained by free-riding incentives in individual lobbying effort contribution caused by a collective action problem in grant-raising among local government politicians.

This paper first formulates a model of how the politicians in a local government collectively lobby to raise intergovernmental grants to their local government. The model identifies a relationship between council size and grants received. I then study this relationship empirically using the distribution of intergovernmental grants to the Swedish local governments. I use a fuzzy regression-discontinuity design that exploits a council size law to isolate exogenous variation in council size and find a large negative council size effect. This pattern provides indirect evidence for the occurrence of lobbying. The direction of the effect could be explained by free-riding incentives in individual lobbying effort contribution caused by a collective action problem in grant-raising among local government politicians.

This paper investigates the effect of political representation on the electoral outcome at the party level in a proportional multiparty election system using data from Swedish local government elections. There are two notions of representation in a council; the first is to hold seats, and the second is to belong to the ruling coalition. I refer to the effect of the former as the incumbency effect and the effect of the latter as the effect of ruling. To identify causal effects, I use the discontinuous variations in the number of seats and ruling (as a coalition receives a majority of the seats) to isolate exogenous variation in incumbency and ruling respectively. I find an advantage of 0.11 percent of the votes for each percent of incumbency. 11 percent of the votes in an election are therefore determined by incumbency, a figure close to the advantage found in majoritarian systems. However, the advantage differs significantly between parties. Further, I find no effects of ruling, contrary to the commonly found cost of ruling in proportional systems.

This paper investigates the effect of political representation on the electoral outcome at the party level in a proportional multiparty election system using data from Swedish local government elections. There are two notions of representation in a council; the first is to hold seats, and the second is to belong to the ruling coalition. I refer to the effect of the former as the incumbency effect and the effect of the latter as the effect of ruling. To identify causal effects, I use the discontinuous variations in the number of seats and ruling (as a coalition receives a majority of the seats) to isolate exogenous variation in incumbency and ruling respectively. I find an advantage of 0.11 percent of the votes for each percent of incumbency. 11 percent of the votes in an election are therefore determined by incumbency, a figure close to the advantage found in majoritarian systems. However, the advantage differs significantly between parties. Further, I find no effects of ruling, contrary to the commonly found cost of ruling in proportional systems.

The continuous expansion of urban land has led to massive encroachment upon cropland. To examine the impacts of urban expansion on the loss and fragmentation of cropland in China's nine major grain production areas (MGPAs), we used standard deviation ellipse, land use transfer matrix, land use dynamic degree, and landscape metric to explore the spatio-temporal evolutions, mutual transfer, and landscape patterns of cropland and urban land. The results show the following: (1) From 1995 to 2018, the areas of cropland in MGPAs showed a trend of "short-term increase—long-term decrease—short-term increase", while that of urban land grew continuously; (2) Urban expansion is the main cause of cropland loss. The cropland area converted to urban land accounts for a large proportion (49.26%) of the total transfer of cropland to other land types, especially in the densely populated, rapidly urbanizing and industrializing Taihu Lake Plain, Jianghuai Region, and Pearl River Delta; (3) In most MGPAs, urban expansion has led to fragmentation of cropland, especially in the Pearl River Delta, as indicated by the significant change of patch density. However, in the Sanjiang Plain and Songnen Plain, a less pronounced or even reduced cropland fragmentation was observed due to the significant conversion of other land types to cropland under specific land policies. From these results, we suggest that the government should regulate the encroachment of urban land on cropland and the transfer of natural land to it, and encourage the rural land consolidation to increase the cropland.