Teaching to the tests: An economic analysis of traditional and modern education in late imperial and republican China
In: Explorations in economic history: EEH, Volume 63, p. 70-90
ISSN: 0014-4983
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In: Explorations in economic history: EEH, Volume 63, p. 70-90
ISSN: 0014-4983
In: CESifo Working Paper No. 10554
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In: NBER Working Paper No. w26754
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In: CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14401
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In: NBER Working Paper No. w22117
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In: Journal of development economics, Volume 104, p. 233-244
ISSN: 0304-3878
In: American economic review, Volume 103, Issue 1, p. 107-144
ISSN: 1944-7981
British Master and Servant law made employee contract breach a criminal offense until 1875. We develop a contracting model generating equilibrium contract breach and prosecutions, then exploit exogenous changes in output prices to examine the effects of labor demand shocks on prosecutions. Positive shocks in the textile, iron, and coal industries increased prosecutions. Following the abolition of criminal sanctions, wages differentially rose in counties that had experienced more prosecutions, and wages responded more to labor demand shocks. Coercive contract enforcement was applied in industrial Britain; restricted mobility allowed workers to commit to risk-sharing contracts with lower, but less volatile, wages. (JEL J31, J41, K12, K31, N33, N43)
In: Journal of development economics, Volume 104, p. 233-244
ISSN: 0304-3878
World Affairs Online
Beyond years of schooling, educational content can play an important role in the process of economic development. Individuals' choices of educational content are often shaped by the political economy of government policies that determine the incentives to acquire various skills. We first present a model in which differences in human capital investments emerge as an equilibrium outcome of private decisions and government policy choices. We then illustrate these dynamics in two historical circumstances. In medieval Europe, states and the Church found individuals trained in Roman law valuable, and eventually supported productive investments in this new form of human capital. In late 19th-century China, elites were threatened by the introduction of Western science and engineering and continued to select civil servants who enjoyed substantial rents based on their knowledge of the Confucian classics; as a result, investments in productive, modern human capital were not made.
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In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4221
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In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4452
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Individuals' choices of educational content are often shaped by the political economy of government policies that determine the incentives to acquire various skills. We first present a model to show how differences in educational content emerge as an equilibrium outcome of private decisions and government policy choices. We then illustrate these dynamics in two historical circumstances. In medieval Europe, states and the Church found individuals trained in Roman law valuable, and eventually supported investments in this new form of human capital. This had positive effects on Europe's commercial and institutional development. In late 19th-century China, elites were afraid of the introduction of Western science and engineering and continued to select civil servants - who enjoyed substantial rents—based on their knowledge of Confucian classics. As a result, China lacked skills useful in modern industry. Finally, we present a variety of other contemporary and historical applications of this theory.
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In: NBER Working Paper No. w17979
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In: Review of Economics and Statistics, Forthcoming
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