Suchergebnisse

U.S. Energy Policy and the Pursuit of Failure is an analytic history of American energy policy. For the past forty years, the U.S. government has tried to develop comprehensive policies on energy, yet these efforts have failed repeatedly. These failures have not resulted from a lack of will or funds but rather from an inability to differentiate between what could be undertaken and what could actually be accomplished. This book explains how and why various policy efforts have come about, shows why politicians have been eager to back them, and analyzes why they have inevitably failed. Over the past four decades, U.S. energy policy makers have pursued not just policies that have failed but also a policy process that leads to failure

AbstractSince the presidency of Richard Nixon, policymakers have sought "energy independence" as the goal of energy policy. But that goal, unclear to begin with, has grown more opaque over time. "Energy independence" has meant different things at different times with no clear definition. Nevertheless, the goal is evocative, with symbolism that draws on key narratives from American history. This article argues that the idea of "energy independence" has become a trope and as such a major component of the energy-policy discourse. It describes the shifting (often only apparent) definitions of the trope both in energy-policy rhetoric and in energy legislation, and also explains how the discourse has shifted in recent years due to resource development and the realities of climate change.

AbstractExogenous shocks may lead to policies that seem extreme and even "irrational". This paper argues that, in the event of a major energy shock in the US that persists, such legislation is an inevitable response to the demand from constituents that political actors "do something". Since shocks by their nature are unanticipated and are often highly technical and complex, boundedly rational legislators cannot generally understand all of the ramifications of the shock, much less hope to craft well-considered and precise legislation to deal with it. But the demand to "do something" means that a range of actions is politically necessary. The "shock" policy process is modelled as a stepwise legislative decision problem. If the crisis persists, legislation that promises a solution is likely to be the result, even if this "solution" is infeasible. The model is applied to five US energy shocks.

Stalin's Great Terror was one of history's most massive political purges. In its form, the Terror resembled a one-shot, n-person prisoner's dilemma game. Although the Terror could not have been sustained if prisoners cooperated, most prisoners defected against one another, as the model would predict. Yet the record of the Terror also demonstrated that in a mass purge there exists a wider strategy set than that of the prisoner's dilemma game. Using an illustrative case and a generalized model of purges, it is shown that if prisoners implicate their interrogators and play what is called a "transformation" strategy, they raise the cost to the authority of conducting the purge. In fact, the authority has no consistent best response to the transformation, and the purge should not be sustainable for long thereafter. The Great Terror was apparently limited by employment of this transformation. Limitations on the formation and use of such a strategy are also considered.