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The Caspian region came into the focus of attention of the Caspian and non-regional states even prior to the collapse of the U.S.S.R. The increased global attention to this region was associated with the presence of proven and potential reserves of hydrocarbon resources, which increased the region's geopolitical significance. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Caspian region found itself in the center of geopolitical rivalry. From that time on, the subject of energy acquired a new meaning in the Caspian region. Western oil and gas companies and government agencies began to demonstrate an increased interest in the hydrocarbon resources of the Caspian region. Moreover, for decades the West has maintained a close focus on the Eurasian space, in particular, on the problems associated with the production and transportation of hydrocarbon resources. The most acute geopolitical standoff occurred between Russia and the United States, which supported various pipeline projects. For Russia, the key task was to preserve its regional dominance, which had been growing over the course of several centuries. The United States supported the geopolitical turn of the new Caspian states, advocating the creation of new hydrocarbon supply routes that would bypass Russian territory. The key task for the Caspian states was to increase hydrocarbon production and provide reliable routes for their export to foreign markets. Based on these goals, the Caspian states built their own foreign policy, including intraregional policy. Thirty years later, the results of geopolitical rivalry are visible. The Caspian countries, which rely on financial resources and political support from non-regional actors, have implemented large-scale hydrocarbon export projects. The new pipeline architecture has changed the balance of power in the Caspian region, increasing the involvement of the Caspian states in the energy policy of Turkey, China, and the EU. At the same time, the regional states have managed to solve the problem of the international legal status of the Caspian Sea in a five-sided format. A new trend of the last decade has involved projects related to the construction of coastal infrastructure and expansion of shipping. The Caspian countries are growing increasingly more interested in participating in international transport projects, considering them as an important component of their foreign policy. Despite the attained agreements and solutions to key problems, competition between the Caspian states, which is greatly influenced by non-regional actors, is intensifying.

The highly favorable geographic location and rich natural resources are the main attractions of post-Soviet Central Asia. After the disintegration of the U.S.S.R, it became clear that different actors operated differently in this strategically important region. This area occupied different places in their strategies, and their goals were realized using different instruments. Regional disunity (Central Asian states then failed to tune up multilateral cooperation) brought grist to the mill of extra-regional players. Mutual political claims and personal ambitions of the regional leaders made it hard or even impossible to initiate common regional projects. Local contradictions in the water and energy sphere became a serious obstacle on the road towards political interaction when dealing with regional problems, environmental protection being one of them. In short, at that time, Central Asian countries did not yet master the art of pushing aside disagreements and problems for the sake of positive actions. Extra-regional actors capitalized on this fact without reservations. The U.S., the EU, Russia, China, India, Japan, and Turkey proceeded from their long-term interests when they tried to impose their political agenda on the local states and draw them into the sphere of their economic interests. Apparently, they preferred bilateral agreements with each of the Central Asian states, since their importance for each of the external players depended on their economic development, geopolitical significance and natural resources that they possessed. In recent years, the extra-regional states have revised and readjusted their Central Asian politics. Today, they prefer multilateral relations; in some cases, this format has been used for a long time, while other extra-regional countries have only recently employed the "5 + an extra-regional actor" format. Turkey and Japan are two leaders in this respect: they were the first to suggest this format, and others followed suit. Many countries limit their multilateral formats to the foreign minister level and, therefore, to declarations and joint statements. Regional states prefer this format, which allows them to balance out external players and address their own problems. Predictably, Central Asian countries are ready to be involved in multilateral formats.

In recent years, the Caspian states have been paying increasingly more attention to port infrastructure development. The construction of new facilities and the reconstruction of existing ports received a new impetus. The Caspian states increase their investments in this sphere every year. They have developed national programs that aim to increase the volume of cargo passing through the Caspian states' seaports. The development of port infrastructure, augmented by new railways, was deliberated by the Caspian states in the context of solving geopolitical problems. The advancement of the negotiation process on the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea brought the solution of economic issues to the fore, along with the development of transport and related infrastructure. The signing of this document in August 2018 only raised the interest of the regional states in trade and economic cooperation. Accordingly, one of the key tasks that the Caspian states were facing was port infrastructure development. The construction of new ports was believed to foster achievement of long-term goals. In addition to economic development, first and foremost, of coastal territories, regional countries sought to reinforce their positions in global trade flows. Besides, the facilities constructed by the Caspian countries in recent years have been integrated in large-scale infrastructure projects, which are being actively promoted by non-regional states. China, the EU and Turkey have a stake in their implementation, and the Caspian infrastructure served as a part of regional transportation projects. The adoption of documents related to the development of transport in the Caspian region by the Caspian states reflected the importance of infrastructure. They formulated long-term tasks and outlined the spheres of cooperation with their regional neighbors. The expansion of regional cooperation by the Caspian countries is accompanied by the intensified struggle for the flow of goods. The Caspian states are growing increasingly competitive in the transportation sphere. The struggle for container traffic volumes and hydrocarbon resources is pushing the Caspian states to apply various financial and administrative mechanisms in order to attract cargo.

In 2020, Central Asian countries faced new challenges that are bound to have a huge impact on the development of the region. The coronavirus (COVID-19) epidemic has posed the region's countries with the need to find mechanisms for adapting the economy and social sphere to the new reality. Despite the difficulties, regional states were able to respond quickly enough to the pandemic and tried to minimize the economic and social consequences. Application of quarantine measures and various restrictions, i.e., border closures and the termination of transport links have yielded positive results. These measures have reduced the incidence of sickness and mortality in all countries. At the same time, they encountered a decline in key macroeconomic indicators. Inflation rate, tumbling GDP and rising unemployment were observed in all Central Asian states. The pandemic has negatively impacted bilateral and multilateral relations of the Central Asian countries. The level of trade and economic relations was lowered, the volume of transported goods decreased. The countries of Central Asia were forced to structure their foreign policy in a new way, which factors in the complicated economic situation in each of the states. Specifically, one of the new trends is the active use of multilateral and bilateral mechanisms of interaction with nonregional states. Despite the steps taken, the countries of the region managed to stabilize the economic situation for a short time. By the fall of 2020, the epidemiological situation remained problematic in the countries of Central Asia. This forced them to develop new measures to support specific sectors of the economy and preserve social and economic stability. The countries did not rule out the introduction of new restrictions and the development of additional economic support measures for the essential sectors of the economy. The slowdown in economic growth in 2020 and the lack of prerequisites for the improvement of the situation do not allow us to expect changes in the region in 2021. The Central Asian states may face a further drop in production volumes, increased unemployment, decreased domestic demand, and inflation. Economic problems in each of the Central Asian countries will negatively affect the geopolitical situation and serve as an obstacle for multilateral interaction of the Central Asian states. Finally, there is still no clear understanding of the impact of the coronavirus on the economies of Central Asia. There are also no calculations that would show how effective the measures taken in the fight against COVID-19 were, and most importantly, it is unclear what resources may be required if the epidemic continues.

The tempestuous events over the past two years in several CIS countries have led to the formation of a qualitatively new geopolitical, economic, and political situation in the post-Soviet expanse. Although the assessments of these events are largely emotional (some call the changes in power in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan revolutions, others refer to them as coups), the general conclusion drawn is that all the former U.S.S.R. republics have entered a qualitatively new stage in their development. This new stage could end in the formation of an essentially different geopolitical reality and new political plots in each of the countries indicated. The situation which has developed in the Commonwealth states is, first, the result of the geopolitical rivalry among Russia, Europe, and the U.S. for domination throughout the expanses of the former Soviet Union, second, is caused by the economic struggle between competing groups within each country, and, third, is generated by the people's discontent with the authorities' policy during the almost 15 years of their independence. Here it is important not to roll everything into one lump, but to look at the main causes of what happened, identify the laws governing them, and determine what awaits these republics in the future.

Traditionally, Central Asia is associated with a favorable geographical location and significant natural resources. These factors are of interests for the West, Russia, and China in the region. Meanwhile, the potential of Central Asian countries leaves many questions unanswered, as they face many regional challenges. The aim of the study is to identify the geopolitical and economic potential of the Central Asian countries, as well as to identify the challenges that the states have faced in recent years. A special attention is paid to the water and energy issue, which remains the most pressing problem for the whole region. In the conclusion, the author identified two of them: the persistence of economic difficulties in the development of Central Asian countries, which to a certain extent act as economic competitors, as well as the increased influence of extra- regional actors on the countries of the region.

In the last decade, the geopolitical situation in the Black Sea region is changing rapidly.The Black Sea states become members of various organizations, and new pipeline projects arebeing implemented, which create a new framework for interstate relations. An active policy iscarried out by Western countries, which seek to establish themselves on the Black Sea as thedominant force. These processes occur against the background of domestic political changesin the countries of the region, which has a direct impact on bilateral relations both between theBlack Sea states and their level of cooperation with extraregional actors.Russia's relations with a number of Black Sea states are emerging in a new way. In recent years,the nature of interstate relations with Ukraine has changed dramatically. Kiev set a coursefor the aggravation of bilateral Russian-Ukrainian relations by defiantly expanding its foreignpolicy towards the West. The Crimea's joining Russia as well as issues related to the Crimean-Tatar population are constantly raised by the Ukrainian side. Kiev deliberately provokesaggravation of relations in the Black Sea by relying on political and informational support fromthe EU and the USA.Despite the difficult international conditions, Russia managed to build a balanced policy towardsTurkey. Energy cooperation, trade and economic cooperation and regional security issues areimportant components of the Russian policy towards Turkey. At the same time, the Russian sidemust take into account the discrepancy between the interests of the two countries in the BlackSea region, and Ankara's desire to use relations with Kiev and other Black Sea states to promoteits long-term interests.The Russian foreign policy has achieved some success in maintaining the country's position inthe Black Sea region. Russian interests are based on the military-political potential, as well aseconomic mechanisms. Russian policy is aimed at minimizing the negative effects of influencein the region of Western states, and expanding political and economic cooperation with the BlackSea countries. However, the Russian side has failed to achieve a radical change in the improvement of relations with Bulgaria, which is a member of the EU and NATO. There are difficulties in the political dialogue with Romania, as well. Domestic political events in those countries, and their desire to follow Western countries and plans to join NATO have a strong influence on relations with Georgia and Ukraine. Nevertheless, the positions formed by Russia allow us to count on the protection of its interests and the preservation of influence in the Black Sea region.

National identities, considered a guarantee of successful development, were among the priorities for the five newly independent states that emerged in the territory of what used to be the Soviet Central Asia and Kazakhstan-the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan. The process began when the Soviet Union still existed: the Soviet Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan adopted laws on language that allowed the Central Asian elites to pass decisions related to the languages used by titular nations. In the post-Soviet years the language policy moved to the fore as one of the key aspects of the gradually emerging national identities treated with special attention at the state level. No matter how similar the processes were, no matter how close the cultures and traditions, each of the Central Asian countries chose its own road, fine-tuned to the specifics of their domestic contexts and the interests of the elites in power. The processes unfolded in full compliance with social continuity, traditions, culture and national languages that survived under Soviet rule. The republics, however, had to take into account the national minorities, including the Russian-speaking populations, in all post-Soviet republics. Inherited from Soviet times, the Russian language was dominant in all of the Central Asian republics, and even preserved much of its influence in the newly independent post-Soviet Central Asian states. This means that they should have opted for a relatively balanced language policy up to and including the continual stage-by-stage contraction of the spheres in which Russian was predominantly used. For obvious reasons they could not push aside their trade and economic relations with Russia and ignore the role of the Soviet cultural and educational heritage. This cushioned the political effects of the Soviet Union's disintegration, partially limited the role of nationalist parties in the newly independent states and helped preserve their educational potential. Shaping national identities in the post-Soviet Central Asian countries was not a smooth, let alone easy, process: societies were far from homogenous, while the regions found it hard to agree to more or less reasonable compromises. This became especially apparent in Kyrgyzstan, which was divided into the southern and northern parts; in Kazakhstan, where the local society was divided into zhuzes; in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, where clans carried a lot of political weight. Thus the elites in power in all of the Central Asian states had no choice but to take into account very different or even clashing interests of informal groups and clans, and tune their policies accordingly. This means that the road towards national identities was far from simple: it meandered between contradictory trends and interests. This also explains the centuries-old mechanism of governance, namely, regional-clan approaches to various problems, which was in place in all of the Central Asian countries, functioning outside the party and state structures. While paying lip service to Communist ideology, leaders of the Central Asian republics invariably took the clan balance of power into account. From the very first days of independence, the Central Asian leaders remained loyal to the conceptual approach to national identities: they concentrated on historical heritage, culture, traditions and national language, the key element of national identity. Despite the fairly long history of their independence, the problem of national identity remains prominent in all of the Central Asian countries. It is intertwined with the problem of the emergence of statehood and development of political systems and the radical geopolitical shifts occurring against the background of mounting economic problems. This cannot but affect the situation in the Central Asian countries in which the process of shaping national identities has not yet been completed.

Intro -- The Handbook of Environmental Chemistry Also Available Electronically -- Aims and Scope -- Series Preface -- Contents -- Introduction -- References -- Geographic Characteristics of the Black-Caspian Seas Region -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Caspian Sea -- 2.1 General Characteristics -- 2.2 Sea Level Variability -- 2.3 Ice Cover -- 2.4 Wind and Waves -- 2.5 Storm Surges -- 2.6 Seismic Activity -- 3 The Caucasus and Other Mountains -- 4 The Black Sea -- 5 The Sea of Azov -- 6 Conclusions -- References -- Hydrocarbon Potential of the Caspian Region -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Overview of the Hydrocarbon Resources -- 3 Hydrocarbon Reserves in the Russian Sector of the Caspian -- 4 Azerbaijan Hydrocarbon Part of the Caspian Sea -- 5 Hydrocarbon Resources of Kazakhstan -- 6 Turkmen Hydrocarbon Reserves in the Caspian -- 7 Iranian Hydrocarbon Resources in the Caspian -- 8 Conclusions -- References -- Oil and Gas Production in the Black Sea Shelf -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Hydrocarbon Production in the Ukrainian Shelf of the Black Sea -- 3 Hydrocarbon Production by Romania -- 4 Hydrocarbon Production in the Russian Shelf of the Black Sea -- 5 Hydrocarbon Development by Turkey -- 6 Bulgarian Shelf: Preliminary Results of Hydrocarbon Production -- 7 Georgian Shelf: On the Threshold of Production -- 8 Conclusions -- References -- Investigation of the Hydrocarbon Potential in the Black Sea Region: First Results -- 1 Introduction -- 2 General Description -- 3 Investigation of the Ukrainian Shelf -- 4 Investigation of the Romanian Shelf -- 5 Black Sea Shelf of Russia -- 6 Investigations of the Turkish Shelf -- 7 Black Sea Shelf of Bulgaria -- 8 Investigation of the Georgian Shelf -- 9 Conclusion -- References -- Pipeline Architecture of the Black Sea-Caspian Sea Region: Geographical and Political Issues -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Caspian Pipelines.