Suchergebnisse

To reduce traffic congestion and protect the environment, license plate control (LPC) policy has beenimplemented in Beijing since 2011. In 2019, 100,000 vehicle license plates were distributed, including60,000 for electric vehicle (EV) and 40,000 for gasoline vehicle (GV). However, whether the currentlicense plate allocation is optimal from a social welfare maximization perspective remains unclear. This paper proposes a two-level Stackelberg game which portrays the interaction between vehicle applicants and the government to quantify the optimal EV license plates under the LPC policy in Beijing. The equilibrium number of EV license plates derived from the Stackelberg model is 58,800, which could increase the social welfare by 0.38%. Sensitivity analysis is conducted to illustrate the impact of important influential factors — total license plate quota, vehicle rental fee, and energy price — on EV adoption. The LPC policy under COVID-19 is also studied through a scenario analysis. If thegovernment additionally increases the total quota by 20,000, 24% could be allocated to GV and 76% to EV. One third reduction of the current vehicle rental fee could increase EV license plates by 10.5%. Interms of energy prices, when gasoline price is low, reducing electricity price could contribute to EVadoption significantly, while that effect tapers off as the gasoline price rises.

To reduce traffic congestion and protect the environment, license plate control (LPC) policy has beenimplemented in Beijing since 2011. In 2019, 100,000 vehicle license plates were distributed, including60,000 for electric vehicle (EV) and 40,000 for gasoline vehicle (GV). However, whether the currentlicense plate allocation is optimal from a social welfare maximization perspective remains unclear. This paper proposes a two-level Stackelberg game which portrays the interaction between vehicle applicants and the government to quantify the optimal EV license plates under the LPC policy in Beijing. The equilibrium number of EV license plates derived from the Stackelberg model is 58,800, which could increase the social welfare by 0.38%. Sensitivity analysis is conducted to illustrate the impact of important influential factors — total license plate quota, vehicle rental fee, and energy price — on EV adoption. The LPC policy under COVID-19 is also studied through a scenario analysis. If thegovernment additionally increases the total quota by 20,000, 24% could be allocated to GV and 76% to EV. One third reduction of the current vehicle rental fee could increase EV license plates by 10.5%. Interms of energy prices, when gasoline price is low, reducing electricity price could contribute to EVadoption significantly, while that effect tapers off as the gasoline price rises.

To reduce traffic congestion and protect the environment, license plate control (LPC) policy has beenimplemented in Beijing since 2011. In 2019, 100,000 vehicle license plates were distributed, including60,000 for electric vehicle (EV) and 40,000 for gasoline vehicle (GV). However, whether the currentlicense plate allocation is optimal from a social welfare maximization perspective remains unclear. This paper proposes a two-level Stackelberg game which portrays the interaction between vehicle applicants and the government to quantify the optimal EV license plates under the LPC policy in Beijing. The equilibrium number of EV license plates derived from the Stackelberg model is 58,800, which could increase the social welfare by 0.38%. Sensitivity analysis is conducted to illustrate the impact of important influential factors — total license plate quota, vehicle rental fee, and energy price — on EV adoption. The LPC policy under COVID-19 is also studied through a scenario analysis. If thegovernment additionally increases the total quota by 20,000, 24% could be allocated to GV and 76% to EV. One third reduction of the current vehicle rental fee could increase EV license plates by 10.5%. Interms of energy prices, when gasoline price is low, reducing electricity price could contribute to EVadoption significantly, while that effect tapers off as the gasoline price rises.

Abstract.  We conduct a theoretical investigation into how financial reforms are affecting the long‐run economic performance of the partially reformed Chinese economy. In a model with a dual structure in commodity production and financial repression, allowing the co‐existence of a state banking system and an informal credit market and introducing heterogeneity in the transaction technologies of individuals, we examine the interactions between the state banking system and the informal credit market, and the effects of various measures of financial liberalization on individuals' optimal portfolio choices and the macroeconomic aggregates.

This paper analyzes the issue of macroeconomic control in the Chinese economy where there is a dual structure (consisting of a state sector and a non‐state sector) and the financial sector is still under tight control by the government. Given the dual structure and financial repression, when inflation is a severe problem, the authors investigate whether it is possible for the government to bring inflation under control without hampering long‐term economic growth performance. The investigation is conducted within the context of an endogenous growth model that incorporates the two major institutional features of the transforming Chinese economy. The paper evaluates the long‐run effects of changes in government monetary and fiscal policies on the major macroeconomic aggregates. The analysis suggests that increasing in the interest rate on government bonds will reduce inflation without affecting the growth rate of output; while increasing the nominal interest rate on bank deposits will exert a stagflationary effect on the economy: raising the inflation rate but reducing the growth rate of output.

A general equilibrium trade model is constructed to study the issue of income redistribution between the state sector and the private sector induced by a tariff reduction in the transforming Chinese economy. The analysis is conducted in the presence of price control, tariff protection, and the coexistence of state and private sectors. It is shown that the way in which income levels of the two sectors are affected by the tariff reduction depends on (i) the way in which the price of nontradables is affected, (ii) the degree of privatization, and (iii) the extent of price control.