Suchergebnisse

Intro -- Contents -- Editor and Contributors -- Introduction -- References -- Peripherality of the CEE Region -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Genesis of Economic Inequality in Europe -- 3 Peripherality in the Rokkan Model -- 4 Applications of the Rokkan Model -- 5 Central and Eastern Europe as a Periphery -- 6 Peripherality as a Problem in the European Union -- 7 Is There a "Multi-Speed Europe"? -- 8 The Future of "Multi-Speed Europe" -- 9 Conclusions -- References -- From Authoritarianism to Neo-Totalitarianism in Belarus -- 1 Main Characteristic of the Neo-Authoritarian Rule in Belarus Before 2020 -- 2 What is (Neo)totalitarianism in Belarus? Reasons of the Regime Changes and Its Basic Elements -- 3 The Enhanced Political Leadership -- 4 Political Terror -- 4.1 Forms and Methods of Terror (Mental and Physical Violence) in Belarus Applied in 2020-2022 -- 4.2 Infrastructure of Terror -- 5 Dismantling the Elements of Façade Democracy and Destroying the Alternative Information Space -- 6 Re-Ideologisation and Ideological Purification in the Belarus -- 7 Consolidation of the Power and Bureaucratic Apparatus -- 8 Conclusions -- References -- Illiberal Turn in Hungary -- 1 Transformation in Hungary -- 2 The History of the Fragile Hungarian Democracy -- 3 The Birth of the 'Homo Kadaricus' -- 4 The Road to Illiberal Democracy -- 5 The Energy Question and the Russian Affair -- 6 The Roots of Russian-Hungarian Friendship -- 7 The International Investment Bank -- 8 Hungary's Individualist Strategy -- 9 The 2022 Elections -- 10 Conclusion -- References -- Illiberalism and Nationalism in Poland's Politics -- 1 Understanding the Notion of Illiberalism and Its Derivative Terms -- 2 The Sources of the Illiberal Turn in Polish Politics -- 2.1 Internal Sources -- 2.2 International (External) Sources.

Chapter 1. Introduction (Ryszard Zięba) -- Chapter 2. Peripherality of the CEE region (Tomasz Pawłuszko) -- Chapter 3. From Authoritarianism to Neo-Totalitarianism in Belarus (Pavel Usov) -- Chapter 4. Illiberal Turn in Hungary (Andrea Schmidt) -- Chapter 5. Illiberalism and Nationalism in Poland's Politics (Ryszard Zięba) -- Chapter 6. EU and NATO Eastern Policy (Ryszard Zięba) -- Chapter 7. Ukraine's Attempts to Join the West (Marharyta Blyzniuk) -- Chapter 8. Russia's Challenge to Central & Eastern Europe (Agnieszka Bryc) -- Chapter 9. Militarization of Security Policies in Central and Eastern Europe (Tomasz Pawłuszko) -- Chapter 10. A Fragile Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Marlena Drygiel-Bielińska) -- Chapter 11. Energy Security of Central and East European Countries (Remigiusz Rosicki) -- Chapter 12. Visegrad Group – Real Entity or Mirage (Andrea Schmidt) -- Chapter 13. Three Seas Initiative (Ryszard Zięba) -- Chapter 14. Central and Eastern Europe in US Foreign Policy (Ewelina Waśko-Owsiejczuk) -- Chapter 15. Central and Eastern Europe in Germany's Foreign Policy (Aleksandra Kruk & Beata Molo) -- Chapter 16. Central and Eastern Europe in France's foreign policy (Marlena Drygiel-Bielińska) -- Chapter 17. Central and Eastern Europe in China's Foreign Policy (Zoltán Vörös).

Introduction -- The Main Determinants of Poland's Foreign and Security Policy in the 21st Century -- Russia as the Main Problem in Polish Sovereign and Security Policy -- Bandwagoning with the USA -- The Dialectic of Strengthening and Weakening the European Union -- Poland Pushes NATO and the EU Eastward -- "Make Poland Great Again:" The Meanders of the Three Seas Initiative -- Poland's Decreasing Activeness for Collective Security at the UN and OSCE -- The Evolution of Poland's International Roles

This book examines the evolution of the Euro-Atlantic security system, from cooperation to rivalry and crisis, since the beginning of the 21st century. By highlighting the causes, manifestations and international consequences of this evolution, the author describes a stage of crisis in the security system, characterized by increasing rivalry for spheres of influence, militarization of policies and the suspension of cooperation due to the growing divergence between the interests of the West - now including the Central European states - and Russia, leading to a subsequent reconfiguration of the world order. Adopting a neo-realistic approach, the author demonstrates that members of the Euro-Atlantic security system, irrespective of the values they claim to hold, are guided in their actions on the international stage by clearly defined interests. The first part of the book analyses the nature of the Euro-Atlantic security system, while the second part illustrates the limited success of Euro-Atlantic collaboration, for example in combating terrorism. Lastly, the third part discusses the consequences of the crisis, such as the conflict in Ukraine, and prospects for the future evolution of the Euro-Atlantic security system.

Celem tego artykułu jest ukazanie z perspektywy neorealizmu implikacji pozimnowojennego rozszerzenia NATO. Implikacje te należy widzieć na wielu poziomach: (a) bezpieczeństwa nowych członków Sojuszu Północnoatlantyckiego, (b) USA i spoistości NATO, (c) Rosji, (d) militaryzacji stosunków w Europie, (e) wybuchu wojny między Rosją a Ukrainą, oraz (f) globalnego systemu międzynarodowego. Wojna na Ukrainie – będąca efektem m.in. polityki rozszerzania NATO – jest wojną zastępczą Rosji z NATO o konsekwencjach globalnych, które przyspieszają rekonfigurację całego ładu międzynarodowego.

After the end of the Cold War, France issued the first document defining its national security strategy only in 1994. In the following years, despite its involvement in NATO and European Union enlargement, France did not publish any documents defining its security strategy. Only when Europe and the world found themselves in the process of reconfiguration of the international order at the end of the first decade of the 21st century did France begin to issue extensive documents defining its defense and national security strategy. As international terrorism became the greatest threat to France, the first document published in 2006 dealt with its position regarding this global phenomenon. Subsequently, White Papers on Defense and National Security were published in 2008 and 2013, followed by the Strategic Review of Defense and National Security in 2017. These documents define threats and challenges to the security of France, as well as its goals, and means and methods for strengthening it. They make up a broad understanding of the security of the state, society and the individuals, and international security. They show the programming of France as a European and world power. The author draws attention to some similarities and differences with the national security strategy of the Russian Federation. The analysis is conducted using the neorealist approach.

Charles A. Kupchan, How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace, Princeton University Press, Princeton–Oxford 2010, ss. XIII + 442.

Contemporary Polish-Russian relations are examined, taking into consideration the broad internal conditions in Poland and in Russia. Negative mutual stereotypes prevail in both countries, shaped in the course of a complicated history of mutual relations, while the concepts of international policies in both states are underdeveloped and divergent. Polish-Russian relations are increasingly more influenced by external conditions, such as the profound change Europe is going through and the evolution of the entire international order. The most important modern issues in Polish-Russian relations concern the persistent differences in the perception of the history of mutual relations, dissimilar concepts of the European security system, and energy security. The conditions of relations between Poland and Russia affect Poland's ability to pursue its international interests in many areas: in relations with Russia and the CIS, in the forum of international organizations (NATO, EU, Council of Europe, OSCE and the UN), in relations with Poland's closest allies and partners (Germany, France, U.S. and Ukraine). Finally, Polish-Russian relations influence the position and international role of Poland, limiting it when these relations are bad or augmenting it when they are good. Since late 2007 Poland has been trying to conduct a pragmatic policy and normalize its relations with Russia. In general, Polish-Russian reconciliation seems feasible.

Państwa zachodnie i ich instytucje międzynarodowe (Unia Europejska i NATO), kierując się liberalną ideologią kontynuowały w XXI wieku politykę promowania demokracji, rządów prawa, praw człowieka i gospodarki rynkowej wobec byłych państw socjalistycznych na terenie Bałkanów Zachodnich oraz byłego ZSRR. Największe przeszkody stawia ich polityce Rosja, która uważa, że państwa zachodnie w rzeczywistości realizują cele poszerzania strefy swoich wpływów i narażają na uszczerbek jej interesy bezpieczeństwa. Do największej konfrontacji między Zachodem a Rosją doszło w 2014 roku na Ukrainie, kiedy UE i USA wsparły prozachodnie aspiracje nowych władz tego państwa, wyłonione w wyniku kilkumiesięcznych demonstracji ulicznych w Kijowie. Kryzys ukraiński spowodował trudności we współpracy międzynarodowej i pogarszanie się stanu bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego w strefie euroatlantyckiej.

Publikacja recenzowana / Peer-reviewed publication ; Polityka bezpieczeństwa i obrony Unii Europejskiej w XXI w. znalazła się w stagnacji. Ważną tego przyczyną był kryzys finansowy z 2008 r. i recesja, która utrzymywała się w kolejnych latach. Ta stagnacja jeszcze pogłębiła się w latach 2014–2016 w wyniku kryzysu migracyjnego i brytyjskiej decyzji o opuszczeniu UE. Czynnikiem stale zwiększającym trudności jest wzrost eurosceptycyzmu po rozszerzeniu Unii Europejskiej w 2004 r. Obecnie dominuje on w krajach Grupy Wyszehradzkiej, w tym w Polsce. Paradoksem w tej sytuacji jest to, że w warunkach kryzysu pojawiły się pomysły utworzenia armii europejskiej. Były one głoszone także przez wiodącego polskiego eurosceptyka Jarosława Kaczyńskiego. Zwolennicy rewitalizacji WPBiO zgłaszali propozycję utworzenia unijnego centrum operacyjnego (kwatery głównej) do kierowania operacjami zarządzania kryzysowego. Autor twierdzi, że Unia Europejska nie wykorzystuje szans ożywienia WPBiO oraz że w czasie kryzysu na Ukrainie, który wybuchł jesienią 2013 r., i kryzysu migracyjnego w latach 2014–2016 ujawniła się jej zasadnicza słabość. Próbami ożywienia polityki bezpieczeństwa i obrony UE są: Globalna strategia na rzecz polityki zagranicznej i bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej (przyjęta w czerwcu 2016 r.) oraz utworzenie Europejskiego Funduszu Obronnego i ustanowienie inkluzywnego i ambitnego mechanizmu stałej współpracy strukturalnej – PESCO (w czerwcu 2017 r.). Trudno jednak ocenić, w jakim stopniu te ostatnie kroki zmobilizują państwa członkowskie UE do przerwania impasu w polityce bezpieczeństwa i obrony. ; The European Union's security and defense policy in the 21st century has been stagnant. An important cause was the financial crisis of 2008 and the recession that persists in the following years. This stagnation deepened in the years 2014–2016 as a result of the migration crisis and British decision to leave the EU. A factor that is constantly deepening the difficulties is the rise in Euroscepticism following the enlargement of the EU in 2004. It currently dominates the Visegrad Group countries, including Poland. The paradox of the situation is that in crisis conditions emerged ideas for the creation of the European army. They were also announced by the leading Polish Eurosceptic Jarosław Kaczyński. The constant demand put forward by supporters of the revitalization of the CSDP is the proposal to create an EU operational center (headquarters) to manage crisis management operations. The author argues that the European Union does not exploit the chances of reviving the CSDP and that the EU's essential weakness has emerged in terms of its security policy during the Ukraine crisis erupted in Autumn 2013 and the migration crisis of 2014-2016. The attempts to revive the EU's security and defense policy are: A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy (adopted in June 2016), the establishment a European Defence Found and an inclusive and ambitious Permanent Structured Cooperation – PESCO (both in June 2017). It is hard to expect, however, how this last steps will mobilize the EU member states to break the deadlock in security and defense policy.