Suchergebnisse

Acknowledgements -- Contents -- Abbreviations -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- Chapter 2: The Path to the First Trade Agreement -- Yugoslavia Between the Blocs: An Overview -- First Contacts Between the EEC and Yugoslavia -- The European Commission's Pro-active Role -- The Adoption of the First Negotiating Mandate and the Italian Veto -- Czechoslovakia 1968 and the Start of Trade Negotiations -- The Commission's Proposal and the French Veto -- The First Trade Agreement -- Conclusions -- Chapter 3: The 1973 Agreement -- From Rey to Malfatti: Continuity in the EEC's Yugoslav Policy

The disintegration of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s is often described as the starting-point of the EEC/EU involvement in Western Balkan politics, as if no political relations had developed between the EEC and Yugoslavia during the Cold War era. Instead, this book shows that the origin of EEC-Yugoslav relations must be placed in the crucial decade of the 1970s. Contrary to received opinion, this work demonstrates that relations between the EEC and Yugoslavia were grounded on a strong political rationale which was closely linked to the evolution of the Cold War in Europe and the Mediterranean. The main argument is that relations between the two parties were primarily influenced by the need to prevent the expansion of Soviet influence in the Balkans and to foster détente in Europe.

This article addresses the influence of personalism – an anti-liberal, anti-socialist intellectual movement which developed in France in the 1930s – on the process of European integration during the European Commission presidency of Jacques Delors (1985–95). The received wisdom is that the personalist tradition contributed to shaping the early developments in European integration in the 1950s but its influence later declined with the consolidation of the bipolar equilibrium in Europe. Instead, this work shows that personalism gradually re-emerged during the mid-1970s and 1980s and inspired the Commission's search for an anti-individualist European social model, the supranational democratisation of the integration process and the continental vision of European integration after 1989.

The present work focuses on the role played by Jacques Delors, who held the presidency of the European Commission between 1985 and 1995, in fostering public attention to the question of the so-called democratic deficit of the European Union (EU). It argues that Delors's involvement in this question was a direct consequence of his post-1989 view of European integration as a "collective" project, that is, a political enterprise based on the direct consensus and involvement of its citizens. This perspective was shaped by the reconfiguration of the role of the European Community in the post-Cold War European scenario and by the impact that "democratic" transitions in Central and Eastern Europe had on the Community itself. As an advocate of a "collective" Europe, Delors criticised the Maastricht Treaty for its failure to push towards political integration, publicly disputing the democratic character of the EU since its very inception.

First published online: 27 September 2019 ; This work reappraises the international dimension of the Osimo Treaties which, in 1975, solved the border question between Italy and Yugoslavia and also shows the connection of such agreements to Yugoslavia's attitude towards the process of Western European economic integration. This article argues that, on the Yugoslav side, the solution of the border problem was shaped by the peculiar economic interests of the northern republics – Slovenia and Croatia – which regarded the end of the border question as a means to foster cooperation with Italy and, at the same time, to obtain privileged access to the expanding Common Market. ; The research leading to this article is part of the project PanEur1970s, which has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (Grant Agreement No. 669194).

Drawing on primary sources from the Archives of Yugoslavia and several Italian archival collections, this article shows that, in the early 1970s, faced with mounting internal problems, the Yugoslav leadership reappraised its self-management propaganda in order to convey the image of a reforming and modernising country. This was functional to the external projection of the country's stability, and to favouring its relations withWestern European partners, Italy in primis. This article develops in three sections. First,it reappraises the historical development of Italian-Yugoslav relations after World War II,to highlight their political limitation and their link to Yugoslavia's policy towards WesternEurope. Second, it shows how the internal crisis experienced by the Yugoslav federation in the early 1970s led to the rediscovery of self-management propaganda. Particular attention is paid to the organisation of the Second Congress of Yugoslav self-managers in Sarajevo (May 1971) and its clear-cut external dimension. Third, this paper discusses the instrumental dimension of the self-management discourse in Italy until the mid-1970s. ; The research leading to this article is part of the project PanEur1970s, which has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (Grant Agreement No. 669194).