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Decision & Control in Management Science analyzes emerging decision problems in the management and engineering sciences. It is divided into five parts. The first part explores methodological issues involved in the optimization of deterministic and stochastic dynamical systems. The second part describes approaches to the model energy and environmental systems and draws policy implications related to the mitigation of pollutants. The third part applies quantitative techniques to problems in finance and economics, such as hedging of options, inflation targeting, and equilibrium asset pricing. The fourth part considers a series of problems in production systems. Optimization methods are put forward to provide optimal policies in areas such as inventory management, transfer-line, flow-shop and other industrial problems. The last part covers game theory. Chapters range from theoretical issues to applications in politics and interactions in franchising systems. Decision & Control in Management Science is an excellent reference covering methodological issues and applications in operations research, optimal control, and dynamic games

We revisit the relationship between market power and firms' investment incentives in a noncooperative differential oligopoly game in which firms sell differentiated goods and invest in advertising to increase the brand equity of their respective goods. The feedback equilibrium obtains under open-loop rules, and aggregate expenditure on goodwill takes an inverted-U shape under both Cournot and Bertrand behaviour, provided product differentiation is sufficiently high. Total industry expenditure is higher under Cournot competition.

AbstractWe consider a two-player differential game of international emissions to represent the interactions between two groups of countries, namely, developed and developing countries. We adopt a broader-than-usual definition of environmental cost for developing countries to account for their evolving involvement in tackling environmental externalities. Cooperative and non-cooperative solutions are characterized and contrasted. We find that it may not be the best course of action to push developing countries to reduce their emissions in the short term, and that cooperation may not create enough dividend, also in the short term, to be implementable.

RésuméLa décision d'exporter ou de ne pas exporter dans la petite entreprise est profondément influencée par le gestionnaire. Plusieurs études, en particulier aux Etats‐Unis, tendent à démontrer que le gestionnaire de la firme exportatrice se différencie sous plusieurs aspects du gestionnaire de la firme non exportatrice. Cette étude, d'après une enquête auprès d'un échantillon de 205 gestionnaires de P.M.E. québécoises, présente une analyse détaillée de leurs perceptions et de leurs caractéristiques.AbstractThe decision to export or not in a small business firm is greatly influenced by the manager. Several studies, especially in United States, have shown that there are significant differences between managers of exporting and non‐exporting firms. This study, based on a sample of 205 managers of small businesses in Quebec, underscores the differences in their personal characteristics and in their perceptions.