Electoral Turnout in Central and Eastern Europe: The Legacies of Communist Socialisation
In: Europe Asia studies, Band 73, Heft 10, S. 1797-1831
ISSN: 1465-3427
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In: Europe Asia studies, Band 73, Heft 10, S. 1797-1831
ISSN: 1465-3427
In: Politics, Band 42, Heft 3, S. 358-375
ISSN: 1467-9256
How does political socialization in a highly fragmented political scene affect propensity to vote? This article focusses on the long-term relationship between the number of political parties and the propensity to turn out in 96 parliamentary elections between 1996 and 2016 of nearly 100,000 individuals in 31 countries. Although intuitively more options might be expected to translate into a greater likelihood of participating in elections, existing research claims that high levels of party fragmentation instead lead to 'choice overload' and alienate citizens from voting. Building on the theory of voting as a habit, I show that early adulthood political socialization in a highly fragmented context leaves a footprint of non-voting in subsequent elections. This finding is especially relevant given the recent significant rise in fragmentation of most party systems in Europe, which in light of this research could mean a further decline in turnout rates in many countries in the future.
In: Europe Asia studies, Band 73, Heft 10, S. 1797-1831
ISSN: 0966-8136
World Affairs Online
In: European Union politics: EUP, Band 25, Heft 2, S. 223-244
ISSN: 1741-2757
Some defenders of democratic rights and the rule of law are becoming increasingly frustrated by the European Union's inadequate response to democratic backsliding in countries like Poland and Hungary. This study focuses on Poland and introduces the concept of 'Eurodisappointment' to describe this new group, which is conceptually and empirically distinct from Euroscepticism. Rather than being Eurosceptic, the Eurodisappointed self-limit their Euroenthusiasm without opposing integration. Drawing on original survey data, we demonstrate that Eurodisappointment is particularly prevalent among women, opposition party voters, and those dissatisfied with the state of democracy in Poland. It is yet to be seen whether and how the concept of Eurodisappointment can be applied to studies of attitudes towards the European Union in other member states.
In: Studia socjologiczne
ISSN: 2545-2770
In: West European politics, Band 46, Heft 6, S. 1178-1204
ISSN: 1743-9655
In: Problems of post-communism, Band 68, Heft 4, S. 264-278
ISSN: 1557-783X
In: East European politics and societies: EEPS, Band 35, Heft 2, S. 336-362
ISSN: 1533-8371
During the long nineteenth century, Poland was divided among the Russian, Habsburg, and Prussian empires. The partition produced regional diversity in political culture and in institutional and economic development. We examine how the cultural legacies of the empires have influenced the propensity of Poles to cast a ballot in parliamentary elections since 1989. Polish National Election Study individual-level data are used to assess whether higher levels of electoral turnout in Galicia are indeed a legacy of the Habsburg rule. Our results confirm that, even after controlling for socio-demographic factors, there is a positive, substantive, and significant effect on turnout of living in the ex-Habsburg part of Poland. This effect can be explained by the frequency of religious service attendance and by ideology. Inhabitants of Galicia not only attend religious services more frequently and are more conservative than their counterparts in the rest of Poland, but also the more frequently they attend church and the closer to the radical right they place themselves, the more mobilized they are to vote. The impact of the legacies of the empires on political behavior in Poland seems persistent.
In: Political research exchange: PRX : an ECPR journal, Band 6, Heft 1
ISSN: 2474-736X
In: Political behavior
ISSN: 1573-6687
AbstractLabor market competition theory has traditionally analyzed the threat perceived by lower and middle class' natives on competition over jobs with immigrants. However, in this article we focus on the fiscal burden and competition for social benefits generated by unemployed immigrants and its impact on the vote for Populist Radical Right Parties (PRRPs). Combining individual-level data and aggregate unemployment indicators for over 60 regions from 10 EU countries, we show that, on the one hand, upper class natives seem to support PRRPs when migrant unemployment rates are higher, irrespective of migrants' origin, which is consistent with the fiscal burden model. On the other hand, lower and middle class natives are more likely to support PRRPs only in contexts of higher unemployment rates among non-EU migrants (but not among migrants from other EU member states), pointing towards an interaction between cultural and economic explanations. These findings underscore the need to account for migrant populations' characteristics and to consider not only labor competition, but also the fiscal burden to better understand how unemployment may impact PRRP voting.
In: Journal of contemporary European studies, Band 31, Heft 2, S. 332-344
ISSN: 1478-2790
In: Political studies review, Band 20, Heft 3, S. 517-524
ISSN: 1478-9302
This article deepens the analysis of the effects of immigration on the vote for Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, focusing on education levels of both natives and immigrants. By analysing the immigrant population in 101 regions from 11 European countries, we show that in contexts with a large immigrant presence, the low-educated voters tend to support Populist Radical Right Parties to a greater degree than those who are more educated. However, when the ratio of skilled immigrants is high, also the more educated population tends to support these parties. Hence, our analysis adds insight into the relationship between immigration, education and Populist Radical Right Parties voting, highlighting the need of focusing at lower levels of aggregation and combining the characteristics of both foreign-born and host populations.
In: Frontiers in political science, Band 3
ISSN: 2673-3145
The traditional Spanish imperfect bipartisanship and the alternation in power that emerged in the early 80s between the center-left PSOE and the conservative PP have shifted towards a multiparty system after the emergence of three new parties. At first, as a result of the economic and political representation crises, Podemos (We Can) emerged at the 2014 European Parliament elections. This left-wing populist party managed to grow rapidly among the dissatisfied voters, reaching the third electoral position in the 2015 general elections. In the same contest, the liberal center party Ciudadanos (Citizens) became the fourth political force boosted, among other reasons, by notorious corruption scandals involving high-rank PP's officials and the process of secession in Catalonia. Finally, driven by the same secession process and thanks to the removal from the office of PP's Prime Minister after a motion of no confidence, the support for the populist radical right Vox also experienced a boost, winning 15 percent of the seats in Parliament in the general elections of November 2019. In this research, we describe the contexts which facilitated the irruptions of these new parties, analyze their impact on the Spanish party system, and study their current voters' profiles.
In: East European politics, Band 36, Heft 2, S. 288-309
ISSN: 2159-9173
In: Government & opposition: an international journal of comparative politics, Band 56, Heft 3, S. 405-426
ISSN: 1477-7053
AbstractThe recent success of right-wing populist parties (RPPs) in Europe has given rise to different explanations. Economic factors have proven to be significant mainly at the aggregate level. As for the individual level, it has been argued that the so-called 'losers of globalization' – the less educated and less skilled, profiles with higher job insecurity – are more likely to support RPPs. Nevertheless, RPPs perform strikingly well in countries less affected by the Great Recession, gathering high levels of support among profiles not considered the losers of globalization. Moreover, the effect of age on support for RPPs is not clear, as, on the one hand, the young are better educated and skilled, but, on the other, they suffered the effects of the economic crisis more. To address this puzzle, we focus on the impact of unemployment and employment insecurity among the youth on voting for RPPs in 17 European countries. We find that youth support for RPPs can be explained by the precariousness of the youth labour market.