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Like nature itself, modern economic life is driven by relentless competition and unbridled selfishness. Or is it? Drawing on converging evidence from neuroscience, social science, biology, law, and philosophy, Moral Markets makes the case that modern market exchange works only because most people, most of the time, act virtuously. Competition and greed are certainly part of economics, but Moral Markets shows how the rules of market exchange have evolved to promote moral behavior and how exchange itself may make us more virtuous. Examining the biological basis of economic morality, tracing the
In: Conflict management and peace science: the official journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 21, Heft 1, S. 1-2
ISSN: 1549-9219
In: Conflict management and peace science: CMPS ; journal of the Peace Science Society ; papers contributing to the scientific study of conflict and conflict analysis, Band 21, Heft 1, S. 1-2
ISSN: 0738-8942
In: Public choice, Band 98, Heft 1, S. 232-234
ISSN: 0048-5829
In: Neuroeconomics; Studies in Neuroscience, Psychology and Behavioral Economics, S. 41-66
In: International studies perspectives: ISP, Band 12, Heft 2, S. 136-152
ISSN: 1528-3585
In: International studies perspectives: a journal of the International Studies Association, Band 12, Heft 2, S. 136-153
ISSN: 1528-3577
In: Structural change and economic dynamics, Band 13, Heft 4, S. 435-455
ISSN: 1873-6017
Is it politically feasible for governments to engineer endogenous growth? This paper illustrates two reasonable political decision mechanisms by which fiscal policy generates endogenous growth with a single accumulable factor, under a constant returns to scale production technology, and without production externalities. In the first mechanism, optimal policies are chosen by the government to maximize constituent support by raising aggregate income. In the second mechanism, optimal policies are determined in a voting equilibrium where agents are concerned only with their own incomes. We demonstrate that policies that target aggregates generate balanced growth and are Pareto optimal. Policies chosen by the median voter also produce balanced growth, but result in public investment 50% below the socially optimal level.
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In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Band 111, Heft 470, S. 295-321
ISSN: 1468-0297
Capital flight often amounts to a substantial proportion of GDP when developing countries face crises. This paper presents a portfolio choice model that relates capital flight to rate of return differentials, risk aversion, and three types of risk: financial risk, political risk, and policy risk. Estimating the equilibrium capital flight equation for a panel of 47 developing countries over 16 years, we show that all three types of risk have a statistically significant impact on capital flight. Quantitatively, political risk is the most important factor causing capital flight. We also identify several political factors that reduce capital flight by signaling market-oriented reforms are imminent.
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