Search results

The crisis of authority in the U.S.S.R. (1988 - July 1991).
After a preliminary reference to the ideological options open to Mikhail Gorbachev, initiator of the break-up of Stalinism, and the mistrust which be inspires, both among some of his opponents as well as among right-wing conservatives, the author considers the recent evolution of the Soviet Union, from the monopoly of Party rule to the difficult birth of a pluralistic regime.
He first raises the question of the Party's attitude to perestroika. Article 6 of the Constitution of 1977, which aknowledges the leading role of the Party, was reluctantly annulled by Gorbachev, but annuled it was, thus leaving the way open for pluralism. Condemnation of factionalism within the body of the Party has not prevented the emergence of various "tendencies" (particularly the democratic Platform and the marxist Platform) which find official expression. Similarly, political and social groupings, independent of authority, began to proliferate : from groupings moved by a common principle, for example tne Safeguarding of the national heritage, or the defense of the environment, they rapidly became popular fronts, lending the system a de facto pluralism which would only later enjoy a de jure existence.
This spontaneous development took shape first of all in the Baltic countries, and then with increasing momentum spread to all the republics. In parallel with this, the communist Party leadership initiated a reform of the political system, which found expression in the semi-free elections of March 1989, marked by the defeat of various party and State notables. This was the beginning of a multi-party system, there having been two major opposing tendencies during the campaign for the regional elections in the spring of 1990 : the democratic Russia bloc (liberal) and the patriotic Russian bloc (conservative), surrounded by a multiplicity of organizations of the most diverse and constantly evolving tendencies. The charge levelled against them is that they have no autonomous ideas or initiative, and have only one single programme : mass rejection of the Party apparatus. Some observers are of the opinion that a deep schism will develop within the CPSU, and that this will give rise to a real multi-party system. The first stage of this development has just begun, with the movement for democratic reforms, which was launched in July 1991 by frontline reformers.
The other major problem which arises is that of the preservation or the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The authority of the Center is in question, and already six republics have decided to leave the union, proclaiming their sovereignty loud and long (the three Baltic states, Armenia, Georgia and Moldavia). But although the right of scission is officially acknowledged, its implementation is a vast battleground (see the law of 3rd April 1990). The upsurge of centrifugal forces has led the republics, one after the other,
to proclame their sovereignty (primacy of republican laws over federal laws, economic autonomy, ownership of the soil and mineral deposits, etc.) or their outright indépendance. Autonomous Republics and territories followed suit, opposing the authorities of the republics to which they belonged. Inter-ethnic conflict broke out all over.
The dispute over federal authority led to a "way over laws", setting the Centre at odd with republics resolved to insist on recognition of their rights (ownership of all the ressources found on their territory, freedom to exploit these resources, etc.). In this context, the question of finance and the budget had pride of place, together with that of material and technological supplies. The entire supply system was disorganized, with the republics refusing to carry out the orders of the State, or to deliver consumers' goods outside of their frontiers, in order to avoid a worsening of their own shortages. The Soviet government tried to combat the supply problems, at least in part, by setting up commodity markets. A series of economic programms was worked out, including V. Pavlov's anti-crisis plan (April 1991) which was adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, but it is not entirely clear how the economic responsabilities will be apportioned among the Central authorities, the republics and the lower-rank administrative bodies, and what will be the share of the state and private sectors. Also, it is not known how he proposes to overcome the present crisis, and how long this will take.
Another major source of discord is the army and the police. The republics demand the right to raise armed forces, and to assume the responsability for maintaning order within their territory. Certain of them, who have been the victims of attacks by the special forces of the Ministry of Interior, the OMON, have organized militias and defense groups, wich are virtually republican armies in embryo.
In the end, there was an overriding necessity for redefining the Union, and the first version of the new Union Treaty was adopted by referendum on the 17th March 1991. A slightly modified version of it was published on the 19th June, but neither the one nor the other gives a very clear idea of the respective areas of competence and the common areas of competence of the Centre and the constituent republics of the Union (and still less of the fate in store for secessionist republics). On the other hand, one can be sure that the Treaty will be the source of innumerable controversies and disputes, especially on the particularly explosive issue of the budget, taxation and the distribution of ressources. In the final part, the author ventures some thoughts on the future. He sets perestroika in the continuing context of the history of the Russian empire, recalling that the demands made (individual freedoms and democracy, self-determination and decolonization) were already those of the protagonists of the Russian democratic revolution of February-March 1917, which was "taken over" by the Bolshevik coup d'Etat. Now that the empire has fallen victim to its contradictions and weaknesses, and finally disintegrated, what will take its place ? The cure prescribed by the Union Treaty seems ill-adapted to the task, and several outcomes are possible : a resolute commitment to the way of democracy and decolonization, a return to an authoritarian régime but one establishing a market economy, the option of passivity while waiting for a solution "which will come of itself, or a return to thorough-going, tough dictatorship accompanied by a blood bath. If Gorbachev does not once more take his courage in both hands, and proceeds to decolonize the empire, however slow and piecemeal the process, others will do it for him. And in that case, we may fear the worst.

L'expansion considérable du commerce Est-Ouest intervenue au cours de la première moitié des années 1970 a été rendue possible par l'offre d'abondants crédits occidentaux. Mais elle traduit aussi les besoins considérables des pays de l'Est en technologie occidentale et en capitaux destinés à leur développement.
Cette expansion a cependant fait naître un énorme endettement qui a tendance à croître ces dernières années, malgré les efforts des pays de l'Est pour réduire le déficit de leurs balances commerciales. La dette dont le niveau a depuis longtemps dépassé les limites d'un endettement jugé « sain » est considérée cependant comme « acceptable > par les hommes d'affaires occidentaux qui comptent, en partie au moins, sur l'Union Soviétique pour renflouer les ressources de ses partenaires du CAEM en difficulté.
Devant l'ampleur du déficit à prévoir pour les années 1980, certains auteurs s'interrogent sur l'attitude possible des Occidentaux face à un éventuel défaut de paiement de certains pays de l'Est. Ils prévoient une attitude fortement influencée par des considérations de politique extérieure (ne pas renforcer la dépendance des pays du CAEM envers PU.R.S.S.) et de politique intérieure (soutenir leurs banques et entreprises en difficulté, même celles ne bénéficiant pas de garanties officielles de crédit). Un contingentement des crédits accordés à l'Est pourrait être appliqué, de même qu'un plan prévoyant des achats massifs et exceptionnels pour éponger, partiellement au moins, la dette difficilement recouvrable.
C'est l'attitude des pays de l'Est qui sera cependant déterminante dans les années à venir. La réduction actuelle du déficit de leurs balances commerciales et la pression pour la conclusion d'accords de compensation et de contre-achats ne constituent que des remèdes partiels. Ils seront acculés au choix : se replier vers l'isolement économique au sein de la zone du CAEM ou s'ouvrir davantage à une division internationale du travail. Les défauts de la planification administrative et les besoins aigus en technologie et en capital pourraient les obliger à choisir la seconde solution, à moins que les Occidentaux n'offrent à nouveau des crédits abondants et bon marché, ce qui ne ferait que reporter l'échéance.

Economie Reforms versus Reorganization of Centralized Management.
The term «reform» being equivocal, it can signify changes brought about through the use of administrative power or fundamental ones which modify the system itself. The former approach is favored by Marie Lavigne, although she also discusses some of the attemps made to modify the system. The author's preference for improving central planning brings her to a favorable evaluation of the concentration of power in the USSR, Poland and the G.D.R. as a means of revitalizing the Economic Reforms and to criticism of the market techniques employed in Hungary. Eugène Zaleski differs with Marie Lavigne on this point and believes that the "Hungarian experiment proves in itself that firms' activities can be controlled through the use of fiscal and other economic instruments without the intervention of central power.
Marie Lavigne adopts the same reasoning with regard to inflation in the East European countries. The Soviet Union, Poland and the G.D.R. attempt to contain inflation through imperative central planning while Hungary uses market controls. The success with which inflation is checked in these countries is only relative, but Marie Lavigne's use of the official price index as a success indicator is hardly conclusive in the reporter's opinion. On the contrary, Hungary in its attempt to curb inflation through the use of economic mechanisms confirms the viability of market socialism.
In the socialist context, the aim for efficiency should reduce the firm's autonomy and the aim for justice should restrain the profit motivation according to Marie Lavigne. Profit should not, therefore be the dynamic force of a socialist economy. From the administration's point of view, Marie Lavigne has little difficulty pointing out the insufficiencies of profit, but the solution she proposes — management's identification with «socialist ambition» and with society at large — is utopie. Profit has, moreover, been officially recognized in the East as one of the chief success indicators and the limitations placed on it as an indicator in Hungary, in no way refute its utility or that of market socialism.

The Producers' Unions and the Problem of Concentration of Enterprises in the U.S.S.R. The problem of economic efficiency, as it pertains to the policy concentration of Soviet enterprises, is studied in the first part. It seems that the practice of setting up agglomerations tended to compromise specialization of production and to hinder an increase of productivity. The system of administrative planning is not conducive to maintaining small, autonomous enterprises, even though it keeps them going in the form of workshops and subsidiary productive activities. Small enterprises, in the form of autonomous units, can be economically profitable only if differences in size are realistically taken into account.
The new economic system also favours concentration of enterprises. However, it does take into account both size (optimal size for serial production) and economic advantages (satisfaction of consumers demand and social advantages).
Territorial «Producers Unions», created in 1961 by the Regional Economic Councils, have not always paralled economic motivations. Their rapid expansion was halted in 1965, following the reestablishment of the system of branch management and of the industrial ministries. This move was in any event facilitated by the opposition of small enterprise managers to the Unions, because these had suffered from a reduction of their bonuses and social status thanks to the Union system. It should be noted that the territorial Producers Unions had been able, because of their larger size, to obtain more autonomy in management and economic accounting.
The new experiment started in 1966, responds more closely to the present system of management by branches and seems to enjoy the government's support. It seems that under this system both the traditional instruments of administrative planning and the financial resources accumulated in different funds (made available through the recently established system of autonomous economic accounting) are concentrated in the Central Administrations of industrial Ministries.
The new experiment is just starting, but the following trend seems to be developing : increased authority on the part of the new Unions and diminishing autonomy, especially financial autonomy, of enterprises. The continuation of this experiment hinges on introducing autonomous economic accounting into the management of industrial ministries. This in turn suggests that important changes in the « style » of their work must take place. Neither is certain. The new experiment implies that economic tools of management will be introduced into the whole Soviet system. One can well ask whether the creation of powerful industrial corporations endowed with far reaching administrative powers but relatively modest financial means, is the most efficient way of achieving this target.