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This comprehensive volume focuses on overlapping identities and integration processes in the Mediterranean basin and queries to what extent these various identities and integration processes are compatible or in conflict. Incorporating both theoretical and empirical material, it unites contributions from a variety of countries, thus exploring these issues from different perspectives.

The article reconstructs the negotiations and decisions-making processes leading to the monetary union between West and East Germany 1990 ; The German unification in 1990 generated many benefits, but also many disappointments. After the introduction of the monetary union between the GDR and West Germany on 1 July 1990, the East German industry collapsed, and mass unemployment became persistent. Ever since the modalities of the monetary union have been discussed controversially. This paper reconstructs the decision-making processes and negotiations towards monetary union. To a high extent, this reconstruction is based on original documents. Early on in Bonn a consensus was reached that monetary union had to be introduced soon, the rapid decline of the GDR making stepwise approaches impossible. Many officials were aware of the detrimental effects of a 1:1 conversion of the wages. But few dared to go against the widespread demands for 1:1 in the GDR population and government, not the least because of over-optimistic promises before the elections in the GDR in March 1990.

In this article, I explore the development and character of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and its compatibility with China's OBOR initiative. The genesis of the EEU is placed in the context of Russia's attempts to fill its "Monroe Doctrine" with substance, i.e. to claim the post-Soviet space as a zone of exclusive Russian influence. Russia's "Monroe Doctrine" was primarily formulated against the EU, its enlargement and its "European Neighbourhood Policy" (ENP) which offers privileged relations also to countries in the post-Soviet space. The logic of the Russian "Monroe Doctrine" works, however, against all countries trying to establish closer ties with former Soviet republics, China included. In 2013, President Putin presented the EEU as a predominantly political project, shortly after the Chinese President had launched the OBOR initiative; all twelve states in the post-Soviet space were invited to participate. However, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine opted for an association agreement with the EU, a move to which Russia responded by the annexation of Crimea and starting an insurgency in Eastern Ukraine. In 2015, the EEU officially started with the participation of only five countries: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia. It implied the extension of the rather high Russian tariffs to the whole EEU, a move which had negative effects on Chinese transactions with the region. This, however, could not impede a rise of the Chinese presence in Central Asia. In its present form, the EEU is not compatible with the OBOR initiative. A free-trade agreement between China and the EEU could make it compatible, but this is not a realistic perspective for the near future. The EEU seems to be an unstable construction, with many basic rules and norms being unclear, and many tensions and conflicts among its members. Keywords: China, European-Atlantic Security Community, Eurasian Economic Union, "One Belt One Road" Initiative, Russia's "Monroe Doctrine".

In this article, I explore the development and character of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and its compatibility with China's OBOR initiative. The genesis of the EEU is placed in the context of Russia's attempts to fill its "Monroe Doctrine" with substance, i.e. to claim the post-Soviet space as a zone of exclusive Russian influence. Russia's "Monroe Doctrine" was primarily formulated against the EU, its enlargement and its "European Neighbourhood Policy" (ENP) which offers privileged relations also to countries in the post-Soviet space. The logic of the Russian "Monroe Doctrine" works, however, against all countries trying to establish closer ties with former Soviet republics, China included.In 2013, President Putin presented the EEU as a predominantly political project, shortly after the Chinese President had launched the OBOR initiative; all twelve states in the post-Soviet space were invited to participate. However, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine opted for an association agreement with the EU, a move to which Russia responded by the annexation of Crimea and starting an insurgency in Eastern Ukraine. In 2015, the EEU officially started with the participation of only five countries: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia. It implied the extension of the rather high Russian tariffs to the whole EEU, a move which had negative effects on Chinese transactions with the region. This, however, could not impede a rise of the Chinese presence in Central Asia. In its present form, the EEU is not compatible with the OBOR initiative. A free-trade agreement between China and the EEU could make it compatible, but this is not a realistic perspective for the near future.The EEU seems to be an unstable construction, with many basic rules and norms being unclear, and many tensions and conflicts among its members.

Many observers posit that a shift in global power has taken place the last many years, away from the West to "emerging powers", in particular the BRICS. In contrast to this view, this paper accepts Moravcsik's view that it has been the EU which has developed into the "second superpower", being the only one to influence matters on a global scale besides, the US. Of particular importance in this context has been the growing attractiveness of the EU market and the considerable "soft power" which the EU exerts in some parts of the world. The paper reconstructs the most important steps of Europe's rise, with emphasis on the "expansionist" character of the EU. Internal developments in the EU have been crucial for its growing external influence. The "expansionism" of the EU and its system has until recently been peaceful. In the case of Ukraine, however, another (regional) power has applied military force to prevent further EU expansionism. The last part of the paper deals with the Ukraine crisis.

In September 2004 David Shambaugh, of George Washington University, published a small article under the heading: "China and Europe: The Emerging Axis." In his view, one "of the most important, yet least appreciated developments … has been the dramatic growth in ties between China and Europe" (Shambaugh 2004, 243). He pointed, firstly, at the strong growth in trade relations; the EU also became the largest foreign supplier of technology and equipment, in the form of direct investment, but also through a number of joint technology projects. The EU-China Framework Program became the world's largest common research project. As to political cooperation, numerous meetings have been institutionalised, among them, at the top level an annual EU-China Summit. The contacts have resulted in a number of agreements, for instance on group tourism. According to estimates 100,000 Chinese Students went to European universities and colleges in the 2003/4 academic year, considerably more than the 60,000 in the US. Also the Chinese Communist Party has established many exchanges with European political parties. Twenty separate dialogues and working groups covered a variety of issues, from human rights to textile trade. Each meeting generated the elaboration of proposals and negotiations of tangible programs – "thus marrying the respective bureaucracies and fusing them with common purpose." The multitude of all these interactions has often been confusing and overlapping, "but the totality of exchanges is impressive." To be sure, there were also points of frictions such as the European arms embargo (introduced after the Tianmen massacre in 1989), but Shambaugh saw it as highly likely that the relationship between EU and China would continue to grow and develop. "Over time it will become a new axis in world affairs, and will serve as a source of stability in a volatile world" (Shambaugh 2004, 248).

In this paper I compare African and European integration. Despite some important progress, so far African integration has not been as deep as the European one. Measured on the terms of intergovernmental versus supranational cooperation, the AU is essentially an intergovernmental arrangement, with a few elements which might have supranational potentialities in the future. In its present form, the AU is more akin to the UN that to the EU. By contrast, the EU is a complex set of arrangements of both intergovernmental and supranational character. In the broad policy fields under "pillar one", the EU resembles already a federal state, with increasing tendencies in this direction. The different degree of integration has been the cause of many factors. I highlight here the importance of two basic conditions for substantial progress at supranational integration. The first one is a consensus on basic constitutional principles. Such a consensus was in place in Western Europe after World War II (democratic rule by law), whereas Africa has exhibited a broad array of incompatible constitutional models after independence. The second condition has been compatible (not identical) socio-economic systems. The Western European countries have been mixed economies with a public sector, but where economic activities were mainly coordinated by market forces. This opened the possibilities to use these market forces, e.g. by removing trade barriers, to strengthen cooperation at ground level and create pressures for further integration. Adherence to such a socio-economic model has also become an explicit criterion for EU membership. By contrast, Africa has seen all kinds of economic systems, centrally-planned socialist ones included. The last ones are incompatible with market economies. The multitude of systems has therefore created additional barriers for African integration. Today there is reason to be moderately optimistic as regards some progress at African integration. Democratic principles are much stronger rooted today than previously, and the time of sweeping social experiments seems to be over. However, in the nearer and mid-term perspective progress is more likely to be achievable on a sub-continental scale; in many cases the first step must be the reconstruction of the "failed state". A further strengthening of cooperation at AU-level is conceivable, but it will hardly acquire supra-national characteristics for many years to come.

In this paper I try to explore whether the EU can go on expanding and thereby become culturally ever more diversified, and at the same retain its stability. The answer is, in principle, affirmative. Europe has always been much diversified, and therefore it is not possible to define a European identity in terms of particular cultural traditions. However, in spite of their diversity, the EU-member countries are united by their adherence to the principles of democracy, rule by law and human rights. Countries which do not share this basic consensus would not be accepted as members, nor is it likely that they would apply for it. An essential part is the willingness of member states to accept a reduction of national sovereignty on some important policy fields. The EU project is basically about lifting the principles of democracy and rule by law on the international level, most and foremost among the member states, but also as to the outer world. This endeavour can be seen the core of the European identity. It provides mechanisms which allow handling cultural differences, and in principle, it is open to other countries. Furthermore, theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence has convincingly shown that economic modernisation leads to a set of predictable cultural changes, among them exactly the spread of democratic ideals. Modernisation is thereby a powerful ally of the European project. Further geographical expansion and an intensification of the cooperation are the most likely scenarios, and so is the existence of many conflicts. But this is simply EU-normality.