Persuasion Meets Delegation
In: UNSW Business School Research Paper No. 2018-06
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In: UNSW Business School Research Paper No. 2018-06
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In: American economic review, Band 107, Heft 9, S. 2666-2694
ISSN: 1944-7981
Several agents with privately known social values compete for a prize. The prize is allocated based on the claims of the agents, and the winner is subject to a limited penalty if he makes a false claim. If the number of agents is large, the optimal mechanism places all agents above a threshold onto a shortlist along with a fraction of agents below the threshold, and then allocates the prize to a random agent on the shortlist. When the number of agents is small, the optimal mechanism allocates the prize to the agent who makes the highest claim, but restricts the range of claims above and below. (JEL D63, D82)
In: International Economic Review, Band 54, Heft 3, S. 769-785
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In: Journal of political economy microeconomics, Band 2, Heft 1, S. 77-128
ISSN: 2832-9368
Kolotilin acknowledges financial support from the Australian Research Council Discovery Early Career Research Award DE160100964 and from MIT Sloan's Program on Innovation in Markets and Organizations. Mylovanov acknowledges financial support from the Office of Naval Research Multidisciplinary University Research Initiative Award N0001417-1-2675 and from Kyiv School of Economics. Zapechelnyuk acknowledges financial support from the Economic and Social Research Council Grant ES/N01829X/1. ; We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where a sender's utility depends only on the expected state. We show that upper censorship that pools the states above a cutoff and reveals the states below the cutoff is optimal for all prior distributions of the state if and only if the sender's marginal utility is quasi‐concave. Moreover, we show that it is optimal to reveal less information if the sender becomes more risk averse or the sender's utility shifts to the left. Finally, we apply our results to the problem of media censorship by a government. ; Publisher PDF ; Peer reviewed
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In: UNSW Business School Research Paper No. 2016-21
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