Suchergebnisse

The relationship between ways of viewing regional conflict (RC) & conflict resolution is explored. RC can be thought of in three ways, each suggesting a different approach to resolution: (1) as a clash of conflicting unilateral solutions requiring a formula for a joint or multilateral mutually satisfactory outcome; (2) as a succession of opposing policies based on cost-benefit calculations, requiring a ripe moment comprised of a mutually hurting stalemate, impending catastrophe, & a formula for a way out for resolution; & (3) as an event in process of change requiring negotiation of a new regime to replace an old one that embodied certain expectations & behaviors. Examples of RCs & their successful & unsuccessful resolutions are discussed. Adapted from the source document.

Officially public authorities do not negotiate with terrorists. However, governments frequently do end up negotiating with hostage takers and kidnappers and with political groups classified as terrorists. While this briefing does not necessarily advocate negotiating with terrorists, it outlines the practicalities of such negotiations, providing a guide to deciding how, when, and with whom to negotiate.

Officially public authorities do not negotiate with terrorists. However, governments frequently do end up negotiating with hostage takers and kidnappers and with political groups classified as terrorists. While this briefing does not necessarily advocate negotiating with terrorists, it outlines the practicalities of such negotiations, providing a guide to deciding how, when, and with whom to negotiate.

The Angolan conflict is no small war according to most criteria; lasting nearly 35 years, with a death toll exceeding half a million, it has involved the troops of four countries & the intervention of three superpowers. Four attempts have been made to negotiate an end to the conflict, but they failed & led to an even bloodier & more brutal conflict. Here, the intrastate nature & causes of the conflict are explored, examining the mediation processes at Gbadolite, Zaire, & Bicesse, Portugal. It is shown how, due to a lack of requitement & of accommodations for all parties after elections, further escalation remained a possibility even after an agreement was signed. The failure of these attempts in terms of both construct & implementation is analyzed, demonstrating how these failures have led to a direct reexamination of the conflict & redefinition of a mutually satisfactory & tenable resolution in the ongoing mediation process in Lusaka, Zambia. Adapted from the source document.