Should Courts Enforce Credit Contracts Strictly?
In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Volume 115, Issue 500, p. 166-184
ISSN: 1468-0297
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In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Volume 115, Issue 500, p. 166-184
ISSN: 1468-0297
In: The review of international organizations, Volume 15, Issue 4, p. 817-843
ISSN: 1559-744X
In: The journal of development studies, Volume 54, Issue 3, p. 481-500
ISSN: 1743-9140
World Affairs Online
In: The journal of development studies, Volume 54, Issue 3, p. 481-500
ISSN: 1743-9140
In: Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano Development Studies Working Paper No. 393
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Working paper
In: Bulletin of Economic Research, Volume 64, Issue 4, p. 509-536
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In: The B.E. journal of economic analysis & policy, Volume 11, Issue 1
ISSN: 1935-1682
Abstract
The literature on collusive cartels has mainly focused on the impact of antitrust fines on the sustainability of cartels, in infinitely repeated games. This approach, however, does not allow us to study the effect of antitrust fines on the incentives to form cartels in the first place. In this paper, we adopt a coalitional game approach to modeling collusive agreements, showing that antitrust fines may drive firms from partial cartels to a monopolistic cartel. Moreover, by introducing uncertainty on market demand, we show that the socially optimal competition policy can call for a finite or even zero antitrust penalty, even if there are no enforcement costs. We provide a sufficient condition for these results to apply to any coalitional game of cartel formation with symmetric firms. Then, we discuss the extension to asymmetric firms and dynamic collusion.
In: Bulletin of economic research, Volume 64, Issue 4, p. 509-536
ISSN: 1467-8586
ABSTRACTRecent studies indicate that the effect of migrants' remittances on the economic growth of receiving countries depends negatively on the level of development of the domestic financial sector. In this paper, we introduce a new indicator of financial development to measure the efficiency of the domestic banking system, and find the existence of complementarity between remittances and bank efficiency in economic growth, such that remittances promote growth only in countries whose banks function well. This result is robust to controls for other traditional measures of financial depth and institutional quality indicators.
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3106
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In: The Economics of Imperfect Markets; Contributions to Economics, p. 213-232
In: The B.E. journal of economic analysis & policy, Volume 7, Issue 1
ISSN: 1935-1682
Abstract
In some European countries, the liberalization of the motor insurance market in the 1990s led to substantial increases in fares and claims throughout the whole decade. In this paper we argue that these phenomena are due to the impact of liberalization on companies' optimal incentives to fight fraud. By developing a circular city competition model with a cost-reducing stage prior to the price game and a settlement stage following it, we show that price deregulation entails decreasing monitoring investments and increasing claims both in the short and long run. Even equilibrium premiums may steadily increase if the ``competition effect" connected to new entries is outweighed by a ``monitoring effect" that raises marginal costs.
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In: World development: the multi-disciplinary international journal devoted to the study and promotion of world development, Volume 40, Issue 10, p. 1944-1969
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3103
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