Suchergebnisse

AbstractDeveloping countries are often thought to be particularly exposed to the constraints of global markets. Facing scrutiny from foreign investors, why do developing-country governments enter international bond markets, especially when they can access cheaper finance from international financial institutions? I argue that borrowing governments' perception of market constraints depends on global liquidity. When bond markets are highly liquid, investors become more risk acceptant and governments perceive the political costs of borrowing to be lower, especially compared to the conditionality of concessional loans. I use data on the timing of bond issues and three case studies—Ethiopia, Ghana, and Kenya—to demonstrate that choices to issue debt were shaped by global liquidity. These findings nuance debates about how markets constrain governments, emphasizing that market constraints are conditional on systemic factors, including, global liquidity.

AbstractDoes international migration contribute to the spread of global commerce? Recent work demonstrates the relevance of international migration for patterns of investment, focusing on migrants' role in facilitating investment from their host country to their country of origin. By contrast, we investigate the potential for migrants to attract inward investment into their host country. As customers, migrants shape the composition of the market in the country where they live, such that global networks of migrants can shape investment decisions of co-national firms. Focusing on a single sector, banking, we identify the mechanisms by which international migration attracts foreign investment. First, migrants may prefer home country banks, especially if they are excluded from financial services in their host country. Second, migrants require financial institutions to send remittances to their country of origin. We test these arguments using a global sample of foreign bank ownership data and find that bilateral migrant networks are a predictor of cross-border banking investment. These findings speak to how the composition of markets affects international investment, as well as the reinforcing relationship between two features of globalization: international migration and financial integration.

Abstract
We examine the processes by which regulations prevailing in countries at the core of the global economy spread to countries outside this small group. We show how specific cross-border relationships between banks, regulators, and investors generate regulatory interdependence that drives the diffusion of international standards from the standard-setting countries at the core of the financial system to the financial periphery. We argue that regulatory decisions in the financial periphery are shaped by the prior choices of regulators in other countries, mediated through four specific cross-border relationships associated with banking globalization. We draw on a new dataset of Basel II adoption in over ninety jurisdictions in the financial periphery. Using spatial lag models we show that regulators' decisions over the adoption of international standards are shaped by the choices of regulators to whom they are connected through the cross-border operations of individual banks, international professional networks, and competition for capital. Our analysis underscores the value of parsing out the relevant actor-level linkages that connect countries: while international considerations shape regulatory decisions, what matters is not the extent to which countries are connected to the global economy but rather the nature of these connections.