Suchergebnisse

Reflexionar sobre el sistema de partidos argentinos implica dar cuenta de una configuración política fluida. Pronto a cumplirse 25 años de democracia, el artículo rastrea su evolución para trazar los principales rasgos que adopta a principios del siglo XXI, haciendo hincapié en el intento kirchnerista de reconstituir el esquema de competencia partidaria. A pesar de la dificultad de analizar situaciones inestables, las tendencias pasadas y los rasgos actuales permiten generar algunas hipótesis acerca de la probable evolución del sistema de partidos argentino.

Reflexionar sobre el sistema de partidos argentinos implica dar cuenta de una configuración política fluida. Pronto a cumplirse 25 años de democracia, el artículo rastrea su evolución para trazar los principales rasgos que adopta a principios del siglo XXI, haciendo hincapié en el intento kirchnerista de reconstituir el esquema de competencia partidaria. A pesar de la dificultad de analizar situaciones inestables, las tendencias pasadas y los rasgos actuales permiten generar algunas hipótesis acerca de la probable evolución del sistema de partidos argentino.

Presidential agenda success is usually accounted for through measures of interbranch cooperation, such as bill approval rates, participation rates, and roll-call data of support from presidential initiatives. These measures do not provide an accurate picture of presidential agenda success because they cannot capture the ability of presidents or Congress to shape the substance of legislation. To overcome this limitation, this paper proposes a combination of two measures of influence on legislative outcomes: the Legislative Input Score for partisan involvement in lawmaking, and the Barrett and Eshbaugh-Soha Scale for legislative substance. To illustrate the potential of these measures, it puts them to work in analyzing the ability of presidents to control the substance of their proposed legislation in Argentina between 1999 and 2007. Preliminary results show that when agenda success is measured with these scores, presidents can consistently shape legislative substance regardless of popularity, coalition size, and honeymoon periods. (GIGA)

Presidential agenda success is usually accounted for through measures of interbranch cooperation, such as bill approval rates, participation rates, and roll-call data of support from presidential initiatives. These measures do not provide an accurate picture of presidential agenda success because they cannot capture the ability of presidents or Congress to shape the substance of legislation. To overcome this limitation, this paper proposes a combination of two measures of influence on legislative outcomes: the Legislative Input Score for partisan involvement in lawmaking, and the Barrett and Eshbaugh-Soha Scale for legislative substance. To illustrate the potential of these measures, it puts them to work in analyzing the ability of presidents to control the substance of their proposed legislation in Argentina between 1999 and 2007. Preliminary results show that when agenda success is measured with these scores, presidents can consistently shape legislative substance regardless of popularity, coalition size, and honeymoon periods. Adapted from the source document.

¿Cómo responden los legisladores al uso de decretos legislativos por los presidentes? Este artículo pone a prueba las teorías de la usurpación, la delegación y la convergencia estratégica considerando tanto las respuestas a los decretos como sus contenidos específicos de política pública en Argentina. Los legisladores argentinos aprueban tácitamente la abrumadora mayoría de los decretos, inclusive en áreas de política pública donde tendrían incentivos para modificarlos o rechazarlos. El estudio de una de estas áreas, la política impositiva, apoya la teoría de la convergencia estratégica: la comparación del contenido de los decretos y las leyes impulsadas por legisladores indica que los presidentes elaboran aquellos buscando converger con las preferencias del Congreso en las dimensiones conflictivas de las políticas públicas. ; How do legislators respond to the use of legislative decrees by presidents? This article tests the theories of usurpation, delegation, and strategic convergence considering both the responses to decrees and their specific policy contents in Argentina. Argentinian legislators tacitly approve the overwhelming majority of decrees, even in policy areas where they would have incentives to modify or reject them. The study of one such area, tax policy, supports the theory of strategic convergence: the comparison of the contents of decrees and laws initiated by legislators indicates that presidents construct their decrees seeking to converge with congressional preferences over conflictive policy dimensions. ; Fil: Bonvecchi, Alejandro. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Cs.politica y Estudios Internacionales. Prog.de Estudios Electorales y Legislativos; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina ; Fil: Zelaznik, Javier. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales; Argentina