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Feminist theorizations have recovered the ethical and political value of shame, suggesting that shame operates not only as a mechanism of normalization and social exclusion but also as a primary affect of intersubjective life. This paper argues that this theorization can be enriched by putting into conversation Agamben's and Deleuze's interactions with Primo Levi on shame as an ambivalent affect. What is shameful, for both Deleuze and Agamben, is not simply the sense of being judged by others as unworthy, unwanted, or wrong, but rather the awareness of one's complicity in Others' suffering. This essay explores the pedagogical openings of shame as the inability of the self to respond to Others' suffering. The paper concludes by suggesting that certain experiences of shame can be transformative in that they create pedagogical possibilities that could subvert negative referents of shame. What the author terms critical pedagogies of shame pay explicit attention to the affective complexities of the narratives of oppression and suffering that enter the classroom and interrogate in particular the trappings of normative narratives of shame.

Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to revisit Spivak's seminal essay "Can the Subaltern Speak" and the perennial challenges of researchers to collect information about the Other, focusing on the recent developments in affect theory.


Design/methodology/approach
The paper brings into the conversation the recent work on affect and sentimentality by Lauren Berlant with Spivak's claims in the essay concerning the representation of the subaltern by scholars and researchers. The paper draws on Berlant's work to trouble the liberal culture of "true feeling" as well as the liberal subject implied in Spivak's essay as a subject who is "actively speaking."


Findings
Recent theoretical developments on the affect theory make an important intervention to the perennial methodological tensions about representation, ontology and epistemology – as raised by Spivak and others over the years – and inspire new ways of thinking with the tools of doing qualitative research.


Originality/value
Bringing into the conversation, the affect theory and Spivak's iconic essay have important methodological implications for qualitative research.

This is a response to Ásgeir Tryggvason's argument that the deliberative critique of the agonistic approach to citizenship education is based on a misreading of the main concepts in agonistic theory—a misreading that has important implications for any attempt to bring closer agonism and deliberation in citizenship education. My aim in this response is to offer some clarifying comments and questions and suggest some further ideas for expanding Tryggvason's analysis, highlighting in particular two perspectives that, in my view, deserve further attention in citizenship education: first, the consequences of cultivating agonistic emotions in the classroom; and, second, the possibilities and limitations of acknowledging what has been called "affective citizenship" as an important element of citizenship education. My response concludes by discussing how affective citizenship education illuminates the debate between agonists and deliberators.

In this article, I address the issue of how we can instil pedagogical practices in higher education with ethical and political significance so that the hegemonic rationalist epistemology of educational development is interrupted. To do this, I take up two recent streams of response to this challenge; one focused on care and the other on discomfort. Illustrating the tensions and possibilities that the notion of the 'ethic of care' and 'ethic of discomfort' may have in discourses of educational development is the focus of this article. In particular, the following three questions structure my discussion: What are the contributions and limits of the ethic of care in exploring issues of educational development in our contemporary globalised world? How can the scope of care and caring teaching be extended through an ethic of discomfort? Finally, what are the implications for educational development of such a reconceptualization of care on the basis of 'pedagogies of discomfort'? To approach these questions I first consider some theoretical conversations regarding caring teaching in (higher) education, pointing out the possibilities as well as some limitations. Then I discuss the reconceptualisation of caring teaching in higher education on the basis of an ethic of discomfort. Following this, I lay out some implications for educational development and teaching in higher education and answer the question of how a reconceptualised ethic of care through discomfort can contribute to reconsidering mainstream perceptions of and pedagogical practices in higher education.Keywords: ethic of care; ethic of discomfort; pedagogies of discomfort; higher education; educational development

In this article, I address the issue of how we can instil pedagogical practices in higher education with ethical and political significance so that the hegemonic rationalist epistemology of educational development is interrupted. To do this, I take up two recent streams of response to this challenge; one focused on care and the other on discomfort. Illustrating the tensions and possibilities that the notion of the 'ethic of care' and 'ethic of discomfort' may have in discourses of educational development is the focus of this article. In particular, the following three questions structure my discussion: What are the contributions and limits of the ethic of care in exploring issues of educational development in our contemporary globalised world? How can the scope of care and caring teaching be extended through an ethic of discomfort? Finally, what are the implications for educational development of such a reconceptualization of care on the basis of 'pedagogies of discomfort'? To approach these questions I first consider some theoretical conversations regarding caring teaching in (higher) education, pointing out the possibilities as well as some limitations. Then I discuss the reconceptualisation of caring teaching in higher education on the basis of an ethic of discomfort. Following this, I lay out some implications for educational development and teaching in higher education and answer the question of how a reconceptualised ethic of care through discomfort can contribute to reconsidering mainstream perceptions of and pedagogical practices in higher education.

This is a response to Ruitenberg's (2015) argument that citizenship-as-equality should be the focus of citizenship education. My aim in the response is to offer clarifying comments and questions and suggest further ideas for expanding her analysis, highlighting in particular two perspectives that deserve more attention: first, the role of emotions in the constitution of political subjectification and the practice of equality; second, the possible openings that might be created when the notion of citizenship-as-equality is utilized as a point of departure to instill more criticality in students' understandings of and feelings about citizenship.

This article seeks to revisit Gramsci"s legacy on counter-hegemony, the subaltern and affectivity, by focusing on the implications of his cutting-edge position on the role of subaltern feelings in the formation of an "emotional pedagogy" of activism in the context of higher education. Three insights follow from this analysis. First, Gramsci"s work facilitates an understanding of how affect and ideology are entangled. Second, Gramsci"s concepts of counter-hegemony, the subaltern, and the organic intellectual in relation to his views about the unity of reason and emotion offer points of departure for activism, especially small acts of everyday life that often go unnoticed. Finally, Gramsci"s concern with the emotional potential of subaltern subjects shows how important it is to consider subaltern passions as political resources that challenge hegemonic conditions and formulate strategic counter-hegemonic responses in higher education.Keywords: activism; affectivity; critical theory; emotional pedagogy; Gramsci; higher education.

AbstractThis article reflects on the absence of integrated schooling in Cyprus, trying to make sense of why this educational model seems impossible at the moment, interpret the shared education initiatives or policies that have been attempted in the recent past, and consider the potential for integrated schooling and shared education in the future. The article takes the following route. It begins by offering a brief background on the Cypriot conflict and its connections with education. This is followed by an overview of the findings of a large ethnographic study I conducted between 2008 and 2010 in two schools in which some sort of shared educational experiences had taken place. Finally, the article concludes by analysing the tensions and challenges of shared education in these schools and identifying the future prospects of integrated schooling in Cyprus.