Suchergebnisse

Chapter 1. Introduction -- Chapter 2. Rationale for Slogan Politics -- Chapter 3. Slogan of "New Type of Great Power Relations" -- Chapter 4. Slogan of "Belt and Road Initiative" -- Chapter 5. Slogan of "Community of Shared Future for Mankind" -- Chapter 6. Conclusion.

Why did the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) not follow the failure of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union? This book examines this question by studying two crucial strategies that the CCP feels it needs to implement in order to remain in power: ideological reform and the institutionalization of leadership succession.

Why did the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) not follow the failure of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union? This book examines this question by studying two crucial strategies that the CCP feels it needs to implement in order to remain in power: ideological reform and the institutionalization of leadership succession.

AbstractChina's open embracing of the age of artificial intelligence (AI) has attracted considerable academic and media attention. Many argue that China has taken advantage of its national approach to contest for AI supremacy and geopolitical dominance. The relevant analyses assume China's AI plans as being Beijing's coherent top‐down geopolitically driven national strategy, reflecting Chinese leaders' global ambitions. This article argues that these views are mistaken. It argues that China's AI plans are primarily driven by contestation and the struggle for resources among domestic stakeholders who are economically motivated and have little awareness of the bigger geopolitical picture. Instead of a top‐down command approach, China's national AI plan is an upgrade of existing local AI initiatives to the national level, reflecting a bottom‐up development. This article suggests that the existing analyses vastly exaggerate: (1) Beijing's capacity to coordinate domestic capital and actors towards a unified, specific strategic objective; and (2) the extent of China's AI advancement and its geopolitical threat, triggering unnecessary anxiety among China's near competitors.

This article studies the security politics of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in China. Using securitization as an analytical framework, it examines the official Chinese AI discourse and how AI is becoming a security matter. The article argues that the Chinese central government is securitizing AI to mobilize local states, market actors, intellectuals, and the general public. China's historical anxieties about its technology and regime security needs are conducive to the rise of a security discourse in China's AI politics, a trend also fuelled by tensions arising from great power competition. Although helpful in convincing domestic actors, this securitization trend could undermine Chinese key AI objectives by heading in an inward-looking, techno-nationalistic direction that may be seriously detrimental to China's AI industry and leadership ambitions.

China has adopted a proactive and strategic approach to embrace the age of artificial intelligence (AI). This article argues that China's bold AI practices are part of its broad and incoherent adaptation strategy to governance by digital means. AI is part of a digital technology package that the Chinese authoritarian regime has actively employed not only to improve public service, but also to strengthen its authoritarian governance. China's digital progress benefits from its huge internet market, strong state power and weak civil awareness, making it more competitive than western democratic societies where privacy concern restricts their AI development. However, China's ambitious AI plan contains considerable risks; its overall impact depends on how AI affects major sources of political legitimacy including economic growth, social stability and ideology. China's approach is gambling on its success in (a) delivering a booming AI economy, (b) ensuring a smooth social transformation towards the age of AI and (c) proving ideological superiority of its authoritarian and communist values.

China has adopted a proactive and strategic approach to embrace the age of artificial intelligence (AI). This article argues that China's bold AI practices are part of its broad and incoherent adaptation strategy to governance by digital means. AI is part of a digital technology package that the Chinese authoritarian regime has actively employed not only to improve public service, but also to strengthen its authoritarian governance. China's digital progress benefits from its huge internet market, strong state power and weak civil awareness, making it more competitive than western democratic societies where privacy concern restricts their AI development. However, China's ambitious AI plan contains considerable risks; its overall impact depends on how AI affects major sources of political legitimacy including economic growth, social stability and ideology. China's approach is gambling on its success in (a) delivering a booming AI economy, (b) ensuring a smooth social transformation towards the age of AI and (c) proving ideological superiority of its authoritarian and communist values.

AbstractThis article studies the formation process of China's belt and road initiative (BRI) – the most important Chinese foreign policy initiative under Xi Jinping. It argues that the BRI was put forward as a broad policy idea that was subsequently developed with relatively concrete content. During this process, the shifting international landscapes have gradually driven the BRI from a periphery strategy into a global initiative. By examining the case of Jiangsu Province, this article also shows how Chinese local governments have actively deployed their preferred narratives to influence and (re‐)interpret the BRI guidelines of the central government in order to advance their own interests. As a result, this produces a variety of competing, ambiguous and contradictory policy narratives of the BRI within China, which undermines the Chinese central government's monopoly on the BRI narratives. This leaves the BRI as a very vague and broad policy slogan that is subject to change and open to interpretation. In this regard, the existing analyses – that consider the BRI as Beijing's masterplan to achieve its geopolitical goals – pay insufficient attention to the BRI's domestic contestation and overstate the BRI's geopolitical implications.

This article studies the formation process of China's belt and road initiative (BRI) – the most important Chinese foreign policy initiative under Xi Jinping. It argues that the BRI was put forward as a broad policy idea that was subsequently developed with relatively concrete content. During this process, the shifting international landscapes have gradually driven the BRI from a periphery strategy into a global initiative. By examining the case of Jiangsu Province, this article also shows how Chinese local governments have actively deployed their preferred narratives to influence and (re‐)interpret the BRI guidelines of the central government in order to advance their own interests. As a result, this produces a variety of competing, ambiguous and contradictory policy narratives of the BRI within China, which undermines the Chinese central government's monopoly on the BRI narratives. This leaves the BRI as a very vague and broad policy slogan that is subject to change and open to interpretation. In this regard, the existing analyses – that consider the BRI as Beijing's masterplan to achieve its geopolitical goals – pay insufficient attention to the BRI's domestic contestation and overstate the BRI's geopolitical implications.

AbstractThe rise of China as a global power has significantly reshaped its global ambition. Under the leadership of Chinese president Xi Jinping, China has proposed a series of diplomatic initiatives – most notably 'new type of great power relations' and 'one belt one road' – in order to shift the international order in its favour. Does Europe matter in China's major initiatives under the leadership of Xi Jinping? How does Europe (and the EU) fit into China's strategic narratives? This article aims to address these questions by analyzing Chinese scholarly writings and conducting interviews in China. It also explores the evolution process of China's strategic narratives with a focus on the gradual appearances of Europe. This article argues that the EU/Europe is a second order concern for China, and Europe only plays a marginalized role in China's policy discussion. Appreciation of the internal dynamics of China is essential for Europe to develop a more accurate understanding of EU–China relations.