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"Over the last ten years, drones have become a critical tool in the war against terrorist and militant organizations worldwide. Their advantages over other weapons and intelligence systems are well known. They can silently observe an individual, group, or location for hours on end, but take immediate action should a strike opportunity become available-- all without putting a pilot at risk. This combination of capabilities is unique and has allowed the United States to decimate the leadership of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and disrupt the activities of many other militant groups. Yet, as Micah Zenko writes in this Council Special Report, drones are not without their drawbacks, especially with regard to targeted killings. Like any tool, drones are only as useful as the information guiding them, and for this they are heavily reliant on local military and intelligence cooperation. More important, significant questions exist about who constitutes a legitimate target and under what circumstances it is acceptable to strike. There is also the question of net utility: To what extent are the specific benefits derived from drone strikes offset by the reality that the strikes often alienate the local government and population? And there is the reality that drones are proliferating but, as is often the case with new technologies, the international legal and regulatory framework is lagging behind. Zenko puts forward a substantive agenda. He argues that the United States should end so-called signature strikes, which target unidentified militants based on their behavior patterns and personal networks, and limit targeted killings to a limited number of specific terrorists with transnational ambitions. He also calls Congress to improve its oversight of drone strikes and to continue restrictions on armed drone sales. Finally, he recommends that the United States work internationally to establish rules and norms governing the use of drones."--Foreword

The New START Treaty, signed by presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev in April 2010, was an important achievement. A follow-on to the 1991 START treaty, New START commits both countries to substantial reductions in their nuclear arsenals. Pending ratification, New START limits both countries to 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads, far below the Cold War peak of 31,000 strategic and tactical nuclear weapons in the United States alone. Moreover, the New START treaty furthers Obama's goal of "resetting" U.S.-Russia relations. In just the past two years, the former adversaries also finalized an agreement on plutonium disposition, imposed UN sanctions against Iran in reaction to its nuclear program, and enhanced security for non-deployed tactical nuclear weapons. Despite these signs of progress, it is unwise to be complacent. Even after the implementation of the New START Treaty, Obama's goal of a "world free of nuclear weapons" will remain elusive: the United States and Russia will still command enough nuclear weapons to annihilate each other several times over. In this report, the author argues that reducing nuclear weapons stockpiles even further than New START treaty levels -- to one thousand warheads, including tactical nuclear weapons -- would be both strategically and politically advantageous. It would decrease the risk of nuclear weapons theft and nuclear attack and increase international political support for future U.S. initiatives to reduce or control nuclear warheads, all while maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent. To achieve such a significant reduction in a follow-on to the New START treaty, the United States and Russia would need to reach agreement on three long-standing and contentious issues. Tactical nuclear weapons deployments will be the most difficult of these challenges, since Russia has a much larger arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons than does the United States and will therefore bear the brunt of the tactical nuclear weapons cuts. Missile defense is the second obstacle toward further significant nuclear reductions. Much work remains to secure Moscow's cooperation on, or acceptance of, the project. Finally, the United States and Russia must reach agreement on the use of nuclear vehicles for conventional weapons. It is difficult to overstate the potential danger if either country mistook a conventional missile for a nuclear one

Nuclear terrorism is not a post-9/11 or even post-cold war phenomenon. In fact, this review of declassified intelligence estimates spanning the past five decades reveals that the prospect of a clandestine nuclear attack on the United States—be it from the Soviet Union, China, or al Qaeda—has been a regular concern for U.S. officials since the advent of nuclear weapons. Although the estimates themselves have been a mixed bag of quiet successes and failures, this article's key findings suggest that the threat of nuclear terrorism is very real and that the U.S. government remains ill prepared to counter that treat.

Nuclear terrorism is not a post-9/11 or even post-cold war phenomenon. In fact, this review of declassified intelligence estimates spanning the past five decades reveals that the prospect of a clandestine nuclear attack on the United States -- be it from the Soviet Union, China, or al Qaeda -- has been a regular concern for U.S. officials since the advent of nuclear weapons. Although the estimates themselves have been a mixed bag of quiet successes & failures, this article's key findings suggest that the threat of nuclear terrorism is very real & that the U.S. government remains ill prepared to counter that treat. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright 2006 The American Academy of Political and Social Science.]

Nuclear terrorism is not a post-9/11 or even post-cold war phenomenon. In fact, this review of declassified intelligence estimates spanning the past five decades reveals that the prospect of a clandestine nuclear attack on the United States--be it from the Soviet Union, China, or al Qaeda--has been a regular concern for U.S. officials since the advent of nuclear weapons. Although the estimates themselves have been a mixed bag of quiet successes and failures, this article's key findings suggest that the threat of nuclear terrorism is very real and that the U.S. government remains ill prepared to counter that treat.[Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright 2006 The American Academy of Political and Social Science.]

An eye-opening look at the history of national security fear-mongering in America and how it distracts citizens from the issues that really matter What most frightens the average American? Terrorism. North Korea. Iran. But what if none of these are probable or consequential threats to America? What if the world today is safer, freer, wealthier, healthier, and better educated than ever before? What if the real dangers to Americans are noncommunicable diseases, gun violence, drug overdoses-even hospital infections? In this compelling look at what they call the "Threat†'Industrial Complex," Michael A. Cohen and Micah Zenko explain why politicians, policy analysts, academics, and journalists are misleading Americans about foreign threats and ignoring more serious national security challenges at home. Cohen and Zenko argue that we should ignore Washington's threat†'mongering and focus instead on furthering extraordinary global advances in human development and economic and political cooperation. At home, we should focus on that which actually harms us and undermines our quality of life: substandard schools and healthcare, inadequate infrastructure, gun violence, income inequality, and political paralysis