Suchergebnisse

High Wire provides a novel and comprehensive analysis of how China regulates its tech sector and more broadly governs its economy. It focuses on electronic platform regulation in three key areas: antitrust, data, and labor. It also explains how Chinese platforms regulate themselves outside of state control, and how the two modes--public and self-regulation--interact. Finally, High Wire shows how the current tech crackdown in China is shaping the country's transition from soft-tech to hard-tech and considers how China will regulate the rapidly expanding field of generative artificial intelligence.

This article examines strategic public shaming, a novel form of regulatory tactics employed by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) during its enforcement of the Anti-Monopoly Law. Based on analysis of media coverage and interview findings, the study finds that the way that the NDRC disclosed its investigation is highly strategic depending on the firm's co-operative attitude towards the investigation. Event studies further show that the NDRC's proactive disclosure resulted in significantly negative abnormal returns of the stock prices of the firm subject to the disclosure. For instance, Biostime, an infant-formula manufacturer investigated in 2013, experienced −22 per cent cumulative abnormal return in a three-day event window, resulting in a loss of market capitalization that is 27 times the antitrust fine that it ultimately received. The NDRC's strategic public shaming might therefore result in severe market sanctions that deter firms from defying the agency. (China Q/GIGA)

Common ownership by the Chinese State recently caused a stir in Europe. During its review of a joint venture involving a Chinese nuclear power company, the European Commission ("Commission") held that it would treat all Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the energy sector as a single entity. This decision carries significant legal and practical implications for both businesses and the regulator. It also contradicts the Commission's previous approach to European SOEs. In this Article, I argue that the legal framework under the E.U. Merger Regulation (EUMR) is unsuited to deal with the anticompetitive effects of state ownership. While the delineation of the boundary of an undertaking is a prerequisite for merger review, ownership and control are not absolute. Importantly, the extent to which the coordination by the Chinese State has lessened competition is a quantitative question rather than a qualitative one. Consequently, a bright-line approach to defining an undertaking is both over and underinclusive. To address the European Union's dilemma in handling Chinese SOEs, I propose that the Commission should view national security review as a complement to its merger review. The optimal regulatory response to Chinese acquisitions hinges not only on economics but also, perhaps more importantly, on politics.