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China's nuclear capability is crucial for the balance of power in East Asia and the world. As this book reveals, there have been important changes recently in China's nuclear posture: the movement from a minimum deterrence posture toward a medium nuclear power posture; the pursuit of space warfare and missile defence capabilities; and, most significantly, the omission in the 2013 Defence White Paper of any reference to the principle of No First Use. Employing the insights of structural realism, this book argues that the imperatives of an anarchic international order have been the central drive.

America's embracement of a competition posture against China has redefined their bilateral relationship and reordered the latter's strategic environment. However, how China has responded to US strategic competition has been understudied. This study seeks to fill the gap by using structural realism to gauge China's reactions. It argues that China's periodic confrontations with the United States, such as the one over Nancy Pelosi's Taiwan visit, do not define its strategy towards the United States. In fact, this strategy incorporates three components: binding, balancing, and competition. China continues to seek to bind further with the US to limit Washington's ability to shift towards a full containment posture. As the same time, China has also been pursuing bolder or new balancing and competition measures to safeguard its security and influences. While binding represents China 'hoping for the best', balancing and competition show it is 'preparing for the worst'. China's balancing and competition measures have only further intensified the strategic rivalry with the US, even though Beijing prefers as much cooperation with Washington as possible. (J Contemp China / GIGA)

Abstract
Strategic competition, or great power competition, has become a new buzz-word in international politics. Yet, few studies have undertaken any systematic examination of what caused its return to the centre stage of international relations. This study hence formulates a parsimonious structural explanation of renewed great power rivalry. Relying on the insights of neorealism and its two structural variants—defensive realism and offensive realism—the study first suggests that current definitions of strategic competition are, due to their emphasis on power competition, overly imbued with offensive realist nuances. However, security competition, which originates in the security dilemma, also underlies strategic competition. Employing neorealism's polarity perspective, this study then posits that the end of US-led unipolarity and ongoing power deconcentration in the international system are major causes of renewed great power rivalry. While unipolarity harnesses the anarchic effect and compels second-tier major powers to exercise strategic restraint, multipolarity resurrects insecurity and removes disincentives for the aggressive pursuit of power, influence, and status. Ever intensifying security competition and power competition have thus shifted international politics into a new paradigm defined by great power conflict.

Abstract
Samuel Huntington's famous prediction in 1993 of "clashes of civilisations", amid that decade's rosy expectations of "liberal peace", sparked wide criticism for its rebutting of the then-conventional wisdom of globalisation, global governance, and democratic peace that defined the so-called "liberal" international politics of the 1990s. However, events in recent decades have corroborated his stark prediction. In particular, conflicts between the West and non-Western rising powers have become a salient feature of international politics—an outcome shaped not only by differences in civilisational identity but also by power shifts that trigger civilisational clashes. In their quest to acquire influence better befitting their expanding material capabilities, rising powers seek to reorder the international system by shaping its rules and institutions according to their civilisational values and norms. This aspiration has generated conflict between non-Western rising powers and the West over ideational incompatibilities, global governance, and the reconfiguration of regional orders. The consequences of such civilisational conflict have led to escalating fragmentation, disorder, and instability in world politics.

This study dispels the common view that the Trump administration has fundamentally reoriented the United States' China policy by emphasizing strategic competition. Instead, the study argues that the Obama administration's pivot initiative began the shift of the United States' China policy from a defensive realist posture toward an offensive realist posture. The Biden administration's China policy inherits the strategic competition approach. This study suggests that the competitive logic of the anarchic international system underlies all three administrations' competition-oriented China policies. Therefore, while there are differences in the China policies of the three administrations, their commonalities and continuities are salient. Structural realism, especially offensive realism and dynamic neorealism, thus offers important insights into the future direction of Sino-US relations. (J Contemp China / GIGA)

Since Ma Ying-jeou assumed the presidency, Taiwan's relations with Mainland China have been profoundly transformed. This article uses the perspective of a grand strategy to interpret and explain Taiwan's new approach to cross-Strait relations. It suggests that Ma's government has adopted a grand strategy of accommodation that uses assurances, confidence building, and economic integration to enhance Taiwan's security. This new grand strategy has both ideational and materialist roots. The article also assesses the preliminary results of Taiwan's new security approach and its future sustainability. (J Contemp China/GIGA)

The U.S.-China military space relationship has been driven by the security dilemma in international relations. China pursues military space capabilities in part to counter perceived national security threats posed by the U.S. quest for space dominance and missile defense. However, the current strategic adjustment by the Obama administration and the altered situation at the Taiwan Strait have moderated the bilateral security dilemma, offering an opportunity for arms control in outer space.